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ABSTRACT 
Background/problem identification 
‘Gaps’, defined for the purposes of this study as ‘discontinuities’ or breakdowns in 
the sequence or continuity of care, are prevalent in health care and increase the risk 
of preventable adverse events. Research has investigated the role of nurses in 
managing risk, recovering medical errors and surveillance. The role and expertise of 
nurses in anticipating, detecting, and bridging gaps, however, have not been formally 
investigated in the cultural context of Australia. A key objective of this study was to 
redress this oversight. 
Aims 
The key aims of this study were to: 
x describe the patient care gaps that nurses commonly anticipate, detect and 
bridge; 
x provide a comprehensive explanation of how nurses anticipate, detect and 
bridge:  
- familiar gaps;  
- new and unfamiliar gaps; and 
- familiar gaps whose characteristics have changed. 
x describe the processes used by nurses to do so;  
x propose a practice model of gap management by nurses; 
x propose a hypothesis of possible linkages between gaps management and 
patient safety outcomes for further investigation. 
Research questions 
The research questions driving this study were: 
x What are the gaps that are commonly anticipated, detected and bridged by 
nurses? 
x How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge gaps that are familiar to them? 
x How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge new and unfamiliar gaps? 
x How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge familiar gaps whose 
characteristics have changed? 
x How do nurses bridge gaps once detected? 
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Method 
The study was conducted as a naturalistic inquiry using a qualitative exploratory 
descriptive approach. A purposeful sample of 71 registered nurses was recruited 
using snowballing and professional networking from emergency, critical care, 
perioperative, neurosciences, rehabilitation and transitional care settings. Data were 
collected via in-depth, semi-structured interviews using three methods: face-to-face, 
telephone, and e-mail interviewing. The purpose of the interviews was to elicit 
information about the types of gaps nurses discern and how they anticipate, detect 
and bridge these gaps. The audio-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim and 
the data analysed using content and thematic analysis strategies.  
Findings 
This study found that gaps in patient care created the opportunity for something to go 
wrong in the form of an error or adverse event. When gaps were present, patient care 
was disjointed and lacking organisation such that the normal, expected or planned 
sequence of events was delayed, disrupted or did not occur as it should. The gaps 
identified in this study and found to be familiar to nurses were failure to recognise 
and respond to the deteriorating patient; inattention to the ‘simple things’; the 
practice of taking ‘short cuts’; failure to communicate the information required to 
plan and deliver care safely; and lapses in critical thinking. The study also identified 
three gaps involving technology or equipment that were new and unfamiliar to 
nurses. These gaps were unanticipated, occurred in critical care settings, and created 
the potential for catastrophic patient harm. A close examination of the data failed to 
identify any gaps that were familiar to nurses but their characteristics had changed. 
The study found that the anticipation, identification and bridging (management) 
of gaps were based on nurses’ knowledge and experience of: where gaps occur; the 
types of gaps that occur; the things that happen, go wrong and are overlooked; the 
clinical environment; available equipment; and correct processes and procedures. 
Furthermore, nurses’ clinical knowledge and experience, intuition and higher order 
thinking abilities (critical thinking and clinical judgement) were key attributes that 
underpinned successful gaps management. The same processes were used by nurses 
to manage gaps, irrespective of whether the gaps were familiar or new and 
unfamiliar.  
The strategies used by nurses to anticipate, identify and bridge gaps were 
surveillance, teamwork and communication. Effective nursing surveillance was 
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found to be a complex process with many components: a systematic, comprehensive, 
head-to-toe and ‘hands-on’ approach to patient assessment; vigilance; observing and 
looking; checking; and making sure. Happenstance (luck) also played a part in the 
management of gaps.  
Conclusions 
Patient safety initiatives have conventionally focussed on adverse events, 
ascertaining their root causes via structured processes such as root cause analysis and 
determining what went ‘wrong’. This study has demonstrated that valuable lessons 
can also be learned from the investigation of how nurses manage gaps and ‘get it 
right’. The study provides a rich description of effective nursing surveillance and 
successful everyday nursing performance in hospital settings. The elements of 
nursing expertise and strategies captured in this study embody what has been termed 
the ‘nursing safety net’. The study has concluded that the ‘nursing safety net’ creates 
safety in hospital settings and protects patients from the harmful effects of gaps in 
health care. The management of gaps and patient safety would be further enhanced 
through efforts to promote close, attentive and thorough observation and assessment 
of patients using a careful, well organised and systematic approach.  
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GLOSSARY 
To enhance the comparability and transferability of the findings of this thesis, the 
preferred terms and definitions of the International Classification for Patient Safety 
(ICPS), proposed by the World Alliance for Patient Safety of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) have been used (Runciman et al. 2009; The World Alliance For 
Patient Safety Drafting Group et al. 2009).  
 
Adverse event: an incident that resulted in harm to a patient. 
 
Detection: an action or circumstance that results in the discovery of an 
incident. 
 
Enrolled Nurse: a nurse who works under the direction and supervision of a 
Registered Nurse as stipulated by the relevant nurse registering 
authority. The care provided by the enrolled nurse is determined 
by the registering authority’s license to practise, educational 
preparation and the context of care. 
 
Error: failure to carry out a planned action as intended or application of 
an incorrect plan. 
 
Event: something that happens to or involves a patient. 
 
Hazard: a circumstance, agent or action with the potential to cause harm. 
 
Harm: impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any 
deleterious effect arising there from. Harm includes disease, 
injury, suffering, disability and death. 
 
Health care: services received by individuals or communities to promote, 
maintain, monitor or restore health. 
 
Near miss: an incident which did not reach the patient. 
 
 xiv 
 
Patient: a person who is a recipient of health care. 
 
Patient 
outcome: 
 
the impact upon a patient which is wholly or partially attributable 
to an incident. 
 
Patient safety: a state in which the risk of unnecessary harm associated with 
health care has been reduced to an acceptable minimum. 
 
Patient safety 
incident: 
 
an event or circumstance that could have resulted, or did result, in 
unnecessary harm to a patient. 
 
Preventable: accepted by the community as avoidable in the particular set of 
circumstances. 
 
Resilience: the degree to which a system continuously prevents, detects, 
mitigates or ameliorates hazards or incidents. 
 
Registered 
Nurse 
(Division One): 
 
 
a first-level nurse who has completed an approved educational 
program of at least three years leading to nurse registration. A 
Registered Nurse practices without supervision and is accountable 
and responsible for their practice. In Australia all registered nurses 
are now educated in the university system and receive a Bachelor 
of Nursing. A number of participants in this study, however, 
completed their initial nursing education in hospital training 
programs prior to their transition to the tertiary sector in the 
1980s. 
 
Risk: the probability that an incident will occur. 
 
  
 xv 
 
Root cause 
analysis: 
 
a systematic iterative process whereby the factors that contribute 
to an incident are identified by reconstructing the sequence of 
events and repeatedly asking why, until the underlying root causes 
have been elucidated. 
 
System failure: a fault, breakdown or dysfunction within an organization’s 
operational methods, processes or infrastructure. 
 
System 
improvement: 
 
the result or outcome of the culture, processes, and structures that 
are directed towards the prevention of system failure and the 
improvement of safety and quality. 
 
Violation: deliberate deviation from an operating procedure, standard or rule. 
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AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The key aims of this study are to: 
x describe the patient care gaps that nurses commonly anticipate, detect and 
bridge; 
x provide a comprehensive explanation of how nurses anticipate, detect and 
bridge:  
- familiar gaps;  
- new and unfamiliar gaps; and 
- familiar gaps whose characteristics have changed. 
x describe the processes used by nurses to do so;  
x propose a practice model of gap management by nurses; 
x posit a hypothesis of possible linkages that exist between gaps management 
and patient safety outcomes for further investigation. 
The related objectives of the study are to: 
x describe the gaps commonly anticipated, detected and bridged by nurses; 
x describe how nurses anticipate, detect and bridge: 
- familiar gaps 
- new and unfamiliar gaps, and 
- familiar gaps whose characteristics have changed. 
x describe how nurses bridge gaps once detected; 
x describe the relationship between gaps management and patient safety 
outcomes; 
x develop base-line data that may be used to inform: 
- improvements in patient safety education and nursing practice, and 
- a multidisciplinary study of patient safety and gaps management by 
other health care professionals.   
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Look at what goes right, as well as what goes wrong. Learn from what 
succeeds as well as from what fails. Indeed, try to learn from the 
situations where nothing out of the ordinary seemed to happen, by 
understanding what actually took place. Things do not go well because 
people simply follow the procedures. Things go well because people 
make sensible adjustments according to the demands of the situation. 
Find out what these adjustments are and try to learn from them! 
(Hollnagel 2012b, p. 8). 
                                                                                                               
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background to the study, outlines the scope of the inquiry, 
identifies the aims and related objectives of the study, and lists the research questions 
the study has sought to address. Attention is also given to describing the origin of the 
study. The chapter concludes by outlining the structure of this thesis and providing a 
synopsis of each chapter.  
1.2 Background to the study 
1.2.1 Nurses inseparably linked to patient safety 
Nurses are widely recognised as being inseparably linked to patient safety and an 
indispensable ‘front line’ defence that protects patients from the harmful effects of 
health care errors and preventable adverse events (Page 2004; Savitz, Jones & 
Bernard 2005). In its position statement on patient safety, the International Council 
of Nurses (ICN)1 holds that patient safety is integral to the provision of quality 
nursing care (International Council of Nurses 2002). This stance is supported by 
other lead nursing organisations such as the Nursing and Midwifery Board of 
Australia (NMBA), formerly the Australian Nursing and Midwifery Council 
                                                 
1  The International Council of Nurses (ICN) is a federation of more than 130 national nurses 
associations, representing the more than 13 million nurses worldwide.  
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(ANMC)2. The NMBA’s Professional Practice Framework acknowledges the key 
role of nurses in identifying and preventing health care errors that contribute to 
patient harm (Nursing & Midwifery Board of Australia 2008). These organisations 
and others, including the American Nurses Association (American Nurses 
Association 2010) and ICN (International Council of Nurses 2002), draw attention to 
the need for a non-punitive, systems approach to the management of human error in 
health care settings. 
Evidence of nursing’s connection to patient safety can be traced back to 
Florence Nightingale, the founder of modern nursing science. Nightingale observed 
that mortality rates for some diseases were higher in hospital settings than in the 
community. Horrified by inadequate standards of care and appalling hospital 
conditions, she published her book Notes on Hospitals, to encourage much needed 
reform of hospital systems (Nightingale 1863). In the preface to this book, 
Nightingale holds that a hospital should ‘do the sick no harm’ (Nightingale 1863, p. 
III). While considered odd at the time, Nightingale’s message is a salient one in the 
context of current global efforts to reduce the incidence and impact of preventable 
adverse events and improve patient safety. As Nightingale (1863) writes:  
It may seem a strange principle to enunciate as the very first requirement 
in a Hospital that it should do the sick no harm. It is quite necessary, 
nevertheless, to lay down such a principle, because the actual mortality in 
hospitals, especially in those of large crowded cities, is very much higher 
than any calculation founded on the mortality of the same class of 
diseases among patients treated out of hospital would lead us to expect 
(p. III). 
In an effort to reduce the mortality associated with treatment in hospitals, 
Nightingale conducted some of the first epidemiological research, assessing and 
aggregating data that demonstrated a link between unsanitary hospital conditions and 
patient deaths. While not widely recognised, Nightingale was also one of the first 
modern health professionals to identify the advantages of a systems approach to the 
management of human error (Johnstone & Kanitsaki 2006b). In her classic book, 
                                                 
2  The Australian Nursing and Midwifery Council (ANMC) was established in 1992 as a peak 
organisation to develop a national approach to nursing and midwifery regulation. Under a new 
National Registration and Accreditation Scheme the ANMC became the Australian Nursing and 
Midwifery Accreditation Council (ANMAC) in 2010 reflecting its role as the independent accrediting 
authority. With the onset of the National Scheme, the Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia 
(NMBA) assumed responsibility for the regulation of nurses and midwives.  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
3 
 
Notes on Nursing, first published in 1859, Nightingale described her experience of 
‘fatal accidents’ that in ‘all probability’ would not have happened had there been ‘an 
organised system of attendance’ of trustworthy and qualified nurses (Nightingale 
1969, p. 40). Worthy of note is Nightingale’s use of the term ‘accident’ to describe 
unplanned and harmful events, evidence of the ‘lessons learned’ from these events, 
and her refusal to punish the individuals concerned, insisting they be ‘absolved from 
all blame’ (Nightingale 1969, p. 40). As Nightingale (1969) writes:   
If you look into the reports of trials or accidents, and especially of 
suicides, or into the medical history of fatal cases, it is almost incredible 
how often the whole thing turns upon something which has happened 
because ‘he’, or still oftener ‘she’, ‘was not there’ [...]. The person in 
charge was quite right not to be ‘there’, he was called away for quite 
sufficient reason, or he was away for a daily recurring and unavoidable 
cause; yet no provision was made to supply his absence....Upon my own 
experience I stand, and I solemnly declare that I have seen or known of 
fatal accidents, such as suicides in delirium tremens, bleedings to death, 
dying patients dragged out of bed by drunken Medical Staff Corps men, 
and many other things less patent and striking, which would not have 
happened in London civil hospitals nursed by women. The medical 
officers should be absolved from all blame in these accidents. How can a 
medical officer mount guard all day and all night over a patient (say) in 
delirium tremens? The fault lies in there being no organised system of 
attendance. Were a trustworthy man in charge of each ward, or set of 
wards, not as office clerk, but as head nurse, the thing would not, in all 
probability, have happened (p. 40). 
1.2.2 The problem of patient safety 
An adverse event is an incident arising from the process of health care that causes a 
patient harm in the form of disease, injury, suffering or disability that is physical, 
psychological or social in nature (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000; Runciman 
et al. 2009). While adverse events may be minor, resulting in temporary symptoms, 
severe adverse events are a cause of significant and permanent disability and patient 
death. Although research has suggested that as many as half of all adverse events are 
avoidable in the particular set of circumstances, not all adverse events are attributable 
to error and considered preventable (Brennan et al. 1991; Leape et al. 1991; 
Runciman et al. 2009; Wilson et al. 1995). Conversely not all health care errors result 
in adverse events and harm to patients. On this point, McNeil and colleagues (2000, 
p. vi) hold that an adverse event may be considered an ‘acceptable complication of 
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treatment’ and that determining the preventability of such an event can be a difficult 
task. An adverse drug reaction, for example, to a drug that was correctly prescribed 
and for which the patient had no history of allergy is an example of what might be 
considered an ‘acceptable complication’ (Johnstone & Kanitsaki 2006c).  
Improving patient safety by reducing the incidence and impact of preventable 
adverse events is a pressing global challenge. The scale of iatrogenic injury and 
adverse events in hospital contexts was unknown until publication of the Harvard 
Medical Practice Study (HMPS) revealed that such events occurred in 3.7 percent of 
hospitalised patients (Brennan et al. 1991; Leape et al. 1991). Extrapolation of the 
results from this epidemiological study suggested that as many as 98,000 deaths 
occurred annually in the United States alone. Further studies in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Latin America and Australia have suggested that adverse 
events occur in 4 to 16.6 percent of hospitalisations and that in as many as 50 percent 
of cases these events are preventable (Aranaz-Andrés et al. 2011; Baker, GR et al. 
2004; Thomas, Studdert, Burstin et al. 2000; Vincent, Neale & Woloshynowych 
2001; Wilson et al. 1995). 
Nearly a decade after the Harvard Medical Practice Study, in response to wide 
spread acceptance of the problem of preventable adverse events, the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) released its report, To Err Is Human (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, 
M 2000). The report is described as having: 
converted an issue of growing professional awareness to one of 
substantial public concern in a manner and pace unprecedented in modern 
experience with matters of health care quality (Leape, Berwick & Bates 
2002, p. 501).  
The immediate adoption of a resolution on patient safety at the Fifty-fifth World 
Health Assembly (WHA) in 2002 placed patient safety at the forefront of policy 
development and public debate, transforming the drive for safer health care into a 
‘world-wide endeavour’ (Donaldson, L 2002, p. 112). At this meeting preventable 
adverse events were identified as a threat to quality of care and a significant and 
avoidable cause of human suffering worldwide. Member states were urged to address 
the problem of patient safety (World Health Organisation 2002, Agenda Item 13.9).   
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The WHA resolution on patient safety set out four areas for action: 
(i) to develop global norms, standards and guidelines for quality of care and patient 
safety; the definition, measurement and reporting of adverse events and near misses 
in health care; and, to provide support in developing reporting systems, taking 
preventative action, and implementing measures to reduce risks; 
(ii) to promote framing of evidence-based policies, including global standards that will 
improve patient care, with particular emphasis on product safety, safe clinical 
practice in compliance with appropriate guidelines and safe use of medicinal 
products and medical devices; 
(iii) to promote a culture of safety within health care organisations and to develop 
mechanisms, for example, through accreditation or other means […] to recognise 
the characteristics of health care providers that offer a benchmark for excellence in 
patient safety internationally; 
(iv) to encourage research into patient safety, including epidemiological studies of risk 
factors (World Health Organisation 2002, pp. 1-2).   
The need for immediate attention to the problem of patient safety was  
underpinned by the fact that all people requiring health care have a strong moral 
interest in being safe (Johnstone & Kanitsaki 2006c). This interest is particularly 
strong in health care contexts where people are already experiencing the harmful 
effects of disease, injury or illness (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000). Patients 
enter the health care system in search of healing, comfort and protection, not 
expecting to be placed in danger or harmed during the course of their treatment 
(Johnstone & Kanitsaki 2006c). The fact that many people are needlessly harmed by 
the ‘system’ is unacceptable and not ‘right’ in a moral sense. At a very minimum the 
health care system must ensure that it will first do no harm (Kohn, Corrigan & 
Donaldson, M  2000). 
1.2.3 The systems approach to human error management 
The longstanding and dominant response to accidents in health care domains has 
been to ‘name’, ‘blame’ and ‘shame’ individuals (i.e. nurses, doctors and 
pharmacists) at the ‘sharp’ end of health care delivery where the system and human 
person interface (Reason 2000; 1995). This ‘person’ focussed, punitive approach to 
accidents holds that errors are a consequence of ‘aberrant mental processes’ such as 
forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation or carelessness (Reason 2000, p. 768). 
While blaming individuals can be emotionally satisfying, its critical shortcoming is 
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the failure to identify and address the system factors that contribute to errors (Reason 
2000). Furthermore, focussing on the failure of individuals discourages the 
development of a culture which encourages open reporting of incidents, near misses 
and ‘free lessons’ (Reason 2000, p. 769). The alternative and preferred system 
approach recognises that humans are fallible, to err is human, and that errors are to 
be expected, even in the best organisations and often from the best people (Kohn, 
Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000; Reason 2000). Accordingly, Leape, Berwick and 
Bates (2002) have argued that: 
the main thrust of the safety movement, [and] one of the most important 
learnings during the past decade is that safety is primarily a systems 
problem (p. 504). 
A crucial feature of the latent failure model, developed by Reason (1990; 2000), 
is the contribution of upstream system factors in the form of latent conditions to 
accidents. These conditions (i.e. technology, processes, practices), described as 
‘resident pathogens’, arise from the strategic decisions taken by managers, 
regulators, governments, designers and manufacturers. They can lie dormant within a 
system for long periods, encouraging errors by creating hazardous work conditions. 
Accidents occur when latent conditions combine with active failures (the errors and 
unsafe acts of individuals in direct contact with patients) to create weaknesses or 
windows of ‘accident opportunity’ in a system’s defences. Active failures have an 
immediate and direct impact on safety while latent conditions can be anticipated and 
remedied to prevent future failures (Reason 1991; 2000). 
While system defences and safe-guards (i.e. equipment, people and processes) 
are generally effective in protecting individuals from local hazards and harm, they 
inevitably contain weaknesses or ‘holes’. Reason’s (2000) well-known Swiss cheese 
model of system accidents describes how the defensive layers of a system that 
protect people from harm are like slices of Swiss cheese with many holes. In 
complex, dynamic and rapidly changing environments, such as hospitals, these holes 
or vulnerabilities are continually opening, closing and shifting their location. A 
trajectory of accident opportunity is created when the holes in many levels of a 
system are momentarily aligned (Reason 2000). The trajectory originates in the 
higher levels of a hospital system and passes through a hole or window in each 
successive defensive layer until it reaches the patient and causes harm.  
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Widespread recognition that preventable adverse events in hospital contexts are 
largely the result of upstream system factors has shifted attention away from the 
errors and failings of individuals on the front-line (Dekker et al. 2008). The system 
approach focuses on identifying the many factors that contribute to errors and 
developing system defences that discourage errors and mitigate the impact on 
patients when they do occur (Leape et al. 1995).  
1.2.4 A scientific basis for progress on patient safety 
In the years following publication of the Harvard Medical Practice Study (Brennan et 
al. 1991; Leape et al. 1991) and a similar study of adverse events in Australia (The 
Quality in Australian Health Care Study, Wilson et al. 1995) attention turned to 
research on complex systems outside health care (i.e. aviation, marine safety and 
power generation) (Cook et al. 2004; Cook, Woods & Miller 1998; Woods & Cook 
2002; 2004). In these industries, a number of highly publicised accidents3 provided 
the catalyst for research, many years before the scale of health care related 
preventable harm was fully appreciated (Cook & Woods 1994). In 1997, a workshop 
convened by three peak bodies in the United States of America (U.S.A.) (The 
National Patient Safety Foundation, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the 
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research) examined the lessons learned in these 
industries and their application to the problem of patient safety (Cook, Woods & 
Miller 1998). 
(a) Two contrasting views of patient safety 
A key theme of this workshop (Cook, Woods & Miller 1998) and other patient safety 
publications (Cook & Woods 1994; Cook et al. 2004; Cook, Render & Woods 2000; 
Hollnagel 2012a; 2012b; Patterson et al. in press; Woods & Cook 2002; 2004) is the 
presence of two contrasting views of safety. The ‘First Story’ is an account of patient 
safety based on the reconstruction of ‘celebrated’ and highly visible medical 
accidents that attracted widespread media coverage and captured the public’s 
attention (i.e. the Florida wrong leg case4, the Colorado nurses case5). The ‘Second 
                                                 
3  These include the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear power accidents; various aircraft 
crashes; the explosion of Apollo 13 and the in flight break-up of the space shuttle Challenger; the 
capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise; and the grounding of the oil tanker the Exxon Valdez. 
4 In Florida, a surgeon amputated the incorrect leg of a diabetic patient (Cook, Woods & Miller 1998). 
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Story’ presents an alternative view of safety based on closer examination of these 
and other less celebrated cases.  
(b) The ‘First Story’ 
The ‘First Story’ is a superficial and simplistic view of accidents and their causation 
based on after the event reconstruction of celebrated cases (Cook, Woods & Miller 
1998; Cook et al. 2004; Patterson et al. in press; Woods & Cook 2002; 2004). In this 
story, accidents are attributed to the errors and flaws of individuals ‘at the sharp end’ 
(Cook et al. 2004) and humans are widely regarded as an unreliable element that 
degrades an otherwise safe system (Paterson et al. in press). Efforts to forestall future 
accidents comprise classifying, measuring and reporting errors; rewriting and 
enforcing policies and procedures; educating and retraining individuals; and, the 
addition of technology and automation. There are, however, a number of weaknesses 
associated with these measures and a retrospective, simplistic approach to accidents.   
Firstly, the retrospective investigation of accidents (i.e. after harm has occurred) 
is especially susceptible to hindsight bias, the tendency for knowledge of the 
outcome to influence perceptions about the predictability of an event and the 
processes and behaviours leading to that event (Cook & Woods 1994; Cook, Woods 
& Miller 1998; Woods & Cook 2002). In fact, Cook and Woods (1994, p. 295) have 
asserted that ‘hindsight bias is the greatest obstacle to evaluating the performance of 
humans in complex systems after bad outcomes’. Secondly, attention is given only to 
what went ‘wrong’ (Hollnagel 2012a) and the most straightforward explanation for 
the accident rather than the complex range of contributing factors, both human and 
system (Cook, Woods & Miller 1998). Finally, the underlying assumptions (i.e. the 
‘fallibility’ of the human practitioner versus the ‘infallability’ of automation and 
technology) and utility of the measures described above have been challenged (Cook 
& Woods 1994; Cook et al. 2004; Nemeth et al. 2008). It is suggested that some of 
these methods add to a system’s complexity, thereby rendering it more fragile and 
prone to failure (Cook & Woods 1994; Nemeth et al. 2008).  
(c) The second story and ‘New Look’ approach to safety 
Closer examination of celebrated medical accidents reveals a deeper and more 
complex ‘Second Story’. In the Colorado nurses case, for example, a series of gaps 
                                                                                                                                          
5 In Colorado, the administration of benzathine penicillin intravenously by three nurses resulted in the 
death of a neonate (Smetzer 1998). 
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contributed to the intravenous administration of benzathine penicillin and death of a 
neonate (Cook, Render & Woods 2000). Nonetheless, in industries outside health 
care it is the rigorous investigation of uncelebrated cases that has been particularly 
instructive in revealing a contrasting approach to safety (Cook, Woods & Miller 
1998; Cook et al. 2004; Patterson et al. in press; Cook & Woods 1994; Woods & 
Cook 2002; 2004). An important finding of this research is that efforts to improve 
safety by defining, measuring and reducing the incidence of human error are ‘neither 
the first step nor a useful step, but only a dead end’ (Woods & Cook 2004, p. 96). 
Furthermore, focussing on human error constrains efforts to understand the complex 
nature of failure and the contribution of humans to failure and success (Cook & 
Woods 1994). The alternative and somewhat counterintuitive approach, based on 
research, draws attention to a deeper understanding of technical work as it is 
performed at the sharp end.   
The body of research underpinning this approach is known as the ‘New Look’6 
(Cook, Woods & Miller 1998). Informed by a range of disciplines (i.e. human 
performance, cognitive science, cognitive engineering and organisational theory) it 
includes studies of accidents, near-accidents (i.e. instances where harm was averted) 
and the behaviours of humans as they work in naturally complex settings (Woods & 
Cook 2004). The distinguishing features of the ‘New Look’ approach include its 
focus on (i) understanding sources of safety as well as threats to safety; (ii) human 
performance, as distinct from human error; and (iii) the contribution of human 
performance and other factors not only to failure but also to success (Cook, Woods & 
Miller 1998). This approach has yielded critical insights into the nature of system 
vulnerabilities in complex systems; the ways in which humans identify and respond 
to these vulnerabilities, contributing to success and failure; and the close relationship 
between success and failure. Woods and Cook (2004, p.106) contend that the 
compelling message from the ‘New Look’ body of research is that failures represent 
‘breakdowns in [the] adaptations’ used by health care providers to manage 
complexity.   
                                                 
6 Cook, Woods and Miller (1998) make reference to the work of Jens Rasmussen (1986; 1990a; 
1990b; 1994; 1999); Erik Hollnagel (1983; 1993; 1998; 1999); James Reason (1997) and Woods et al. 
(1994).  
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(d) Human factors 
‘Human factors’ as a science and as a discipline can be traced back to the Second 
World War and the investigation of human errors (Bogner 1994; Dekker 2005; 
Morath & Turnball 2005). Early work in this field identified, for example, that the 
location and appearance of aircraft controls were a factor in pilot’s selecting the 
wrong control (Dekker 2005). Concerned with understanding the interaction between 
human persons and the elements that comprise a given system (Carthey 2013), 
research in this area aimed to maximise human and system performance, safety, 
health and satisfaction by informing system designs that reflected ‘a well-established 
understanding of human abilities, traits and variability’ (Catchpole & McCulloch 
2010, p. 618).  
Human factors research draws on a range of disciplines (i.e. psychology, 
anatomy, physiology, engineering, design) and has a particular focus on complex, 
socio-technical systems. In the decades following the Second World War, further 
conceptualisations of human factors were developed and applied in a range of 
hazardous industries and technologies (e.g., transportation, nuclear power 
generation).  It was not until the late 1980s, however, that these concepts were 
identified as also having relevance in health care domains (Reason 1995). In the 
context of health care, human factors has been defined as:  
Enhancing clinical performance through an understanding of the effects 
of teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace, culture, organization on 
human behaviour and abilities, and application of that knowledge in 
clinical settings (Catchpole 2011). 
Interest in human factors research and its possible application in health care 
followed increasing recognition of the scale of preventable adverse events in health 
care (Reason 1995; 2000). In recent years, there has been growing awareness of the 
need to integrate human factors into the design and development of ‘safer’ health 
care systems, processes and tasks (Carthey 2013). Key human factors concepts 
recognised as being important to health care and patient safety included 
organisational culture, leadership, communication, teamwork, situation awareness, 
decision making, stress, fatigue and the work environment (WHO 2009). 
Commensurate with these concepts tools have been developed to increase 
understanding of them and to guide the implementation, measurement and training of 
safety processes in health care settings (Carthey 2013; WHO 2009). An example of a 
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commonly advocated and widely used tool to reduce human factors variables in 
health care practice is SBAR (situation-background-assessment-recommendation) 
(Beckett & Kipnis 2009; Porteous et al. 2009). The SBAR tool provides a framework 
for clear and effective communication between health care providers and has been 
shown to reduce variation in handover practices (Beckett & Kipnis 2009; Porteous et 
al. 2009). 
(e) Resilience Engineering 
The term resilience has been used in a range of contexts, including ecology, 
metallurgy, psychology, supply chain management, strategic management and safety 
engineering (Bhamra, Dani & Burnard 2011). In recent years Resilience Engineering, 
a human factors concept, has emerged as a new way of approaching safety in 
complex systems (Dekker et al. 2008; Hollnagel et al. 2011; Hollnagel, Woods & 
Leveson 2006; Nemeth et al. 2008). Commonly, resilience refers to an element or 
system’s ability to return to a stable state in the presence of discontinuities and 
disruption (Bhamra, Dani & Burnard 2011). From a system perspective, resilience is 
a measure of a system’s ability to maintain continuity and smooth operations in the 
presence of gaps and complexity (Nemeth et al. 2008). Thus, resilience has been 
defined as: 
the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, 
or following changes and disturbances so that it can sustain required 
operations, even after a major mishap or in the presence of continuous 
stress (Nemeth et al. 2008, p. 1). 
Resilience Engineering represents a move away from traditional, retrospective 
approaches to safety management which have generally focussed on ‘reducing the 
number of things that go wrong’ (Hollnagel 2011, p. xxxvi). In contradistinction to 
these approaches, Resilience Engineering is not linked to the notion of error and the 
‘negatives’ but is concerned with ‘the positive capabilities of people and 
organisations that allow them to adapt effectively and safely under pressure’ (Dekker 
et al. 2008, p. 3). In short, its main aim is to ‘increase the number of things that go 
right’ (Hollnagel 2011, p. xxxvi). Specifically, this new paradigm is concerned with 
a deeper understanding of:  
how success is obtained – how people learn and adapt to create safety in a 
world fraught with gaps, hazards, trade-offs, and multiple goals (Woods 
& Hollnagel 2006, p. 3).  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
12 
 
Westrum (2006) explains that resilience comprises different modes including the 
ability to (i) foresee and prevent bad things from happening; (ii) cope with instances 
of failure by preventing their evolution into something more serious or catastrophic; 
and (iii) recover and return to normal operations in the aftermath of failure. Woods 
(2006, p. 21) contends that the notion of resilience should encompass consideration 
of how a system adapts to ‘unanticipated variability or perturbations’ beyond its 
normal adaptive capacity. Hollnagel (2011, p. xxxvii) proposes ‘four cornerstones’ of 
system resilience, namely: 
(i) ‘Knowing what to do’ - being able to respond to foreseen and unforeseen 
interruptions and disturbances; the ability to respond to the actual. 
(ii) ‘Knowing what to look for’ - knowing ‘how to monitor that which is or 
can become a threat in the near term’; the ability to respond to the 
critical. 
(iii)‘Knowing what to expect’ - knowing ‘how to anticipate developments, 
threats, and opportunities’; the ability to respond to the potential. 
(iv) ‘Knowing what has happened’ - being able to learn from success and 
failure; the ability to respond to the factual. 
A key reason for the emergence of Resilience Engineering as an alternative 
theoretical construct is the evolution of complex socio-technical and largely 
intractable systems such as health care organisations (Hollnagel 2011). A key 
argument advanced by Hollnagel (2011) is that restricting the variability of human 
performance in these intractable systems is neither useful nor possible. In 
contradistinction to traditional conceptualisations of safety and error, resilience 
engineering holds that performance variability is an asset and essential for the 
successful functioning of complex, intractable systems (Hollnagel 2011).  
(f) Humans as active creators of safety 
Humans, in their key role as ‘active creators of safety’ (Cook, Woods & Miller 1998, 
p.13), are a source of resilience and integral to the successful functioning of complex 
systems such as hospital settings, ensuring that the scale of actual failures is vastly 
outweighed by the opportunities for failure (Cook et al. 2004; Cook & Woods 1994). 
Woods and Cook (2004, p. 104) contend that ‘progress on patient safety ultimately 
comes from helping workers and managers create safety’. As Cook and Woods 
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(1994) explain, humans are pivotal to the successful functioning of health care 
settings: 
the systems are so complex and are operated under such variable 
conditions that only human operators can be expected to have the 
flexibility and judgment necessary to control them (p. 289). 
Van der Schaaf (1995, p. 1236) underscores the indispensable role of humans in 
complex systems, arguing they are the ‘strongest link in the chain’. The inherent 
creativity and flexibility that is unique to humans allows them to recognise and solve 
new problems before accidents occur. Moreover, positive deviations in human 
behaviour that preserve safety and maintain reliability are worthy of investigation, 
providing valuable qualitative insights into how a system functions (Van der Schaaf 
1995). Writing from the context of the chemical process industry, Van der Schaaf 
(1995, p. 1236), proposes that human recovery, the ‘ability to find (intuitively) 
original solutions to unexpected problems’, is deserving of our attention and 
especially important given that preventing human error is a difficult task.  
Human recovery is defined as (i) the timely detection of abnormal warning 
signs, (ii) the correct diagnosis of their cause, and (iii) the timely and accurate 
execution of corrective action (van der Schaaf 1995, p. 1236). The investigation of 
human recovery can enhance understanding of the system defences that protect 
patients from preventable adverse events (Reason 1990; van der Schaaf 1995). 
Reason (2000, p. 770; 2008) concurs, noting that timely human adjustments and 
‘human variability in the shape of compensations and adaptations to changing 
events’ are one of the most important safeguards of high reliability systems. On this 
point, Hollnagel (2012b) highlights the need to identify and learn from the ‘sensible 
adjustments’ that comprise successful performance, he suggests: 
Things do not go well because people simply follow the procedures. 
Things go well because people make sensible adjustments according to 
the demands of the situation. Find out what these adjustments are and try 
to learn from them! (p. 8). 
(g) The need to investigate ‘what goes right’ 
Safety has been characterised as a dynamic non-event that is largely invisible (Weick 
1987). The dominant focus in safety management has, nonetheless, been the absence 
of safety which is highly visible and easily recognisable (Hollnagel 2011; Reason 
1991; 2008). The ‘new look’ body of research challenges assumptions about the 
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nature of safety and the causes of failures, revealing that, in complex systems, 
success and failure are closely related and a function of the same processes 
(Rasmussen 1985; Woods & Cook 2004). Accordingly, Woods and Cook (2002) 
argue that research of successful performance in the presence of constraints and 
pressures provides a deeper understanding of failure:  
Failures occur in situations that usually produce successful outcomes. In 
most cases, the system produces success despite opportunities to fail. To 
understand failure requires understanding how practitioners usually 
achieve success in the face of demand, difficulties, pressures and 
dilemmas (p.139). 
From a Resilience Engineering perspective, safety is ‘the sum of the accidents 
that do not occur’ (Hollnagel 2006, p. 9). Safety is ‘dynamically emergent’ and 
created by the system (Dekker et al. 2008). Within this paradigm, safety has been 
defined as ‘the ability to succeed under varying conditions’ and is thus considered 
the ‘flipside’ of failure (Hollnagel 2011, p. xxix). Hollnagel (2011, p. xxix) argues, 
therefore, that the investigation of how a system generally functions is both 
‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’ for understanding failure and how a system succeeds 
under varying conditions. Recently, Hollnagel (2012b) has expressed concern at the 
imbalance between proactive and reactive approaches to safety management in 
health care contexts. A key argument advanced by Hollnagel (2012a; 2012b) is that 
safety management has focussed overly on ‘what goes wrong’ (i.e. how the system 
fails) rather than on ‘what goes right’. He suggests that, in part, this is related to 
definitions of safety (i.e. the tendency to define safety in terms of its absence, in the 
form of adverse outcomes, hazards, accidents), regulatory frameworks that mandate 
the reporting of accidents, and media reports, data collection efforts and publications 
that have, as their focus, what went ‘wrong’. Hollnagel (2012a, p. 2) has concluded 
that ‘an unintended but unavoidable consequence of associating failure with things 
that go wrong is a creeping lack of attention to things that go right’.  
Hollnagel (2012b, p. 3) contends that safety management requires a proactive 
approach that investigates ‘how everyday performance usually goes well rather than 
on why it occasionally fails’. Van der Schaaf (1995) similarly argues that important 
safety lessons can be learned from the investigation of positive outcomes. A key 
benefit of turning attention away from what has gone ‘wrong’ to what has gone 
‘right’ is the vast array of data that is readily accessible for analysis (Hollnagel 
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2012a). Hollnagel (2012b) adds that efforts to improve safety must focus on learning 
from what succeeds as well as what fails:  
Look at what goes right, as well as what goes wrong. Learn from what 
succeeds as well as from what fails. Indeed, try to learn from the 
situations where nothing out of the ordinary seemed to happen, by 
understanding what actually took place (p. 8). 
Reason (2008 p. 3) contends that the role of humans in averting harm and 
bringing ‘troubled systems back from the brink of disaster’ is an under-investigated 
perspective in patient safety research. This study attempts to redress the imbalance 
between proactive and reactive approaches to patient safety by investigating how 
nurses get it ‘right’ by anticipating, detecting and bridging gaps.  
1.2.5 Gaps 
Gaps have been described as ‘discontinuities’ or ‘breakdowns’ in the continuity of 
care that appear as losses of information, momentum or interruptions in health care 
delivery (Cook, Render & Woods 2000). In health care, the combination of 
processes, technology and human interaction produce many gaps between providers, 
stages and processes. In hospital contexts, gaps are endemic (Nemeth, Cook & 
Woods 2004), spawned by the complex nature of patient care and the intricate 
network of individuals, professions, departments and shifts of work that provide care 
over a twenty four hour period (Krogstad, Hofoss & Hjortdahl 2002). Research has 
revealed that the complex nature of nursing work also contributes to gaps in patient 
care (Ebright et al. 2003). Furthermore, measures to improve safety through the 
addition of technology (i.e. bar code medication administration and electronic 
medication prescribing systems) and strengthening of system defences (i.e. the 
practice of pharmacists routinely screening medication orders for errors) may create 
new and unintended gaps and opportunities for error (Jeffs et al. 2012; Nemeth et al. 
2008; Patterson et al. in press; Westbrook et al. 2013). 
Gaps often occur at ‘fracture points’ in patient care such as change of shift or 
health care provider or when a patient transfers to another unit or organisation 
(Patterson et al. in press). Tools such as transfer forms, clinical handover and other 
forms of communication have been designed to forestall the adverse consequences of 
these types of gaps. While some gaps are readily identifiable, others that are less 
discernible may emerge within the processes of patient care and with single 
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practitioners (Cook, Render & Woods 2000). In critical care settings, for example, 
gaps may occur when patient care needs are perceived as being non-urgent (i.e. 
nutrition, interventions to prevent pressure ulcers) and receive less attention (Benner, 
Hooper-Kyriakidis & Stannard 1999). From the patient’s perspective, gaps result in 
loss of continuity, regularity and the normal sequence in their experience of health 
care.  
While gaps increase the risk of preventable adverse events, they rarely lead to 
‘overt failure’ relative to hospital admissions and increasing patient morbidity (Cook, 
Render & Woods 2000). A key reason for this is that providers, including nurses, are 
generally successful at anticipating, detecting and bridging gaps (Cook, Render & 
Woods 2000). To bridge a gap is to take some form of remedial action to span the 
gap and re-establish the continuity and sequence of patient care so that it can proceed 
smoothly. Although bridging a gap averts any harmful consequences for patients it 
does not eliminate the gap (Cook, Render & Woods 2000). 
According to the ‘New Look’ approach to patient safety, accidents are the result 
of a breakdown in the methods normally used by health care providers to 
successfully manage complexity and gaps (Cook, Render & Woods 2000; Patterson 
et al. in press). Accordingly, Cook, Render and Woods (2000) argue that safety 
might be increased by understanding and reinforcing the ability of health care 
providers to manage gaps in patient care. Furthermore, the investigation of gaps and 
their management is a way of characterising complexity and how health care 
providers cope with complexity (Cook, Render & Woods 2000; Patterson et al. in 
press). Cook, Render and Woods (2000) suggest that effective management of gaps 
requires: 
(i) knowledge of the conditions and situations that point to the presence of gaps;  
(ii) awareness of the types of gaps that are likely to occur;  
(iii) the ability to detect the existence or presence of gaps;  
(iv) techniques to bridge gaps;  
(v) the capacity to anticipate, foresee or realise beforehand, the gaps that may occur in 
the future (p. 793).  
Integrating patient care to prevent gaps and bridging gaps when they do occur 
have been identified as key nursing roles that improve patient safety outcomes (Page 
2004). Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis and Stannard (1999, p. 430) suggest that nurses 
‘piece together the continuity and tapestry of care’ and prevent patient harm by 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
17 
 
‘bridging, filling in, and coordinating’ the efforts of other health care professionals. 
The detection and management of gaps is a hallmark of clinical leadership. As 
Benner and colleagues (1999) explain: 
Clinical leaders commonly recognise gaps in patient care, manoeuvre 
within the system to affect a response, and additionally coach and teach 
others about how to bridge the gaps (p. 491).  
An electronic search of the health care literature revealed that Cook, Render and 
Woods’ (2000) article Gaps in the continuity of care and progress on patient safety 
has been extensively cited and that numerous studies have focussed on health care 
gaps that increase the risk of adverse events (i.e. clinical handover, teamwork, 
communication, and failure-to-rescue). However, this search also revealed a dearth 
of exploratory research on identifying and describing the types of gaps that nurses 
encounter in clinical contexts and how they anticipate, detect and bridge gaps to keep 
patients safe. One notable exception to this is a study by Ross and colleagues (2012) 
who investigated how the care of hospitalised patients with diabetes was normally 
accomplished. The study identified many gaps in patient care, including the referral 
of patients for specialist diabetes care; hospital processes (i.e. the availability of 
meals for optimal glycaemic control); the availability of specialists; and the transfer 
of information between the hospital setting and providers in the community. 
Importantly, diabetes specialist nurses, amongst others, played a pivotal role in 
bridging gaps by anticipating and responding to problems; proactively monitoring 
patients; and supporting and educating staff and patients (Ross et al. 2012).  
How nurses anticipate, detect and bridge gaps and ensure the safe passage of 
patients through an acute hospitalisation has not been comprehensively investigated 
in Australia. An important aim of this study is to redress this oversight. The 
investigation of how nurses successfully cope with gaps can deepen understanding of 
how front line care workers cope with complexity along with the system and 
individual characteristics that create safety.  
1.2.6 The skilful safety work performed by nurses 
The incidence of preventable adverse events in health care contexts is a complex 
problem for which there is no single solution (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M  
2000). Safety emerges from the combined effect of many small changes, particularly 
solutions generated by ‘people on the ground’ (i.e. front line clinicians) in response 
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to problems they encounter in their environments (Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality 2012b; Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000).  
While nurses are widely recognised as playing a key role in the protection of 
patients from harm, most of the skilful safety work undertaken by nurses, including 
the management of gaps, recovery of medical errors and prevention of adverse 
events, is intimately woven into other technical work and thus often difficult to 
recognise as a discrete and separate activity (Cook, Render & Woods 2000; Jeffs, 
Affonso & MacMillan 2008; Rothschild et al. 2006). This work is, in other words, 
‘embedded’ in practice, considered routine, and lacking articulation and investigation 
(Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis & Stannard 1999; Griffiths et al. 2008; Hurley et al. 
2008; Jeffs, Affonso & MacMillan 2008; Rothschild et al. 2006). It is not 
consistently recognised or valued by nurses and non-nurses alike nor is it easily 
discerned from patient records. Furthermore, data collection efforts, incident 
reporting systems and root cause analyses are often focussed on ‘safety failure’ 
rather than instances where harm was averted and patient safety was preserved 
(Clarke 2004). Clarke (2004) contends that good patient outcomes are often 
attributed to medical care or the patient rather than the skills, knowledge and 
judgement of nurses. Accordingly, Groves, Finfgeld-Connett and Wakefield (2012, 
p. 2) argue that research is needed, firstly, to explicitly investigate the role of nurses 
in ‘creating safety’ and, secondly, to generate ‘bed-side level description’ of how 
this occurs.   
A key aim of this study is to bridge this gap in knowledge of embedded nursing 
practice and develop a rich description of the skilful nursing work that is crucial to 
the management of gaps and creation of safety in hospital settings.  
1.2.7 Key studies of how nurses protect patients from harm 
Even though nurses are uniquely positioned to prevent adverse events, how they do 
this and contribute positively to patient safety outcomes is not well understood 
(Despins, Scott-Cawiezell & Rouder 2010; Groves, Finfgeld-Connett & Wakefield 
2012; Henneman, EA & Gawlinski 2004). While the nursing management of gaps 
has been largely overlooked, a small emerging body of literature is capturing how 
nurses keep patients safe through the management of risk (Groves, Finfgeld-Connett 
& Wakefield 2012), recovery of medical errors (Henneman, EA & Gawlinski 2004; 
Henneman, EA et al. 2006; Henneman, EA et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 2008) and 
process of surveillance (Schmidt 2010). It should be noted that each of these studies 
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has been conducted in the cultural context of the U.S.A. and thus caution should be 
taken in applying the findings to other cultural contexts. Despite this limitation there 
are lessons to be learned that are applicable to other contexts, as this thesis will show. 
Early work in this area proposed a model of the nurses’ role in error recovery 
and near-miss situations using hypothetical case studies (Henneman, EA & 
Gawlinski 2004). A key feature of the model developed by Henneman and Gawlinski 
(2004) is the concept of ‘human recovery’: the ability of humans to identify, interrupt 
and correct an error and in so doing prevent it from reaching and harming the patient. 
The model is an adaptation of the Eindhoven model (van der Schaaf 1992) developed 
for the investigation of near miss situations in the chemical process industry and later 
revised for application in transfusion therapy.  
Further studies have investigated how nurses recover errors in emergency 
department (Henneman, EA et al. 2006), critical care (Henneman, EA et al. 2010) 
and coronary care settings (Hurley et al. 2008). Each of these studies included a 
sample of 18-20 nurses from a single clinical specialty (i.e. emergency, critical care 
or coronary care). Henneman and colleagues (2006; 2010) used focus group 
interviews to elicit information about how nurses identify, interrupt and recover 
errors while Hurley and colleagues (2008) conducted semi-structured interviews to 
explore nurses’ recent experience of protecting a patient from harm (i.e. thoughts, 
interpersonal processes and actions). The processes of error recovery identified in 
each of these studies are summarised in Table 1.1 (page 21 of this thesis). 
Surveillance, vigilance, double checking and knowledge (i.e. experiential and of the 
patient, the plan of care, other team members, policies and procedures, what needed 
to be done) are recurring themes in these studies.  
Henneman and colleagues (2006; 2010) concluded that the findings of the ED 
and critical care studies provided empirical support for the Eindhoven model. Hurley 
and colleagues (2008) found, however, that the Eindhoven model did not adequately 
explain the experience of coronary care nurses in protecting a patient from harm. 
Hurley and colleagues (2008) proposed instead a three-stage model of error recovery 
that included the circumstances or events that preceded error recovery (antecedents); 
the recovery process itself; and, the outcome and nurses’ feelings about the process. 
The key antecedents of error recovery were the evolving clinical situation, the 
nurses’ knowledge of the patient and the nurses’ own clinical expertise. In a number 
of cases, the processes of identifying, interrupting and recovering errors ‘occurred so 
rapidly they were nearly indistinguishable’ (Hurley et al. 2008, p. 223).   
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A classical grounded theory study of how nurses ‘watch over’ their patients is 
one of the few studies to investigate the process of nursing surveillance and generate 
‘bed-side’ data about this process (Schmidt 2010). Data were collected via semi-
structured interviews with fifteen nurses who worked in medical surgical and critical 
care units. The study found that ‘making sure’ was the basic social process used by 
nurses to ‘watch over’ their patients. The key components of surveillance included 
knowing what was happening with each patient; being close to the bedside; watching 
patients through direct and close observation; remaining alert; and not taking 
anything for granted. Of note, the themes of knowing and vigilance, identified by 
Schmidt (2010), are also evident in the studies of error recovery summarised in Table 
1.1 and a study of how nurses manage risk (Groves, Finfgeld-Connett & Wakefield 
2012).  
Groves, Finfgeld-Connett and Wakefield (2012) also used a grounded theory 
method to investigate the process by which nurses keep patients safe. The study was 
conducted in a single hospital setting with a sample of twelve registered nurses who 
worked in medical and surgical units. Strategies used by nurses to assess risk 
included ‘getting the big picture’, gathering and synthesising patient data from 
multiple sources and, as mentioned, ‘knowing the patient’, while ‘knowing normal’ 
and the ‘reluctance to normalise’ were the key to recognising risk (Groves, Finfgeld-
Connett and Wakefield 2012. p. 9). Nurses also revealed that prioritising patient care 
was an important aspect of maintaining patient safety. 
To date, key studies of how nurses keep patients safe have focussed on the 
nursing management of risk, recovery of medical errors, and process of surveillance 
(Groves, Finfgeld-Connett & Wakefield 2012; Henneman, EA et al. 2006; 
Henneman, EA & Gawlinski 2004; Henneman, EA et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 2008; 
Schmidt 2010), while the nursing managment of gaps has been largely overlooked. 
Furthermore, these studies have all been conducted in the cultural context of the 
U.S.A. and with small samples (i.e. between 12 and 20 participants), thereby limiting 
the transferability of the findings to other cultural contexts outside the U.S.A. In 
three studies the samples consisted of nurses from one clinical specialty (i.e. 
emergency department, critical care or coronary care) (Henneman, EA et al. 2006; 
Henneman, EA et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 2008), while in two the participants were 
recruited from a single hospital (Groves, Finfgeld-Connett & Wakefield 2012; 
Henneman, EA et al. 2006). These studies have included nurses from emergency, 
critical care, medical, surgical, and emergency contexts. Even so, little attention has 
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been given to how nurses keep patients safe in other domains (i.e. perioperative, 
neurosciences and rehabilitation and transition care) and across multiple hospital 
sites. These remain important areas for future inquiry. 
 
Table 1.1 Summary of the processes used by nurses to identify, interrupt and correct errors 
in studies conducted by Henneman, EA et al. (2006), Hurley et al. (2008) & Henneman, EA 
et al. (2010) 
 
 
Emergency department (Henneman, EA et al. 2006) 
 
 
Identification of error Interruption of error Correction of error 
Surveillance 
Anticipation 
Double checking 
Awareness of the ‘big picture’ 
Experiential ‘knowing’ 
Patient advocacy 
Offer of assistance 
Clarification 
Verbal interruption 
Creation of delay 
 
Assemble the team 
Involve leadership 
   
Coronary care unit (Hurley et al. 2008) 
 
 
Identification of error Interruption of error Correction of error 
Critical thinking 
Being ‘at the ready’ and 
prepared 
Surveillance-vigilance  
Anticipating outcomes and 
consequences 
Apply clinical judgement 
Be the clinical expert 
Knows what should be done 
 
Knowing how to intervene 
Being the patient’s voice 
Providing patient or family 
perspective 
Nurse/physician 
communication 
Advocating 
Attending the whole person 
Protecting and safe guarding 
the patient 
 
   
Critical care unit (Henneman, EA et al. 2010) 
 
 
Identification of error Interruption of error Correction of error 
Knowing the patient 
Knowing the players (other 
team members) 
Knowing the plan of care 
Surveillance 
Knowing policies & procedures 
Double checking 
Using systematic processes 
Questioning 
 
Offering assistance 
Clarifying 
Verbally interrupting 
Persevering 
Being physically present 
Reviewing or confirming the 
plan of care 
Offering options 
Referring to standards or 
experts 
Involving another nurse or 
physician 
 
1.3 Origin of the project  
As a neuroscience nurse with extensive experience in multiple clinical and cultural 
contexts I have been at the forefront of detecting changes in the neurological status 
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of patients and responding to protect them from harm. My experience as a clinical 
nurse specialist, nurse educator and case manager in acute neuroscience settings in 
Australia and the U.S.A. has long prompted my interest in the work done by nurses 
to prevent adverse events and keep patients safe. As a case manager I managed the 
gaps spawned by the complex needs of neuroscience patients and the involvement of 
many disciplines in their daily care. I also began to consider which care processes 
were most conducive to providing high quality and safe patient care, and how 
existing care processes might be redesigned to provide neuroscience patients and 
their families with integrated, seamless care across settings, clinicians and time. The 
focus of this present PhD inquiry fits with my strong interest in the relationship 
between nursing, safety and quality at the ‘sharp’ end of health care delivery.  
1.4 Scope of the study 
This study has as its focus the relationship between patient safety and the nursing 
management of gaps. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, the Methodology and 
Method chapter of this thesis, the study has been conducted as a naturalistic inquiry 
using the qualitative exploratory descriptive method. Nurses who worked in a variety 
of clinical settings were interviewed, including (i) rapidly changing, very acute and 
highly unpredictable settings such as emergency, critical care and perioperative units 
and (ii) less rapidly changing, less acute and more predictable settings such as 
neuroscience, rehabilitation and transitional care units.  
1.5 Research aims 
The key aims of this study are to: 
x describe the patient care gaps that nurses commonly anticipate, detect and 
bridge; 
x provide a comprehensive explanation of how nurses anticipate, detect and 
bridge:  
- familiar gaps;  
- new and unfamiliar gaps; and 
- familiar gaps whose characteristics have changed. 
x describe the processes used by nurses to do so;  
x propose a practice model of gap management by nurses; 
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x propose a hypothesis of possible linkages between gaps management and 
patient safety outcomes for further investigation. 
The related objectives of the study are to: 
x describe the gaps commonly anticipated, detected and bridged by nurses; 
x describe how nurses anticipate, detect and bridge: 
- familiar gaps 
- new and unfamiliar gaps, and 
- familiar gaps whose characteristics have changed. 
x describe how nurses bridge gaps once detected; 
x describe the relationship between gaps management and patient safety 
outcomes; 
x develop base-line data that may be used to inform: 
- improvements in patient safety education and nursing practice, and 
- a multidisciplinary study of patient safety and gaps management by 
other health care professionals. 
1.6 Research questions 
The research questions driving this study are: 
x What are the gaps that are commonly anticipated, detected and bridged by 
nurses? 
x How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge gaps that are familiar to them? 
x How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge new and unfamiliar gaps? 
x How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge familiar gaps whose 
characteristics have changed? 
x How do nurses bridge gaps once detected? 
1.7 Synopsis of chapters 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two 
provides a review of the literature that informed the formulation of the aims, 
objectives and research questions guiding this inquiry. Chapter three provides an 
overview of the naturalistic inquiry paradigm and the qualitative exploratory 
descriptive (QED) research method selected for this study. In this chapter, attention 
is given to the philosophic assumptions underpinning naturalistic inquiry and the 
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QED method; the setting for the study; the steps taken to advance the study, 
including the sample; data collection and analysis; presentation and dissemination of 
the research findings; and the processes used for ensuring research rigour and the 
credibility of the research findings. The ethics approval process and the strengths and 
limitations of the study are also considered. Chapter four has as its focus the 
presentation and analysis of the data. In chapter five, the findings of the study are 
discussed in the light of presenting new insights with regard to participants’ 
experience of gaps, the management of these gaps and the implications for patient 
safety. In chapter six, the final chapter of this thesis, conclusions are drawn and 
recommendations are made in regard to the ‘practical action’ needed to enhance the 
role of nurses in managing gaps and creating safety. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the literature that informed the formulation of the 
aims, objectives and research questions guiding this inquiry. Attention is given to 
key studies of adverse events in hospital contexts, the role of human error in these 
events, and the evolution of the patient safety movement both in Australia and 
internationally. Consideration is given to the systems approach to human error 
management and the processes used by nurses to identify and respond to threats to 
patient safety. Similarly, studies of gaps are examined and the concepts of 
complexity, reliability and resilience are considered.  
2.2 Method 
Systematic methods were used to gather and evaluate relevant documentation for this 
literature review. A range of databases were searched for published articles on 
patient safety, continuity of care and nursing. The databases included Academic 
Search Complete, CINAHL, Health Business Elite, Health Policy Reference Centre, 
Health Source: Nursing Academic Edition and Medline. Specific key terms that were 
searched included ‘accident prevention’, ‘medical errors’, ‘treatment errors’, ‘health 
care errors’, ‘medication errors’ and ‘nursing errors’. Other terms that were used 
included ‘critical care’, ‘perioperative’, ‘emergency’, ‘neuroscience’ and 
‘rehabilitation’. Parallel searches, using the same key terms, were conducted on the 
Internet to uncover any unpublished studies on these topics. A search was conducted 
using Google Scholar to identify publications that cited Cook, Render and Woods’ 
(2000) study of patient safety and gaps in the continuity of care. The reference lists 
of each article were reviewed to identify additional resources. Articles were selected 
on the basis of their thematic and content relevance to the inquiry.  
2.3 Key studies of adverse events 
Almost fifty years ago Schimmel (1964, p. 100) identified a ‘new type of clinical 
pathology’ in the form of ‘adverse reactions’ and ‘untoward effects’ arising from 
modern diagnostic procedures and treatments. Concerned by the emergence of this 
phenomenon, Schimmel (1964) was among the first to investigate the nature and 
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incidence of complications in hospitalised patients. Conducted in a single hospital 
site in the U.S.A. over a six month period, the study found that 20 percent of patients 
experienced one or more medical complications and that 20 percent of these 
complications were serious or fatal. These results might be considered conservative 
given the study’s exclusion of post-operative complications and those arising from 
human error. 
2.3.1 The Harvard Medical Practice Study 
Three decades later, two population based studies of iatrogenic injury (i.e. injury 
arising from medical care) were published in the literature (Brennan et al. 1991; 
Leape et al. 1991; Wilson et al. 1995). The first of these, the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study (HMPS), described the incidence and nature of in-hospital adverse 
events in the state of New York (Brennan et al. 1991; Leape et al. 1991). The drivers 
of this research were concerns about the increasing number of malpractice claims 
being brought against health care providers and a lack of epidemiological data 
regarding the incidence of iatrogenic injury. At that time, estimates of adverse events 
were based on non-random samples and a small number of patient records (Couch et 
al. 1981; Steel et al. 1981). The HMPS reviewed over 30,000 patient records, 
revealing that adverse events occurred in 3.7 percent of hospitalised patients while 
27.6 percent of these events were due to negligence and 69 percent were associated 
with errors and potentially preventable. Extrapolation of these figures suggested that 
as many as 98,000 deaths and 1 million injuries occur annually in the U.S.A. alone, a 
problem described as ‘more profound, more ingrained, more pervasive, and more 
pernicious than anyone had previously thought possible’ (Cook et al. 2004, p. 19). In 
spite of these troubling statistics, when the study was published, there was ‘almost no 
public or professional outcry’ (Leape 2009, p. 394).  
2.3.2 The Quality in Australian Health Care Study 
A year later the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare examined the methods 
used in the HMPS and concluded they could be applied to a study of adverse events 
in Australian hospitals (Harvey & Cross 1992; Wilson et al. 1995). The Quality in 
Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS) was commissioned in 1994 and, with one 
important exception, modelled largely on the HMPS (Wilson et al. 1995). In contrast 
to the HMPS, the main focus of this Australian investigation was quality 
improvement and preventability. To that end, rather than determine negligence, the 
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QAHCS measured the preventability of adverse events. The study estimated that 
adverse events occurred in 16 percent of hospitalised patients and 51 percent of these 
events were preventable. Extrapolation of these figures suggested that as many as 
18,000 deaths and 17,000 permanent disabilities occur each year from admissions to 
Australian hospitals. The key findings of the QAHCS are summarised in Box 2.1, 
below. 
 
Box 2.1 Summary of the key findings of the Quality in Australian Health Care Study 
(Wilson et al. 1995) 
 
 
x 16.6% of admissions were associated with an adverse event; 
x 51% of adverse events were considered preventable; 
x 13.7% of adverse events  resulted in permanent disability and 4.9% resulted in death; 
x a higher proportion of adverse events were associated with digestive (23.2%), 
musculoskeletal (21.9%) and circulatory disorders (20.2%); 
x errors of omission occurred in 52% of adverse events and were twice as common as 
errors of commission which occurred in 27% of adverse events; 
x almost half of all adverse events (46.8%) occurred in the operating room; 
x a quarter of adverse events occurred in the patient’s room;  
x the preventability of adverse events in the emergency department was high at 82% 
while the preventability for most specialities was close to 50%; and 
x adverse events account for 3.3million bed days per year, of which 1.7 million (8% of 
all hospital bed days in Australia) are for adverse events with high preventability 
 
 
A number of explanations have been proposed for the higher rate of adverse 
events in the QAHCS (16.6 percent) compared to the HMPS (3.7 percent) (Taskforce 
on Quality in Australian Health Care 1996; Thomas, Studdert, Runciman et al. 2000; 
Wilson et al. 1995) but, as noted by Weingart et al. (2000, p. 774), a ‘real difference 
in the rate of injuries to patients in the two populations could not be excluded’. These 
explanations are mostly methodological and include differences in the screening and 
medical review processes; differences in the way that the term adverse event was 
defined in each study; an increase in the complexity of care and/or improvement in 
the quality of medical records in the intervening years between the two studies; and 
the possibility that the focus on quality and improvement in the Australian study 
contributed to a higher number of records.  
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2.3.3 Further studies of adverse events in hospital settings 
Further studies in Canada, the United Kingdom (U.K.), Latin America, New Zealand 
and the states of Utah and Colorado in the U.S.A. have confirmed that adverse events 
are a cause of patient harm globally and a major public health issue (Aranaz-Andrés 
et al. 2011; Baker, GR et al. 2004; Davis et al. 2002; Thomas, Studdert, Burstin et al. 
2000; Vincent, Neale & Woloshynowych 2001). A systematic review of the 
literature, based on studies of adverse events in five countries (i.e. U.S.A., Australia, 
U.K., New Zealand and Canada) and almost 75,000 records, found that nearly one in 
ten patients experienced an adverse event (De Vries et al. 2008). Almost half of the 
events identified were attributable to error and considered preventable (i.e. the 
median preventability was 43.5 percent). Although 53 percent of patients 
experienced no or minor disability, 7.4 percent of adverse events were lethal and 
most were operation or medication related. 
As well as being a significant cause of human suffering, adverse events are a 
substantial drain on health care resources. The total cost of in-hospital adverse events 
over a one year period in the Australian State of Victoria alone, has been estimated at 
in excess of $450 million (Ehsani, Jackson & Duckett 2006). 
2.4 Human error 
The word error originates from the Latin errorem, meaning a wandering or straying 
and is defined as a mistake, inaccuracy or misjudgement, the act or state of being 
wrong (Collins Dictionary of the English Language 2010). Research has established 
that human error is a contributing factor in as many as half of all adverse events 
(Brennan et al. 1991; De Vries et al. 2008; Leape et al. 1991; Wilson et al. 1995). 
James Reason (1995), a human factors psychologist and acknowledged leader in the 
field of error theory, contends that some form of deviation is a feature of all errors. 
The following definition of error, developed by Reason (1990), has been widely 
adopted in the patient safety literature: 
Error will be taken as a generic term to encompass all those occasions in 
which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve 
its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the 
intervention of some chance agency (p. 9). 
Reason (1995) describes two main types of errors: (i) slips, lapses, trips or 
fumbles, and (ii) mistakes. The first, slips, lapses, trips and fumbles are defined as 
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execution or performance failures where the plan selected is adequate for the 
particular goal but its execution does not proceed as intended. Slips and lapses often 
occur during routine tasks in familiar environments and are more easily observed 
than lapses, which result from the failure of internal cognitive processes such as 
attention. The second type of error, mistakes, are failures of intention or planning 
that result in selection of the incorrect plan for a particular goal. Knowledge based 
mistakes ‘occur in novel situations where the solution to a problem has to be worked 
out on the spot without the help of pre-programmed solutions’ (Reason 1995, p. 81). 
Rule based mistakes involve the ‘misapplication of a good rule (usually because of a 
failure to spot the contraindications), the application of a bad rule, or the non-
application of a good rule’ (Reason 1995, p. 81).  
2.5 The patient safety movement 
Concerned by lack of progress on the problem of patient safety, the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) published its report, To Err is Human, almost a decade after 
publication of the Harvard Study (Brennan et al. 1991; Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, 
M 2000; Leape et al. 1991). In the years following publication of the Harvard and 
Australian adverse event studies, it is claimed that insufficient knowledge and 
incentives (Wachter 2004) were factors in the ‘cycle of inaction’ on the problem of 
patient safety (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000, p. 3). The IOM report is 
credited with redressing this problem by launching the patient safety movement 
(Leape 2009; Wachter 2004). Its use of the analogy that deaths in the United States 
from medical errors were equivalent to the downing of one jumbo jet each day was 
powerful, generating substantial public and media attention and raising global 
awareness that health care was not as safe as it should be. 
To Err is Human has profoundly changed the ‘conversations’ and attitudes of 
health care professionals and organisations toward the problem of medical error and 
iatrogenic injury (Leape & Berwick 2005, p. 2385; Wachter 2004). In advancing a 
national agenda for improving patient safety outcomes the report put forward several 
key recommendations, including:  
(i) Establishing a national focus to create leadership, research, tools and protocols to 
enhance the knowledge base about patient safety; 
(ii) Identifying and learning from errors through immediate and strong mandatory 
reporting efforts, as well as the encouragement of voluntary efforts, both with the 
aim of making sure the system continues to be made safer for patients; 
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(iii) Raising standards and expectations for improvements in safety through the actions 
of oversight organisations, group purchasers, and professional groups; and  
(iv) Creating safety systems inside health care organisations through the 
implementation of safe practices at the delivery level, the ultimate target of all the 
recommendations (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000, p. 6). 
In the United States, the Quality Interagency Coordination (QuIC) Taskforce, 
formed in 1998 to examine issues of health care quality, was asked to give priority to 
patient safety and health care related errors (Regenstein 2004). A report from the 
QuIC Taskforce not only supported the recommendations of the IOM report but also 
made key recommendations in regard to the reporting of adverse events. These 
included the establishment of a mandatory reporting system and the provision of 
legal protection to those reporting such events for the purposes of improving patient 
safety. Health care agencies were directed to implement the key recommendations of 
To Err is Human. Meanwhile, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) coordinated efforts to assess the evidence supporting various safety 
practices and determine ‘best practice’ in the prevention of errors and adverse events. 
In 2000, health care professionals, consumers, regulators, accrediting agencies and 
safety-science experts gathered at the first national summit on medical errors and 
patient safety research. At this meeting, a detailed research program was developed 
with a focus on state-wide reporting of patient safety incidents, the improvement of 
medication safety and the translation of safety practices and lessons learned in the 
aviation industry into health care. And so the U.S. patient safety movement was 
launched.  
As the problem of patient safety gained widespread acceptance, governments, 
health care services and health care professionals throughout the world mobilised and 
engaged in unprecedented efforts to improve systems and processes and the overall 
quality and safety of health care (Johnstone & Kanitsaki 2006c; Leape & Berwick 
2005; Small & Barach 2002). The patient safety movement has thus evolved from 
these efforts (Leape, Berwick & Bates 2002). 
2.5.1 The Australian patient safety movement 
Publication of the Quality in Australian Health Care Study (Wilson et al. 1995) 
marked the beginning of the patient safety movement in Australia (Johnstone & 
Kanitsaki 2006c). In response to this study, the Taskforce on Quality in Australian 
Health Care (1996), established by the Australian government, made 56 
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recommendations in relation to research, consumer participation and funding as well 
as standards of patient care, monitoring and professional education. In 1998, the 
National Expert Advisory Group on Safety and Quality in Australian Health Care 
was established to consider the recommendations of the Taskforce and formulate a 
national approach to the improvement of safety and quality. A key recommendation 
of the Expert Group was the need for leadership and coordination of health care 
safety and quality initiatives. To this end, the Australian Council for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) was established in 2000.  
In its final report, the National Expert Advisory Group set out ten national 
actions for the improvement of quality and safety in Australian health care (The 
National Expert Advisory Group on Safety and Quality in Australian Health Care 
1999). These actions are outlined in Box 2.2, below: 
 
Box 2.2 National actions to support quality and safety improvement in Australian health 
care (The National Expert Advisory Group on Safety and Quality in Australian Health 
Care 1999, p. v) 
 
x Support methods to enable increased consumer participation in health care. 
x Facilitate implementation of evidence based practice. 
x Develop strategies and partnerships to improve information flows between all parties 
about areas for quality improvement, and to ensure that patients, their families and 
carers and health care agencies receive timely advice about incidents. 
x Develop legislative changes that will allow the detailed, thorough investigation of 
adverse events or ‘near misses’ and the timely reporting of findings for the information 
of consumers and for action by organisations and health care providers in the system. 
x Facilitate agreement on common systems for the collection and analysis of incidents, 
adverse events and complaints. 
x Develop a national framework for health service performance measurement and 
reporting. 
x Facilitate improvements in the quality of current accreditation mechanisms that address 
the safety and quality of the system in operation. 
x Facilitate improvements to the design and management of the health system that 
promote smoother transitions for consumers across health service boundaries. 
x Research and develop clinical and administrative information systems that have a 
system-wide focus and application. 
x Agree on national requirements for education and training for all health care providers 
to support their involvement in quality management and collaborative approaches to 
health care delivery.  
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(a) The Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) 
In spite of its lack of statutory or regulatory authority, the ACSQHC introduced what 
has been described as ‘a significant platform of reforms’ and improved 
understanding and awareness of quality and safety matters amongst health care 
professionals (Barraclough & Birch 2006, p. S48). Its key achievements included 
progress on:  
x the implementation of incident monitoring and management systems and patient 
safety risk management plans;  
x the creation of a Centre of Research Excellence in Patient Safety (CREPS);  
x the development of a common medication chart in all public hospitals; 
x public reporting of sentinel events;  
x the implementation of national standards for open disclosure when a patient is 
harmed and infection control; and,  
x the use of root cause analysis methodology for severe adverse events (Barraclough 
& Birch 2006, p. S49).   
(b) The Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care 
In 2005, concerns about the governance arrangements for safety and quality in 
Australian health care led to a review of the Council by Paterson (2005). This review 
found that a limitation of the ACSQHC was its lack of formal links with all levels of 
the health care system and its narrow focus on safety in acute care settings (Paterson 
2005; Smallwood 2006). It recommended the establishment of a new, smaller and 
more broadly focussed national body with closer ties to state and territory 
governments. To this end, the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in 
Health Care (ACSQHC) was created by Health Ministers in 2006 to lead and 
coordinate health care safety and quality improvements. Its key functions, described 
by Paterson (2005), include:   
(i) identifying issues and policy directions, recommending priorities for action, 
disseminating knowledge, and advocating for safety and quality; 
(ii) reporting publicly on the state of safety and quality including performance against 
standards; 
(iii) recommending national data sets for safety and quality, working within current 
multilateral governmental arrangements for data development, standards, collection 
and reporting; 
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(iv) providing strategic advice to Health Ministers on ‘best practice’ thinking to drive 
quality improvement, including implementation strategies; and 
(v) recommending nationally agreed standards for safety and quality improvement (p. 
v). 
In 2011, the National Health Reform Act was passed by the Federal 
Government, establishing the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in 
Health Care as an independent statutory authority. The role of the Commission was 
expanded to include the formulation of standards, guidelines and indicators relating 
to matters of health care safety and quality. To that end, the Commission published 
National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards, designed to assist health care 
organisations in the delivery of safe and high quality care (Australian Commission 
on Safety and Quality in Health care 2011). Importantly, these standards, listed in 
Box 2.3 below, are now a component of the accreditation process and the assessment 
of organisational performance.  
 
Box 2.3 National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards (Australian Commission 
on Safety and Quality in Health Care 2011) 
 
x Governance for Safety and Quality in Health Service Organisations  
x Partnering with Consumers  
x Preventing and Controlling Health care Associated Infections  
x Medication Safety  
x Patient Identification and Procedure Matching  
x Clinical Handover  
x Blood and Blood Products  
x Preventing and Managing Pressure Injuries  
x Recognising and Responding to Clinical Deterioration in Acute Health Care 
x Preventing Falls and Harm from Falls  
 
A key and ongoing role of the Commission is to promote, support, encourage 
and monitor the implementation of these service standards with a view to advising 
the Health Ministers about their suitability as national clinical standards.  
2.6 Responses to the problem of patient safety 
James Bagian, the Founding Director of the National Center for Patient Safety 
(NCPS) at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), has famously argued that 
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‘you can’t fix what you don’t know about’ (Bagian et al. 2001). To that end, much 
attention in health care has been given to the identification of system weaknesses and 
errors using techniques such as root cause and human reliability analysis.  
2.6.1 Root cause analysis 
Root cause analysis (RCA), a retrospective structured investigation process, is 
widely used in hospital settings worldwide to identify the latent conditions that 
contribute to preventable adverse events and ‘close calls’ (i.e. cases where harm was 
avoided)  (Bagian et al. 2001; 2002; Iedema et al. 2006b; Nicolini, Waring & Mengis 
2011; Wu, Lipshutz & Pronovost 2008). In Australia, RCA is mandated for critical 
incidents with a severity assessment coding (SAC) of one (i.e. deaths associated with 
clinical care). The RCA process includes gathering data about what happened; 
identifying, where possible, the various causal factors that contributed to the event; 
and developing recommendations and corrective actions that minimise the risk of 
future events (Bagian et al. 2000; Iedema et al. 2006b; Wu, Lipshutz & Pronovost 
2008).  
Valuable system changes resulting from RCA processes have included the 
removal of concentrated potassium chloride from nursing units (Pronovost et al. 
2002). Nonetheless, the process of identifying and implementing organisation wide 
changes from the investigation of a situated clinical incident has been described as a 
challenging task (Iedema et al. 2006a). Furthermore, Iedema and colleagues (2006b, 
p. 1614) contend that, far from being a technically focussed investigation, RCA is an 
‘emergent practice’ that encompasses the affective, critical and moral dimensions of 
clinical practice. They describe the RCA process as a ‘four-fold’ activity requiring 
clinicians to (i) address the technical aspects of patient care; (ii) adopt a non-
punitive, systems approach; (iii) navigate the emotional landscape associated with 
critical incidents arising from human error; and (iv) consider their own moral 
position (Iedema et al. 2006b).  
Concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of the RCA method and the 
considerable time and resources involved, estimated at between 20 and 90 person 
hours per investigation (Wu, Lipshutz & Pronovost 2008). Wu, Lipshutz and 
Pronovost (2008) contend that an important and largely unanswered question in 
many RCA investigations is whether the risk of an adverse event’s recurrence has 
actually been reduced. Accordingly, they argue for the evaluation of RCA 
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recommendations and corrective actions and further research to identify ‘best 
practice’ in the conduct of RCAs (Wu, Lipshutz & Pronovost 2008).   
The utility of retrospective, ‘find and fix’ methods more generally in reducing 
failure rates in complex systems such as health care organisations has been 
challenged (Hollnagel 2012a; Cook & Woods 1994). Hollnagel (2012a) argues that a 
key limitation of these approaches is that learning is constrained by a focus on what 
went ‘wrong’, as this may be more evident and easily portrayed than what went 
‘right’. Cook and Woods (1994) point out that identifying and correcting one 
sequence (or set) of system flaws in the aftermath of adverse event may lead to a 
belief that the problem has been ‘fixed’ when, in reality, this may not be the case. 
They note that further errors and failures may arise from as yet unidentified factors 
or a distinct and unanticipated sequence or combination of flaws.  
2.6.2 Human reliability analysis 
Efforts to improve patient safety have also focussed on prospective methods such as 
human reliability analysis (HRA). HRA encompasses a broad range of techniques 
including ‘health care failure mode effect analysis’ (HFMEA) developed by the U.S. 
Veteran’s Administration National Center for Patient Safety (DeRosier et al. 2002). 
The key purpose of HRA is to identify the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in work 
systems that create the potential for error and failure (Lyons et al. 2004). The process 
also seeks to determine the likely impact of potential errors and failures and the 
aspects of the work system that require modification to forestall such events 
(Institute for Healthcare Improvement 2004). This is achieved by examining the 
tasks, processes and structures within systems of work. The key steps in the HFMEA 
process include: (i) identifying a process (usually an area of vulnerability); (ii) 
gathering a multidisciplinary team of all people involved in the process; (iii) 
describing the steps in the process graphically; (iv) identifying all the possible ways 
that each step of the process can fail (i.e. failure modes) and the severity and 
probability of each potential failure (i.e. hazard analysis); and (v) determining the 
required actions and outcome measures (DeRosier et al. 2002). Failure modes and 
effects analysis may also be used to prospectively evaluate the impact of planned 
change on a work system (Institute for Healthcare Improvement 2004).  
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2.7 Near misses as an under recognised indicator of safety success 
A key underpinning assumption of this study relates to the phenomenon of ‘near 
misses’ as an indicator of safety success. It is acknowledged that the term ‘near miss’ 
is a contested notion (Aspden et al. 2004; Barnard et al. 2006; Kaplan & Fastman 
2003; Kessels-Habraken et al. 2010; Van der Schaaf, Lucas & Hale 1991). 
Nonetheless, there is agreement in the literature that it encompasses situations where 
patient harm was avoided or minimised.   
2.7.1 Near miss reporting and analysis 
Near miss reporting is ‘institutionalized’ in a range of high risk industries (i.e. 
aviation, nuclear power, petrochemical processing) all of which are renowned for 
their low accident rates (Barach & Small 2000). Even so, a lack of agreement on how 
near miss should be defined has been identified as an impediment to the utilisation of 
near miss data generally (Kessels-Habraken et al. 2010) and progress on patient 
safety in particular (Small & Barach 2002). In health care contexts, near miss 
reporting and analysis, as opposed to the reporting of incidents where patients have 
been seriously harmed, offers several benefits. These include the opportunity to 
identify system vulnerabilities and causal pathways before harm occurs; the 
improvement of systems and care processes through the study of recovery patterns 
(i.e. how harm was averted); and, the elimination of perceived legal and emotional 
barriers to reporting because the patient was not harmed (Barach & Small 2000; 
Barnard et al. 2006; Jeffs, Affonso & MacMillan 2008; Kessels-Habraken et al. 
2010). Furthermore, analysis of near misses is freed from the influence of hindsight 
bias, where knowledge of the outcome inevitably influences perceptions about the 
processes and behaviours leading to that outcome (Barnard et al. 2006). In spite of 
the many benefits of near miss reporting and analysis and the prevalence of these 
events in health care contexts, many go undetected and hence valuable 
oppportunities for individual and organisational learning are lost (Jeffs 2010). 
2.7.2 Research of near misses 
Kaplan and Fastman (2003) argue that near miss data yields valuable insights about 
how harm was averted and warrants attention. In particular, the investigation of 
health care related near misses can deepen understanding of the process of successful 
error recovery, the ability of humans to intercept an error and in so doing prevent it 
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from reaching and harming the patient (Kaplan & Fastman 2003; Kessels-Habraken 
et al. 2010). As previously discussed, a number of studies have specifically 
investigated the role of nurses in the recovery of medical errors (Henneman, EA et 
al. 2006; Henneman, EA & Gawlinski 2004; Henneman, EA et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 
2008). Recently, the role of nurses in preventing adverse events such as pressure 
ulcers has also been characterised as a near miss intervention or recovery process 
(Jeffs, MacMillan & Maione 2009). Investigation of this process revealed that 
pressure ulcer prevention was achieved through the implementation of a surveillance 
tool which enhanced patient assessment and the identification of at risk patients.   
Attention has also been given to identifying the factors that contribute to near 
misses and the means by which near misses are mitigated in clinical practice (Jeffs, 
Affonso & MacMillan 2008). Jeffs, Affonso and MacMillan (2008) investigated the 
phenomena of near misses from the perspective of nurses, pharmacists, patients and 
family members. The study identified numerous factors that contributed to near 
misses, including working conditions, inadequate care processes, a lack of patient-
centred care and complacency and carelessness on the part of health care providers. 
Of note, ‘diligant and vigilant pattern recognition’ and efforts to create synergy in the 
delivery of health care were key strategies in the mitigation of near miss events 
(Jeffs, Affonso & MacMillan 2008).  
2.8 The recognition and reporting of risk, error and system failure 
The recognition and reporting of risk, error and system failure is a complex and 
challenging task. In health care contexts a key problem lies in the perception that 
many clinical incidents, such as near misses, are commonplace, routine and ‘part and 
parcel’ of the everyday work of health care practitioners (Jeffs 2010; Henneman, EA 
2007). Henneman (2007, p. 30) contends that nurses in particular become so 
accustomed to ‘working around’ system failures that they fail to recognise and report 
them as such. Luther and Resar (2013) concur, noting that front line clinicians tend 
to ‘accept’ rather than ‘see’ defective processes and systems in their work 
environments. Nurses’ experience of poorly functioning supply systems, problems 
accessing resources, and delays in systems and processes (Ebright et al. 2003; Tucker 
& Spear 2006) may contribute to these perceptions. Henneman (2007) contends that 
in order to identify and capture these complex practice issues, a variety of 
methodologies are needed.  
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A related and largely unanswered question is how nurses identify that a patient is 
at increased risk of harm (Chipps et al. 2011; Despins, Scott-Cawiezell & Rouder 
2010; Kelly 2009; Kelly & Vincent 2011). This is a salient issue given the important 
role of risk identification in effective nursing surveillance (Henneman, EA Gawlinski 
& Giuliano 2012). Although a recent study has explored how nurses manage risk 
(Groves, Finfgeld-Connett & Wakefield 2012), Chipps et al. (2011) note the lack of 
data explaining how nurses identify risk and use risk assessment data in decision 
making.  
Previous studies point to a lack of consistency in nurses’ assessment and 
reporting of medication errors (Baker, HM 1997; Mayo & Duncan 2004). Indeed, a 
recent report by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of 
Inspector General found that as many as 86 percent of adverse events were not 
reported to organisational reporting systems because of a lack of clarity about what 
represents patient harm (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services cited in 
Luther & Resar 2013). A study by Chipps and colleagues (2011) concurs, identifying 
a lack of consistency in nurses’ judgements regarding the severity of an error, 
whether the error carried the risk of harm and the probability that the error might 
recur. Further analysis revealed that nurses’ judgement of these factors was unrelated 
to their level of education, years of experience, clinical specialty or current job role. 
The detection, interpretation and management of risk is a relevant issue given the 
complex nature of nurses’ work environments and global efforts to reduce the 
incidence of preventable health care harm.  
2.9 The relationship between nurses and patient outcomes 
Interest in patient outcomes can be traced back to the epidemiological research of 
Florence Nightingale during the Crimean War (Maas, Johnson & Moorhead 2007). 
Hailed as a ‘hero and martyr of quality and safety’, Nightingale collected and 
analysed the outcome data of patients in her care, demonstrating positive health 
outcomes from her sanitary reforms (Neuhauser 2003). More recently, the problem 
of patient safety and preventable adverse events has highlighted the importance of 
efforts to understand, measure and improve the quality and safety of health care 
(Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000; Savitz, Jones & Bernard 2005). As the main 
providers of inpatient care, important considerations for the nursing profession 
include accountability for patient outcomes and the development of performance 
measures that quantify the contribution and value of nursing care (Given 2005; 
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Kurtzman & Kizer 2005; Needleman, Kurtzman & Kizer 2007). To this end, 
attention has been given to the development of nursing-sensitive performance 
measures (National Quality Forum 2004), defined as: 
processes and outcomes – and structural proxies for these processes and 
outcomes (i.e. skill mix, nurse staffing hours) – that are affected, 
provided, and/or influenced by nursing personnel – but for which nursing 
is not exclusively responsible. Nursing-sensitive measures must be 
quantifiably influenced by nursing personnel, but the relationship is not 
necessarily causal (Kurtzman & Kizer 2005, p. 15). 
It has been noted that research efforts in the area of nursing performance have 
focussed almost entirely on adverse patient outcomes and events as measures of 
nursing quality and effectiveness (Lang et al. 2004; Savitz, Jones & Bernard 2005). 
Considerable attention has also been given to the relationship between nurse staffing 
levels and patient outcomes. Factors providing the impetus for this research have 
been quality and safety considerations, the introduction of minimum nurse-to-patient 
ratios and a shortage of hospital nurses (Burnes Bolton et al. 2007). These studies 
identified an association between increased registered nurse staffing and lower odds 
of hospital related mortality, failure-to-rescue, hospital acquired pneumonia, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, pulmonary failure, surgical wound infection, and 
nosocomial bloodstream infection (Aiken et al. 2002; Hickam et al. 2003; Kane et al. 
2007; Lang et al. 2004; Needleman et al. 2002; Tourangeau et al. 2006; Twigg et al. 
2011).  
Burnes Bolton and colleagues (2007, p. 240) note that many studies of nurse 
staffing and patient outcomes have excluded patient falls and hospital acquired 
pressure ulcers from their analyses, regarded as two ‘stalwart measures of nurse 
staffing effectiveness and patient safety’. These two measures have been rigorously 
investigated and are among a group of standards to have been adopted by the 
National Quality Forum in the United States as nursing-sensitive indicators of the 
quality of hospital care (National Quality Forum 2004). Research to evaluate the 
impact of mandated nursing ratios in California, for example, indicated that variation 
in patient outcomes could not be explained solely by the nursing ‘dose’, the number 
of hours of nursing care or the skill mix of the nurses providing care (Brooten & 
Youngblut 2006; Burnes Bolton et al. 2007; Donaldson, N et al. 2005). While 
mandated nursing ratios significantly increased skill mix and registered nurse hours 
of care in medical surgical units in California, a significant decrease in the incidence 
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of patient falls and hospital acquired pressure ulcers was not detected. Mark (2006, p. 
694) identifies a number of methodological issues that must be addressed before 
nurse staffing research can be considered ‘theoretically and empirically sufficient’. 
These include a lack of theory, the use of different data sources for nurse staffing, 
variation in risk adjustment methods and the problem of spuriousness when drawing 
conclusions from observational data.   
A key argument advanced by Savitz, Jones and Barnard (2005, p. 383) is that 
further consideration should be given to the relationship between nursing care and 
positive patient outcomes, focussing on care at the unit level. A recent study by 
Middleton and colleagues (2011) is one of the first to demonstrate such a 
relationship. The study, a cluster randomised controlled trial, found that nurse 
initiated, evidence based management of fever, hyperglycaemia and swallowing 
dysfunction in patients with stroke resulted in significantly less mortality and 
dependency. At 90 days, patients that received the nursing intervention were 16 
percent more likely to be alive and independent. The authors note that this effect is 
larger than for other established stroke treatments, including drug therapies.  
2.10 Nursing surveillance 
The Collins English Dictionary (2010) defines surveillance as the act of maintaining 
close observation or supervision over a person or group. The term originates from the 
French ‘surveiller’, to watch over, and has a long history in the fields of aviation, 
intelligence and public health. Effective surveillance of the patient and environment 
is one of the most fundamental safety activities undertaken by nurses (Clarke 2004; 
Dresser 2012; Page 2004) and an important strategy in the recovery of medical errors 
in emergency department, critical care and coronary care settings (Dykes, Rothschild 
& Hurley 2010a; Henneman, EA et al. 2006; Henneman, EA et al. 2010; Hurley et 
al. 2008) and prevention of harm in rural hospital settings (MacKinnon 2011). In the 
context of patient safety, surveillance is taken as the ‘purposeful and ongoing 
collection and analysis of information about the patient and the environment’ 
(McCloskey Dochterman & Bulechek 2004, p. 694). Henneman, Gawlinski and 
Giuliano (2012, p. e12) write that surveillance involves the ‘early identification of 
risk’ to protect patients from the harmful effects of health care errors: 
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Surveillance is a systematic and goal-directed process focused on early 
identification of risk and the need for intervention. This process includes 
identifying at-risk patients, promptly identifying potential adverse events, 
as well as preventing and recovering (identifying, interrupting, and 
correcting) medical errors (Henneman, EA Gawlinski & Giuliano 2012, 
p. e12).  
Dougherty (1999, p. 527) suggests that ‘the essence of successful surveillance 
involves the piecing together of minute amounts of information that, when evaluated 
separately, may appear unrelated and insignificant’. Surveillance has temporal and 
cumulative features as patients are often cared for by a team of nurses (Kutney-Lee, 
Lake & Aiken 2009). Surveillance is also a complex and systematic process with 
behavioural and cognitive components - the collection of data using a variety of 
methods from many different sources (i.e. patients, family members, health care 
professionals and clinical support systems) and the analysis, interpretation, 
evaluation and integration of this data (Dougherty 1999; Kelly & Vincent 2011). A 
recent conceptualisation of surveillance, describes six dimensions of nursing 
surveillance - actions, expertise, early recognition, intuition and decision making 
(Kelly 2009; Kelly & Vincent 2011). In this framework, key antecedents of nursing 
surveillance, defined as ‘prepossessed abilities, knowledge, or training that 
influences the concept’, included expertise, intuition and early recognition skills 
(Kelly 2009; Kelly & Vincent 2011, p. 656).  
Inadequate nursing surveillance has been posited as a factor in occurrences of 
failure-to-rescue and related death from complications in hospitalised patients 
(Clarke & Aiken 2003). For example, a recent study by Shever (2011) used the 
number of nursing treatments documented in a nursing data-base as a measure of 
nursing surveillance and found a lower rate of failure-to-rescue in those patients with 
a higher number of documented treatments (i.e. 12 times a day or more). While 
Aiken and colleagues (2003) have hypothesised that enhanced surveillance may 
explain the relationship between higher levels of registered nurse staffing and 
superior patient outcomes, there is a paucity of research on the process of 
surveillance itself (Henneman, EA Gawlinski & Giuliano 2012; Kelly 2009; Kutney-
Lee, Lake & Aiken 2009; Schmidt 2010). Schmidt (2010) contends that this gap is 
suggestive of a ‘precision paradox’, the phenomenon of predicting a particular 
outcome (i.e. higher levels of nurses staffing result in better surveillance and patient 
outcomes) without knowledge of the processes (i.e. surveillance) that are critical to 
that outcome being achieved (Mark 2006).  
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2.11 The recovery of errors by nurses 
A study of adverse drug events by Leape and colleagues (1995) was among the first 
to identify the key role of nurses in the recovery of medical errors. The authors found 
that half of physician errors in ordering and administering medications and one third 
of transcription and dispensing errors were intercepted (i.e. prevented from reaching 
patients) and that nurses were responsible for 85 percent of these interceptions. 
Further research in critical care and emergency settings concurs with these findings, 
suggesting that nurses also protect patients from the errors of junior medical staff 
(Henneman, PL et al. 2005; Landrigan et al. 2004; Rothschild et al. 2005).  
Rothschild and colleagues (2009) comment that, but for the significant number of 
errors recovered by nurses and other professions, the incidence of adverse events 
could be much higher. Moreover, they observe that error recovery not only prevents 
patient harm and suffering but also results in significant cost savings (Rothschild et 
al. 2009). 
Rothschild and colleagues (2006) coined the phrase the ‘nursing safety net’ to 
describe the role of nurses in recovering medical errors and protecting patients from 
harm. Instructive examples of the nature and extent of the ‘nursing safety net’ can be 
found in a small number of critical care and perioperative studies (Dykes, Rothschild 
& Hurley 2010a; Rogers et al. 2008; Rothschild et al. 2006; Yang et al. 2012). 
Research by Rothschild and colleagues (2006) to explore and quantify the 
contribution of critical care nurses to patient safety concurs with earlier research by 
Leape and colleagues (1995). Rothschild and colleagues (2006) found that a large 
proportion (73 percent) of the errors recovered were medication related, involving 
slips and lapses during the execution of tasks. Most errors (69 percent) were 
intercepted before reaching patients and of those errors that reached patients, 13 
percent were mitigated before they resulted in harm, while 18 percent were 
ameliorated before severe harm occurred. Extrapolation of these findings suggests 
that the ‘critical care safety net’ may be an important system defence against 
preventable adverse events (Rothschild et al. 2006). As Rothschild and colleagues 
(2006) write: 
Extrapolating our findings to an eight hour day shift only, slightly more 
than two potentially harmful medical errors per patient are recovered 
daily by each CCU nurse, and for a ten-bed CCU, more than 7,300 
medical errors are recovered annually (p. 67). 
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A further study by Dykes, Rothschild and Hurley (2010a) explored the error 
recovery efforts of critical care nurses (i.e. type, frequency and potential harm of 
recovered errors) over a one year period. Participants (N=345) completed the 
Recovered Medical Error Inventory, a 25 item web survey developed and tested by 
the authors (Dykes, Rothschild & Hurley 2010b) and reported the recovery of        
18,578 medical errors. While almost a quarter of these errors were rated by the 
participants as potentially lethal, these findings need to be considered in light of two 
of the study’s limitations. Firstly, all errors were self reported, creating the potential 
for nurses to over or underestimate their occurrence and severity. Secondly, the 
severity of the errors was judged by the participants themselves rather than 
independently classified, introducing the potential for bias. The most frequently 
recovered, potentially lethal error was the category ‘unsafe transfer decision’ which 
the authors note may be a quality of care issue. Even so, these findings are 
instructive, given that gaps often occur at ‘fracture points’ in patient care such as 
when a patient transfers to another unit (Patterson et al. in press). 
A study of error recovery in perioperative settings identified an average of 11.11 
errors or potential errors per cardiovascular procedure (i.e. coronary artery bypass 
graft, valve replacement) (Yang et al. 2012). Commonly, these incidents related to 
aseptic technique, infection prevention, the surgical count and skin management. Of 
the errors that were thought to have occurred, circulating nurses effectively 
intercepted 77 percent before they reached the patient while the remaining 23 percent 
were mitigated or ameliorated such that the patient was not severely harmed (Yang et 
al. 2012).  
Research suggests that the nursing safety net also protects patients from errors 
made by nurses themselves (Balas, Scott & Rogers 2004; Rogers et al. 2008). Rogers 
and colleagues (2008) found that the most frequently reported errors in a critical care 
setting were those made by nurses themselves (40.6 percent). Balas, Scott and 
Rogers (2004) studied almost 400 hospital nurses and found that 30 percent of nurses 
reported making at least one error or near error, ranging from minor slips to life 
threatening events, while 45 of these nurses reported making multiple errors (i.e. 
between 2 and 5). Eighty nurses reported intercepting at least one of their own errors 
while 37 percent of nurses reported stopping themselves from making multiple 
errors. Most errors were medication related, the most common being administration 
of the incorrect dose of medication. Research of error recovery in dialysis nursing 
found that experience was a factor in the ability of nurses to recover procedurally 
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based errors, while this was not the case with knowledge based errors (Wilkinson, 
Cauble & Patel 2011).  
2.12 Hospitals as complex systems 
A system has been defined as ‘a set of interdependent elements (human and non-
human) interacting to achieve a common goal’ (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M  
2000, p. 52). Health care systems, such as hospitals, are regarded as complex, 
adaptive systems capable of self-organising, emerging and evolving (Barach & 
Johnson 2006; McDaniel & Driebe 2001; Rijpma 1997; 2003). Their complexity and 
ability to deal with new situations stem, in part, from the presence of a large number 
of diverse agents (i.e. patients, health care providers, administrators, processes) 
(McDaniel & Driebe 2001). What these agents all share in common is their ability to 
process information and respond to changes in that information in ways that are not 
always predictable (Barach & Johnson 2006; McDaniel & Driebe 2001).  
Barach and Johnson (2006, p. i10) point out that in complex, adaptive systems 
‘the actions of individuals are interconnected so that the actions of one change the 
context for all the others’. In addition to being complex and adaptive, hospital 
systems are also tightly coupled such that each component of the system interacts 
with and is dependent upon numerous others components, many of which are highly 
specialised (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000). In tightly coupled systems, 
changes to one component have a ‘ripple effect’, forcing changes in other 
components that can be difficult to foresee and detect.  
Cook and Woods (1994) argue that in large, complex systems such as hospital 
contexts, failure has many components, is difficult to foresee, and often catastrophic 
because the system is generally well defended from smaller failures through various 
systems and safeguards. Dekker and colleagues (2008) note that while these systems 
and safe guards increase reliability they inevitably increase complexity. Perrow’s 
(1984) Normal Accident Theory holds that accidents are inevitable in complex and 
tightly coupled systems. Reason (1990, p. 183) contends that it is in their nature to 
‘spring nasty surprises’. Cook and colleagues (2004, p. 22) concur, arguing that the 
potential for catastrophic failure is ‘always just around the corner’ and cannot be 
eliminated from complex systems. 
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2.12.1 The complexity of nursing work 
Adding to the intricacy of health care systems is the inherently complex nature of 
nursing itself. Sources of complexity in the work of nurses include the acute and 
unpredictable nature of many clinical conditions for which patients are hospitalised 
(Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis & Stannard 1999) and the key role of nurses in 
integrating patient care to prevent gaps and bridging gaps when they occur (Page 
2004). In hospital settings, this role demands that nurses interact with a vast array of 
departments from within the broader system (i.e. radiology, pathology, 
administration, catering, allied health). Research by Ebright and colleagues (2003) 
has revealed that nurses’ work is further complicated by their need to balance 
competing goals in relation to patient safety; not falling behind with work; 
minimising further complexity; maintaining competency and efficiency; and 
preserving patient and family satisfaction. In hospital systems, additional and 
potentially avoidable sources of complexity include poorly functioning supply 
systems, interruptions, inconsistencies and breakdowns in communication, and 
problems accessing resources (i.e. supplies, equipment, medications, information) 
(Ebright et al. 2003; Tucker & Spear 2006). As well as adding to the complexity of 
nurses’ work, these factors increase the risk of operational failure (Tucker & Spear 
2006) and create additional gaps in care by reducing the time and attention available 
for higher order thinking such as clinical reasoning (Ebright 2003).  
2.13 Reliability 
In the search for ways to improve patient safety in health care domains, attention has 
turned to models of error management in high reliability organisations (HROs) such 
as nuclear power plants, air traffic control centres and missile launch facilities. While 
involved in inherently high risk activities, HROs are renowned for their ability to 
‘operate continuously under trying conditions and have fewer than their fair share of 
major accidents’ (Weick & Sutcliffe 2007, p. 1). The reliability at the core of these 
organisations has been defined as the ‘unusual capacity to produce collective 
outcomes of a certain minimum quality repeatedly’ (Hannan & Freeman 1984, p. 
153). HROs are preoccupied with failure and while they experience errors, their 
resilience ensures they are not disabled by them. As Reason (2000) writes: 
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They expect to make errors and train their workforce to recognise and 
recover them. They continually rehearse familiar scenarios of failure and 
strive hard to imagine novel ones. Instead of isolating failures, they 
generalise them. Instead of making local repairs, they look for system 
reforms (p. 770).  
The ability of HROs to carry out complex and demanding tasks in hazardous 
conditions and without catastrophic failure has been the subject of research by social 
scientists (Reason 2000; Weick 1987; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld 2008).  These 
researchers argue that a key feature of reliable systems is their consistent 
performance in the face of unknown and unpredictable working conditions and their 
ability to ‘handle unforeseen situations in ways that forestall unintended 
consequences’ (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld 2008, p. 35). Reliability is achieved 
through the standardisation and simplification of processes; the reporting and close 
analysis of all safety failures (including near misses and small incidents) using a 
systems approach; and redundancy in equipment, personnel and safety measures 
(Beyea 2005; Nemeth & Cook 2007). Other important attributes of HROs include the 
reluctance to simplify interpretations; sensitivity to operations; the commitment to 
resilience; and deference to expertise (Reason 2000; Weick & Sutcliffe 2007; Weick, 
Sutcliffe & Obstfeld 2008).  
Some of the key elements of high reliability theory overlap with the resilience 
engineering approach to safety. Nonetheless, concerns have been raised about the 
application of high reliability theory to health care domains (Nemeth & Cook 2007). 
Nemeth and Cook (2007) have argued, for example, that measures such as 
redundancy, standardisation, and extensive training during routine operations may be 
impractical and impede performance in hospital settings. Reasons for this include the 
high level of complexity and variability that characterise health care delivery, the 
presence of resource constraints, and the predominance of human-to-human 
interaction (Nemeth & Cook 2007). 
2.14 Studies of gaps 
Studies of gaps have tended to have as their focus four interrelated processes: 
communication, clinical handover, teamwork, and the phenomenon of failure-to-
rescue. 
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2.14.1 Communication 
Health care has been described as an ‘inherently interdisciplinary […] 
communicative and team-based activity’ (Manser 2009, p. 143). Effective teamwork 
and communication are crucial to the achievement of patient safety outcomes with 
research establishing that communication and teamwork failures are among the most 
frequent contributors to gaps in patient care and preventable adverse events (El-
Dawlatly et al. 2004; Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000; Leonard, Graham & 
Bonacum 2004; Lingard, Espin, Whyte et al. 2004; Meurier 2000; Page 2004; 
Pronovost, Thompson, Holzmueller et al. 2006; Suresh et al. 2004). The QAHCS 
study revealed that breakdowns in communication contributed to 11 percent of 
adverse events (Wilson et al. 1995). Data from the Joint Commission’s Sentinel 
Event Database concurs, attributing more than half of some 3,800 sentinel events (65 
percent) to communication failures (The Joint Commission 2008). Of note, 73 
percent of these breakdowns contributed to the patient’s death. The recognition that 
patient safety is primarily a systems problem underscores the importance of effective 
co-ordination, interaction and communication among members of health care teams 
(Baker, DP et al. 2003).  
Leonard, Graham and Bonacum (2004) contend that effective communication is 
dependent upon (i) standardised communication tools; (ii) a culture where people 
feel they can ‘speak up’; and (iii) a common language. Measures to prevent 
communication gaps have included the introduction of the SBAR (Situation, 
Background, Assessment, and Recommendation) communication tool, originally 
developed by the U.S. Navy to facilitate the communication of critical information 
(Haig, Sutton & Whittington 2006; Hohenhaus, Powell & Hohenhaus 2006). The 
SBAR method has been used to standardise communication during clinical handover 
and the reporting of patient problems and deterioration between health care 
providers.  
2.14.2 Clinical handover 
Clinical handover, an integral part of health care and a method of managing 
discontinuity (Vidyarthi et al. 2006), also represents a ‘fracture’ point in patient care  
(Patterson et al. in press) and an opportunity for the emergence of  ‘vulnerable gaps’ 
in the form of errors and adverse events (Johnson & Barach 2009, p. S110). Clinical 
handover  has been defined as: 
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The transfer of professional responsibility and accountability for some or 
all aspects of care for a patient, or group of patients, to another person or 
professional group on a temporary or permanent basis (British Medical 
Association 2004).  
Research has identified many shortcomings in clinical handover, including a 
lack of structure; incidences of inaccurate, incomplete handover or no handover at 
all; and high variability in the handover process (Bomba & Prakash 2005; Lingard et 
al. 2004; Manser & Foster 2011; Pezzolesi et al. 2010; Riesenberg, Leitzsch & 
Cunningham 2010; Vidyarthi et al. 2006). Barriers to effective clinical handover 
include poor communication; a lack of standardisation of the handover process; 
environmental and equipment issues; insufficient training, education and time; and 
human factors (Botti et al. 2009; Riesenberg, Leitzsch & Cunningham 2010).  
Measures to improve clinical handover have included the development of 
clinical handover standards (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health 
Care 2011) and guidelines to improve handover practices (Australian Medical 
Association 2006; British Medical Association 2004). Other measures include 
standardisation of the process and content of clinical handover and a focus on the 
education and training of health care providers (Bost et al. 2010; Botti et al. 2009; 
Catchpole et al. 2007; Jenkin, Abelson-Mitchell & Cooper 2007).  
2.14.3 Teamwork 
The importance of teamwork in the achievement of patient safety outcomes was 
highlighted in the IOM’s report, To Err is Human (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, M 
2000). Teamwork has been defined as: 
A dynamic process involving two or more health care professionals with 
complementary background and skills, sharing common health goals and 
exercising concerted physical and mental effort in assessing, planning, or 
evaluating patient care’ (Xyrichis & Ream 2008, p. 232).  
Unlike teams in other industries and settings, health care teams have a number of 
defining characteristics. As Manser (2009) has identified, health care teams:  
...work under conditions that change frequently, may be assembled ad 
hoc, have a dynamically changing team membership […] and have to 
integrate different professional cultures’ (p. 143).  
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Key elements of effective teamwork include interdependent collaboration based 
on mutual respect and trust; shared mental models with regard to mutual goals, the 
perception of a situation and team structure (i.e. tasks and roles); open 
communication and the ability to resolve differences; shared decision making; cross 
monitoring of the performance of other team members; and, leadership that values 
contributions from staff, encourages participation in decision making and adapts by 
reallocating functions in critical situations (Baker, DP et al. 2003; Baker, DP, Day & 
Salas 2006; Manser 2009; Xyrichis & Ream 2008). Furthermore, research has 
identified significant differences in perceptions of teamwork with doctors expressing 
greater satisfaction with the quality of teamwork than nurses (Flin et al. 2006; Huang 
et al. 2007; Makary et al. 2006; Miller 2001).   
Efforts to improve team work have focussed on the implementation of formal 
teamwork training methods such as crew resource management (CRM) and 
simulation team training (Awad et al. 2005; Baker, DP et al. 2003; Barrett et al. 
2001; Gaba 2000; Leonard, Graham and Bonacum 2004; Pizzi, Goldfarb & Nash 
2001; Wachter 2004). Lessons learned from the widespread use of CRM in the 
aviation industry have been incorporated into health care to standardise and improve 
teamwork and communication. Typically, CRM training programs encompass team 
training, simulation, group debriefings, and the measurement and improvement of 
team performance (Pizzi, Goldfarb & Nash 2001). Issues addressed in these 
programs include conflict resolution, decision making and peer monitoring. 
2.14.4 Failure-to-rescue  
The term ‘failure-to-rescue’ was first coined by Silber and colleagues (1992) to 
describe death from complications as distinct from death per se (i.e. the number of 
deaths per number of patients). Key studies by Silber and colleagues (1995; 1992) 
revealed that occurrences of failure-to-rescue were associated more with hospital 
characteristics (i.e. availability of technology, physician staffing levels, average daily 
census, nurse-patient ratio) than the severity of the patient’s illness. Over the last two 
decades interest in failure-to-rescue has grown such that it has evolved into a 
significant patient safety issue, an important measure of hospital performance and 
quality of care, and a nursing sensitive outcome measure (Clarke & Aiken 2003; 
Mackintosh & Sandall 2008; Needleman & Buerhaus 2007; Silber et al. 2007). In 
hospital contexts, it is considered a gauge of an organisation’s ‘rescue capability’, its 
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ability to recognise patient complications and clinical deterioration and respond with 
appropriate clinical management (Hravnak et al. 2011; Mackintosh & Sandall 2008). 
Research studies have investigated the relationship between failure-to-rescue 
and a range of hospital characteristics. These studies identified inverse relationships 
between rates of failure-to-rescue and patient-nurse ratios, levels of nurse education, 
total nursing hours and nursing skill mix, and superior patient care environments 
(Aiken et al. 2003; Aiken et al. 2008; Aiken et al. 2002; Kendall-Gallagher et al. 
2011; Lang et al. 2004; Needleman et al. 2002). Nonetheless, failure-to-rescue is a 
multifaceted problem, characterised by the complex interplay between numerous 
patient and system factors (Hravnak et al. 2011; Mackintosh & Sandall 2008; 
National Patient Safety Agency 2007). Relevant patient factors include severity of 
illness, demographics, co-morbidities and individual variation in the physiologic 
signs of deterioration. Some of the system factors identified in a yearlong study by 
the National Patient Safety Agency in the United Kingdom (2007, pp. 14-23) 
include:  communication; working conditions and the environment; patient care 
tasks; education and training; teamwork; organisational factors; equipment and 
resources; and human factors. 
Initiatives to address the problem of failure-to-rescue have included system 
responses such as the introduction of medical emergency teams; standardised 
communication tools; ‘track and trigger methods’ to identify out of range physiologic 
parameters; and the use of simulation techniques to educate nurses in recognising 
patient deterioration (Buykx et al. 2011; Mackintosh & Sandall 2008; National 
Patient Safety Agency 2007). Furthermore, recognising and responding to clinical 
deterioration has been incorporated into recent standards developed by the Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health care (Australian Commission on Safety 
and Quality in Health Care 2012).  
2.15 Nurses and safety success 
Efforts to address the pressing global challenge of preventable harm in health care 
have tended to have as their focus what went ‘wrong’. The Resilience Engineering 
paradigm represents a move away from traditional, retrospective approaches to safety 
management. Instead, the Resilience Engineering approach holds that human persons 
actively create safety and are vital to the successful functioning of complex systems 
such as hospital settings. Thus, important safety lessons can be learnt from the 
investigation of everyday performance and what goes ‘right’.  
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To date, key studies of how nurses create safety have focussed on the 
management of risk, recovery of medical errors, and process of surveillance. While 
gaps are frequently cited as a contributing factor in preventable adverse events, the 
role and expertise of nurses in anticipating, detecting, and bridging gaps to prevent 
harm from reaching the patient is an under-investigated perspective in patient safety 
research. A key objective of this study is to redress this oversight by focussing on 
safety success, namely, how nurses ‘get it right’. 
2.16 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a review of the literature that informed the formulation of 
the aims, objectives and research questions guiding this inquiry. Attention has been 
given to key studies of adverse events in hospital contexts, the role of human error in 
these events, the systems approach to human error management, and the evolution of 
the patient safety movement both internationally and in Australia. Attention has also 
been given to the processes widely used to address systems problems in health care, 
the role of nurses in the recovery of medical errors and the notion of nursing 
surveillance. Similarly, studies of gaps have been examined along with the concepts 
of complexity and reliability.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter has as its focus a discussion of the methodology (naturalistic inquiry) 
and method (qualitative exploratory descriptive research) selected for this study. In 
advancing this discussion attention is given firstly to a brief examination of the 
philosophic assumptions underpinning naturalistic inquiry and the qualitative 
exploratory descriptive (QED) research method. Attention is then given to the setting 
and the steps taken to advance the study, including: the sample (its type and size, the 
processes used for recruiting and accessing the sample selected, and the demographic 
details of the participants recruited); data collection and analysis; presentation and 
dissemination of the research findings; and the processes used for ensuring research 
rigour and the credibility of these findings. Finally, attention is given to the ethics 
approval process and the strengths and limitations of the study. 
3.2 The naturalistic inquiry paradigm 
The naturalistic inquiry paradigm, as described by Lincoln and Guba (1985), is based 
on two important principles7. Firstly, it implies minimal manipulation or control of 
the variables on the part of the inquirer. Secondly the inquirer poses no prior 
constraints on the outcomes of the inquiry (Jacobs 1985; Lincoln & Guba 1985; 
Patton 2002). The inquirer allows the phenomenon of interest to ‘unfold naturally’, 
endeavouring to ‘understand and document the day-to-day reality’ with an ‘openness 
                                                 
7 The term ‘naturalistic inquiry’ arose from the seminal work of Lincoln and Guba (1985) and was 
defined at the level of paradigm. While naturalistic inquiry relies heavily on the human as instrument, 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) point out that it is not essential that naturalistic inquiry be carried out using 
qualitative methods exclusively. Subsequently and confusingly, the term naturalistic inquiry has been 
presented in the literature as a paradigm, a philosophic stance and a research method in qualitative 
research. Jacobs (1985, p. 4) suggests that wide use of the term ‘naturalistic’ is due to its logical 
consistency with ‘one of the basic tenets of the alternate paradigm – the inquiry is conducted in the 
natural setting, not in an artificial or laboratory setting’. For the purposes of this inquiry, the term 
‘naturalistic inquiry’ is defined as a paradigm. 
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to whatever emerges’ (Patton 2002, pp. 39-40). Naturalistic inquiry is a respected 
paradigm in the social and behavioural sciences (Lincoln & Guba 1985). It enhances 
knowledge, understanding and explanation by producing ‘detailed, thick description’ 
of a phenomenon under investigation (Patton 2002, p. 40). Naturalistic inquiry was 
chosen for this inquiry because it was the most appropriate approach for generating 
the data needed to answer the research questions driving the inquiry.  
3.2.1 Philosophic assumptions  
This inquiry was guided by certain philosophic assumptions regarding the nature of 
reality (ontology), the relationship between the researcher and that being researched 
(epistemology), the role of values in an inquiry (axiology), and the possibility of 
naturalistic generalisation and casual linkages as described by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985). The axioms of the naturalistic inquiry paradigm are outlined in Box 3.1, 
below.  
 
Box 3.1 The five axioms of the naturalistic inquiry paradigm (Erlandson et al. 1993; Lincoln & 
Guba 1985, pp. 37-8) 
 
The nature of reality (ontology) 
There is not one, single, objective reality but multiple, constructed, and holistic realities that 
cannot be understood in isolation from their contexts. 
The relationship of the knower to the known (epistemology) 
The knower and known are inseparable, the inquirer and the object of inquiry interact and 
influence each other. 
The role of values in inquiry (axiology) 
Inquiry is value-laden. 
The possibility of naturalistic generalisation 
Naturalistic inquiry produces time- and context-bound working hypotheses that describe the 
individual case. 
The possibility of causal linkages 
All entities are in a state of mutual simultaneous shaping so that it is impossible to distinguish 
causes from effects. 
 
Naturalistic inquiry favours qualitative methods and the use of human 
individuals as the ‘primary data-gathering instrument’ (Lincoln & Guba 1985, p. 39). 
This dependence on human persons is due to their almost ‘infinite adaptability’ and 
capacity to develop and refine as an inquiry progresses (Lincoln & Guba 1985, p. 
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250). Lincoln and Guba (1985) contend that the ‘human as instrument' is inclined 
toward qualitative methods (i.e. interviewing, observing and document review) 
because they are extensions of common human activities (i.e. looking, listening, 
speaking and reading). They propose a set of presumptions for an inquiry to be 
considered ‘naturalistic’ that call for the inquirer to:  
(i) adopt the axioms of the naturalistic inquiry paradigm; 
(ii) rely predominantly on humans for the collection of the data;  
(iii) develop the necessary skills to effectively collect the data; 
(iv) avoid ‘undisciplined and haphazard poking around’ by developing an initial 
design for the inquiry; and  
(v) become familiar with the setting for the inquiry (Lincoln & Guba 1985, p. 
250). 
The initial design of this study included consideration of: a focus for the inquiry, 
the fit of the naturalistic inquiry paradigm to the focus, where and from whom data 
would be collected, the method of collecting and recording the data, and the data 
analysis procedures (Lincoln & Guba 1985). These will be discussed under separate 
subheadings below. 
3.2.2 Rationale for adopting the naturalistic inquiry paradigm 
Naturalistic inquiry is the paradigm of choice when the focus of an inquiry is socio-
behavioural (Lincoln & Guba 1985). The naturalistic inquiry paradigm was adopted 
for this study because its ontological assumptions about the nature of reality were 
consistent with the process of the inquiry. In this paradigm, realities are ‘wholes that 
cannot be understood in isolation from their contexts, nor can they be fragmented for 
separate study of the parts’ (Lincoln & Guba 1985, p. 39). In this inquiry participants 
were interviewed in natural settings, not created for research purposes (i.e. 
laboratories). The researcher as the primary data gathering instrument adjusted to the 
many realities encountered during the inquiry process. The emergent nature of the 
research design permitted flexibility throughout the inquiry and the ‘opportunity for 
the unexpected to arise’ (Green 2002, p. 6). Furthermore, the naturalistic inquiry 
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paradigm permitted an exploration of the phenomenon of gaps management without 
the obligation to locate the study within a grand theory.8  
3.3 The qualitative exploratory descriptive research method 
This inquiry was undertaken using a qualitative exploratory descriptive (QED) 
method informed by the works of Sandelowski (2000), Patton (2002), and 
Ramprogus (2002). QED research is one of the most frequently used research 
methods in the practice disciplines and the method of choice when the researcher 
seeks description of a phenomenon about which there is little scientific knowledge 
and where the data are too complex to be gathered utilising a survey method 
(Sandelowski 2000). QED research produces a low inference description of events 
and is ‘especially amenable to obtaining straight and largely unadorned (i.e., 
minimally theorised or otherwise transformed or spun) answers to questions of 
special relevance to practitioners and policy makers’ (Sandelowski 2000, p. 337). 
The researcher achieves this by capturing all elements of an event, ‘staying close’ to 
the data and to the ‘surface of words and events’, and communicating the facts in 
‘everyday language’ (Sandelowski 2000, p. 334). Sandelowski (2000) explains that, 
unlike other qualitative approaches: 
There is no mandate to produce anything other than a descriptive 
summary of an event, organised in a way that best contains the data 
collected and will be most relevant to the audience for whom it was 
written (p. 339). 
QED research yields ‘a comprehensive summary of events in […] everyday 
terms’ (Sandelowski 2000, p. 334). Its purpose is to describe, not explain, and allow 
‘an understanding of the empirical foundations of theory’ (Johnstone & Kanitsaki 
2005, p. 94). To this end, QED research does not ‘go against the grain of theoretical 
sociological models’ but ‘permits them to exist under more propitious conditions’ 
(Hamel, Dufour & Fortin 1993, p. 34). In contrast to other qualitative research 
                                                 
8 Patton (2002, p. 136) advocates a pragmatic approach to qualitative inquiry, arguing that ‘methods 
can be separated from the epistemology out of which they have emerged’ and that ‘allegiance to any 
single epistemological perspective’ is unnecessary. Furthermore, Patton (2002, pp. 137-45) believes 
that ‘methods of qualitative inquiry now stand on their own as reasonable ways to find out what is 
happening in programs and other human settings’ without being ‘attached to or derived from a 
theoretical tradition’. This notion will be explored in the next section, ‘The Qualitative exploratory 
descriptive research method’.  
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approaches such as phenomenology, ethnography, and grounded theory, language is 
a vehicle of communication and not an interpretive structure used to re-present 
events in other terms (Sandelowski 2000). The pragmatism, characteristic of QED 
research, is advocated by Patton (2002, pp. 136-7) who argues that ‘allegiance to any 
single epistemological perspective’ is unnecessary and that ‘methods of qualitative 
inquiry now stand on their own as reasonable ways to find out what is happening in 
programs and other human settings’. As Patton (2002) explains: 
Not all questions are theory based. Indeed, the quite concrete and 
practical questions of people working to make the world a better place 
(and wondering if what they’re doing is working) can be addressed 
without placing the study in one of the theoretical frameworks (p. 136). 
The QED method was eminently suited to the investigation of gaps and patient 
safety in complex and dynamic hospital settings. This method allowed the researcher 
to explore nurse’s knowledge, understanding, experiences and feelings about gaps in 
patient care. In so doing, the study has ‘elicit[ed] nursing knowledge from practice 
without fragmenting or dissociating it from its contextual reality’ (Ramprogus 2002, 
p. 63) and revealed how nurses contribute positively to patient safety outcomes.  
3.4 Qualitative research and patient safety 
Hoff and Sutcliffe (2006) have argued that patient safety research should encompass 
diverse methodological approaches. While Hoff and Sutcliffe (2006) write for a 
medical audience, the stance they adopt holds easily for nursing. Quantitative designs 
may control or ignore the complexity of health care, oversimplify its delivery and 
produce recommendations with limited application (Hoff & Sutcliffe 2006; 
Runciman 2002). Qualitative methods, on the other hand, accommodate the 
contextual realities of health care, enabling the researcher to achieve a rich 
description of ‘how things work in the ‘trenches’ of patient care’ (Hoff & Sutcliffe 
2006, pp. 7-8). These perspectives may deepen understanding of the organisational 
processes around error, safety and the delivery of patient care (Hoff & Sutcliffe 
2006).  
3.5 Setting 
The participants in this study were nurses employed in emergency, critical care, 
perioperative, neuroscience, and rehabilitation and transitional care settings. The 
selection of these clinical settings was based, in part, on data obtained from the 
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HMPS  (Leape et al. 1991) and the QAHCS (Wilson et al. 1995) - two studies 
exceptional in their rigour and scope and regarded internationally as the benchmark 
for estimating the extent of iatrogenic injuries (Weingart et al. 2000). Emergency, 
critical care and perioperative settings are very acute, rapidly changing and highly 
unpredictable environments that experience high patient throughput. In contrast, 
neuroscience, rehabilitation and transitional care settings are less acute, more 
predictable and less rapidly changing environments. The purpose of recruiting nurses 
from these contrasting contexts with regard to acuity, predictability and propensity to 
change was to examine the phenomena of gaps from multiple perspectives and 
enable triangulation of the data. This approach allowed for meaningful comparisons 
to be made to help answer the question ‘what is going on here’? 
3.5.1 Perioperative 
A salient feature of the results from the HMPS and the QAHCS is the high 
proportion of adverse events in the operating room, 41 percent and 46.8 percent 
respectively (Leape et al. 1991; Wilson et al. 1995). These results are summarised in 
Table 3.1, below. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of the location of adverse events in the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study (HMPS) and Quality in Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS)  
 
Sites of care that resulted in 
adverse events 
Proportion of adverse events 
 HMPS QAHCS 
Operating room 
Patient’s room 
Emergency department 
Intensive care unit 
41% 
26.5% 
2.9% 
2.7% 
46.8% 
25.1% 
1.5% 
 
Perioperative settings provide multidisciplinary care and treatment through the 
pre-operative, intra-operative and post-operative phases of surgery. In recent years 
the term ‘perioperative’ has replaced ‘operating room’ to more accurately reflect the 
specialised roles within this setting and the focus on temporal considerations rather 
than the geographical boundaries of the operation room (Riley & Peters 2000). The 
perioperative setting is a complex, pressured and ‘accident-rich’ health care 
environment (Christian et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2010). This complexity and risk arise 
from the interplay of many factors, including a heavy reliance on technology, the 
Chapter 3. Methodology & Method 
58 
 
surgery itself, patient co-morbidities, anaesthesia, scheduling considerations and the 
need for effective teamwork and communication across many disciplines (Wiegmann 
et al. 2007; Willis et al. 2005). Specialist perioperative nursing roles include 
anaesthetic nurse, circulating nurse (scout), instrument nurse (scrub) and post 
anaesthetic care nurse (recovery). Sixteen participants were recruited from 
perioperative settings.  
3.5.2 Emergency 
The incidence of adverse events in the emergency department (ED) (2.9 percent in 
the HMPS and 1.5 percent in the QAHCS) was found to be considerably lower than 
for other sites such as the operating room and patient room’s but comparable to the 
intensive care unit (Leape et al. 1991; Wilson et al. 1995). Significantly, however, 
the preventability of adverse events in the ED was high, 70.4 percent in the HMPS 
and 82 percent in the QAHCS. While recent studies have identified errors in all 
facets of emergency care (i.e. triage, diagnostic studies, administrative procedures, 
medication administration, therapeutic intervention and patient assessment), only a 
small number (2 to 4 adverse events for every 100 reported errors) resulted in 
adverse events (Fordyce et al. 2003; Henneman, PL et al. 2005).  In contrast to the 
life threatening nature of many errors in critical care settings, errors in the ED 
resulted mostly in delays in treatment and a prolonged stay. 
It is acknowledged that EDs are also ‘high risk, high stress environments fraught 
with opportunities for error’ (Institute of Medicine 2007, p. 23). ED care 
encompasses a broad case mix of patients from diverse racial, ethno-cultural, 
language and socio-economic backgrounds (Johnstone 2007; Nemeth, Cook & 
Wears 2007). The complex and ‘high-tempo’ nature of the ED requires that staff act 
and think quickly and make decisions, often on the basis of incomplete information 
(i.e. medical history, results from diagnostic tests, medications) (Croskerry & 
Sinclair 2001). The contributors to error are multi-factorial and include the presence 
of interruptions, distractions and overcrowding; high noise levels; a heavy reliance 
on technology; the need for effective teamwork and communication; and the high 
demand for emergency care. Nineteen participants were recruited from emergency 
settings.  
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3.5.3 Critical care 
Recent studies in critical care settings have suggested that adverse events and serious 
medical errors are common and occur in between 14 percent and 20 percent of 
patients (Bracco et al. 2001; Donchin et al. 1995; Graf et al. 2005; Rothschild et al. 
2005). Furthermore, between 11 percent and 29 percent of these errors and adverse 
events have been described as severe, potentially life threatening or fatal, with the 
majority occurring during routine care. Consistent with earlier analysis by De Vries 
et al. (2008), almost half (45 percent) were preventable. Rothschild et al. (2005) have 
provided an estimate of the extent of serious errors in critical care settings in the 
U.S.A: 
Assuming that the rates we found are representative of critical care in 
teaching hospitals, we estimate that 148,000 life threatening intercepted 
and non-intercepted serious errors occur annually in teaching hospitals (p. 
1698). 
Critical care settings are ‘intricately designed, technologically laden’ and 
‘intrinsically hazardous’ environments (Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis & Stannard 
1999, p. 347). A number of factors place patients in these settings at greater risk of 
harm from an adverse event. These include the seriousness of the patient’s illness, 
sophisticated equipment and technology, the use of instantaneous therapies and 
medications with a low threshold of error, the need for decision-making on the basis 
of incomplete information (Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis & Stannard 1999; Rothschild 
et al. 2005). Furthermore, care is provided by a ‘constantly changing network of 
providers’ with varying levels of critical care training and experience (Sherwood et 
al. 2002). Twenty participants were recruited from critical care settings.  
3.5.4 Neurosciences 
Results from the HMPS suggest that the rate of adverse events in neurosurgery (9.9 
percent) may be higher than for many other clinical specialties but comparable to 
vascular (16.1 percent), thoracic and cardiac surgery (10.8 percent) (Brennan et al. 
1991). A significant finding of the QAHCS was that more adverse events for the 
nervous system (37.1 percent) resulted in permanent disability (Wilson et al. 1995). 
The study design included neuroscience units as distinct from neuroscience critical 
care settings that care for critically ill patients needing invasive monitoring, 
mechanical ventilation and intensive therapies. Neuroscience units care for medical 
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and surgical patients with a variety of neurological problems, including 
neuromuscular and cerebrovascular disorders, stroke, neurologic infections, epilepsy, 
tumours and head trauma. Two participants were recruited from neuroscience 
settings.  
    
3.5.5 Rehabilitation and transitional care 
A review of the literature failed to locate any adverse event data for rehabilitation 
and transitional care settings. Rehabilitation settings provide specialised health care 
to patients with disabilities and impairment resulting from illness, injury, trauma or 
surgery. Rehabilitation care seeks to maximise the patient’s physical strength, 
cognition, mobility, life skills and independence. Transitional care ‘encompasses a 
broad range of services and environments designed to promote the safe and timely 
passage of patients between levels of health care and across care settings’ (Naylor & 
Keating 2008, p. 58). Transitional care focuses on logistical considerations, 
education and coordination of the care of older adults with chronic and complex 
medical conditions (Coleman 2003). Transitional care units and services may be 
located within hospitals, sub-acute nursing facilities or long term care facilities. 
Fourteen participants were recruited from rehabilitation and transitional care settings.  
The actual number of participants recruited and interviewed from each clinical 
context is summarised in Table 3.2, below. 
 
Table 3.2 Number of participants interviewed from each clinical setting 
Emergency  
 
Critical 
care 
Perioperative Rehabilitation & 
transitional care 
Neuro-
sciences 
TOTAL 
INTERVIEWS 
19 20 16 14 2 71 
 
3.6 Method 
This study was advanced using the following steps: 
x Sample selection 
x Data collection 
x Data analysis 
x Data presentation and dissemination of the research findings 
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Each of these steps will be considered under separate subheadings below.  
3.6.1 Sample selection 
In the discussion to follow, attention is given to describing the sample type and size, 
the processes used for recruiting and accessing participants, and the demographic 
details of the participants recruited. 
(a) Sample type and size 
A purposeful sample of 71 participants was recruited to the study. As previously 
stated, the participants were nurses employed in emergency, critical care, 
perioperative, neuroscience, rehabilitation and transitional care settings. Nurses who 
participated in the study met the following inclusionary criteria: 
(i) current registration as a Registered Nurse in a state or territory of Australia; 
and 
(ii) current employment in a clinical setting relevant to the study. 
Each participant’s registration and employment were verified prior to their 
recruitment. A sample size of 80-100 participants was the target for the study, based 
upon the inclusion of five clinical settings. The recruitment of only two neuroscience 
nurses effectively reduced the number of clinical settings of interest from five to 
four, although the neuroscience data has been included in the analysis. In keeping 
with the major tenets of naturalistic inquiry, informational considerations guided the 
determination of the final number of participants interviewed and the decision to stop 
recruitment (Lincoln & Guba 1985). On this point, Patton (2002, p. 245) states that 
‘the validity, meaningfulness, and insights generated from qualitative inquiry have 
more to do with the information richness of the cases selected’ rather than the 
number of cases per se. Sampling was stopped when it was evident that no new 
information was emerging from the participant interviews and the sample size was 
judged to be ‘adequate’ - neither ‘too large’ such that it precluded ‘the deep, case-
oriented analysis that is a hallmark of all qualitative inquiry’ nor ‘too small’ that it 
hindered ‘a new and richly textured understanding of experience’ (Sandelowski 
1995, p. 183). 
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(b) Sample recruitment 
Purposeful sampling, a crucial element of naturalistic inquiry, guided the recruitment 
of participants in the study (Erlandson et al. 1993; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Patton 
2002). The aim of this sampling technique is to locate participants with an intense 
and salient experience of the phenomenon of interest and from which data can be 
collected and a thick description of the phenomenon under investigation composed. 
The examination of ‘information-rich’ cases yielded rich, descriptive data and 
maximised the range of information obtained about gaps and their management 
(Erlandson et al. 1993; Patton 2002).  
Participants were recruited using snowballing and open recruitment, two widely 
accepted recruitment strategies in qualitative research. Snowballing is a technique 
whereby a participant that has already been recruited to a study informs others with 
the same salient experience of the phenomena about the study (Patton 2002; 
Silverman & Marvasti 2008). Snowballing allowed the researcher to access 
participants who may otherwise have been unreachable. Open recruitment was 
conducted by advertising the study in key nursing publications and presenting at 
meetings of relevant professional nursing groups. These professional nursing groups 
also agreed to circulate information about the study to their members. 
(c) Sample description 
A demographic questionnaire was used to gather data about the participant’s age, 
gender, current role and qualifications for the purposes of analysis and comparison 
(See Appendix 4). 
(i) Gender 
Of the 71 participants, 62 (87 percent) were female and 9 (13 percent) were male. 
The predominance of women in the sample is reflective of the predominance of 
women in the nursing profession generally. 
(ii) Geographical location 
Participants were located in metropolitan or regional and rural settings in all States 
and Territories of mainland Australia. Two participants were living and working 
outside Australia. See Table 3.3, below.  
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Table 3.3 Geographical location of participants 
 VIC QLD SA NSW WA NT ACT Total 
Metropolitan 21 9 4 7 2 2 1 46 
Regional/ 
rural 
9 6 1 7 - - - 23 
 (VIC - Victoria; QLD - Queensland; SA - South Australia; NSW - New South Wales; WA - 
Western Australia; NT - Northern Territory; ACT - Australian Capital Territory) 
(iii) Current role 
The roles of the participants are listed in Table 3.4, below.   
 
Table 3.4 Roles of the participants 
 
Role Total 
Nurse educator 14 
Staff nurse 13 
Clinical nurse specialist/clinical nurse 13 
Clinical nurse consultant 13 
Nursing unit manager/clinical manager 8 
Assistant nursing unit manager/charge nurse 3 
Assistant director of nursing 2 
Nurse practitioner 2 
Quality coordinator 1 
(iv) Age 
Of the 71 nurses recruited, 69 provided details of their age. Two (2) participants 
declined to provide details of their age. With the available data, the following 
demographic profile emerged: 
x 2 participants were aged between 20-25 years (2.9 percent) 
x 5 participants were aged between 26-30 years (7.2 percent) 
x 4 participants were aged between 31-35 years (5.8 percent) 
x 9 participants were aged between 36-40 years (13 percent) 
x 16 participants were aged between 41-45 years (23.2 percent) 
x 18 participants were aged between 46-50 years (26.1 percent) 
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x 8 participants were aged between 51-55 years (11.6 percent) 
x 6 participants were aged between 56-60 years (8.7 percent) 
x 1 participant was aged between 61-65 years (1.4 percent) 
3.6.2 Data Collection 
Data were collected via in depth, semi structured interviews using three 
internationally accepted methods: (i) face-to-face interviewing, (ii) telephone 
interviewing, and (iii) e-mail interviewing (Hodgson 2004; Karchmer 2001; Kennedy 
2000; Kim et al. 2003; Lehu 2004; Meho & Tibbo 2003; Murray, CD 2004; Murray, 
CD & Harrison 2004; Olivero & Lunt 2004). Participants nominated their preferred 
interview method although financial constraints limited face-to-face interviews to 
those participants living in the same city as the researcher. The questions that guided 
each interview are contained in Appendix 1. Of the seventy one interviews 
conducted, 15 were face-to-face, 46 were by telephone, four were by email and six 
were joint email and telephone interviews (See Table 3.5 below). These six 
participants were interviewed initially by email and then over the telephone. 
Consistent with the principles of ‘auditability’ (discussed under the heading 
‘consistency - auditability’ in this chapter), a full record of the data collected and 
analysed has been preserved.  
 
Table 3.5 Face-to-face, telephone, email and email with telephone interviews – 
participant clinical settings 
INTERVIEW 
METHOD 
Face-to-face Telephone E-mail E-mail & 
telephone  
TOTAL 
Emergency 5 11 0 3 19 
Critical care 5 12 2 1 20 
Perioperative 3 10 1 2 16 
Rehabilitation/ 
transitional care 
1 12 1 0 14 
Neurosciences 1 1 0 0 2 
TOTAL 15 46 4 6 71 
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(a) Face-to-face and telephone interviews 
All face-to-face and telephone interviews were conducted at a time and, where 
applicable, place that was mutually convenient to the participant and researcher. At 
the commencement of each interview participants were advised that the interview 
was to be audio-recorded. The interview guide was used to stimulate discussion and 
the interviews were conversational in style. The interviews commenced with a broad 
initial enquiry to which respondents provided extensive reflective responses in a 
narrative. The length of each interview ranged from 45 minutes to 120 minutes. 
Verbatim transcription of audio-recorded interviews was undertaken to ensure 
accuracy of the data collection. It was incumbent on the researcher to exercise great 
care during the transcription process to ensure that a faithful record of the interview 
was captured. In addition to the interview and demographic data, data were also 
obtained from the following sources: 
x Researcher field notes; 
x Notes from meetings with the researcher’s supervisory team; and 
x Documents and other literature sources relevant to the inquiry (i.e. scholarly 
literature on the topic of patient safety and the role of nurses in preserving 
patient safety, reports and policy documents of government and special 
committees, and publicly available documents and reports of health service 
organisations). 
(b) E-mail interviews 
In this section, attention is given to the evolution of e-mail interviewing as a data 
collection method, the use of e-mail interviewing in the current study, and the 
challenges posed by the use of this method. 
(i) Background 
E-mail interviewing is a data collection method that falls within the field of computer 
mediated communication (CMC) - the direct use of computers and text for the 
purposes of communication (Mann & Stewart 2000). The reach, accessibility and 
convenience of the internet have created the opportunity for qualitative researchers to 
apply ‘long-standing principles of recruitment and interviewing to this new setting’ 
(Hamilton & Bowers 2006, p. 821). Over the last twenty years, e-mail has emerged 
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as an alternative to traditional face-to-face and ‘naturalistic’ data collection methods 
(Murray, CD & Sixsmith 1998).  
The suitability of e-mail interviewing as a data collection method has been the 
focus of many methodological studies (Foster 1994; Karchmer 2001; Kennedy 2000; 
Meho & Tibbo 2003; Murray, PJ 1995; Young, Persichitte & Tharp 1998). These 
early studies identified a number of benefits subsequently confirmed by further 
research (Curasi 2001; Hamilton & Bowers 2006; Hodgson 2004; Kim et al. 2003; 
Lehu 2004; Mann & Stewart 2000; Meho 2006; Murray, CD 2004; Murray, CD & 
Harrison 2004; Olivero & Lunt 2004). Consistent with these studies, e-mail 
interviewing offered a number of practical advantages, including access to 
participants from diverse geographic locations and significant cost and time savings 
by eliminating the need for telephone calls, travelling, scheduling of appointments, 
hiring of venues and equipment, and transcription of audio-recorded interviews. The 
potential for transcription bias was eliminated as a digitally generated, verbatim and 
complete account of the whole interview was immediately available for analysis 
(Mann & Stewart 2000). From the participant’s perspective, questions could be 
answered at their convenience and in an environment of their choice.  
Other forms of CMC such as e-mail surveys (an electronic version of a 
standardised paper survey) and web-based surveys were considered inappropriate 
due to the complexity of the phenomenon underpinning this inquiry. Unlike virtual 
focus groups, the contents of the e-mail interviews were not shared with or 
influenced by other participants (Schneider et al. 2002). The asynchronous nature of 
e-mail interviewing allowed the researcher the opportunity to reflect on the interview 
data and revise subsequent questions before responding to the participant. It is 
suggested that this process may produce a ‘closer fit between ideas/emotions and 
their expression in writing’ (Levinson 1990, p. 5). Further benefits of this method 
included the avoidance of interviewer effects and the potential for shy participants or 
those who spoke English as a second language to feel somewhat protected and more 
willing to disclose. Mann and Stewart (2000) contend that participants are less likely 
to feel embarrassed in an on-line environment.  
(ii) The e-mail interviewing process 
Each e-mail interview involved many exchanges between the researcher and 
participant over a period of weeks to months. In keeping with the findings and 
recommendations of other studies (Curasi 2001; Hamilton & Bowers 2006; Meho 
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2006), a number of measures were taken to ensure the interviewing process was 
effective. Participants were advised that interview responses could be sent in the 
body of the e-mail or as an attached document. They were asked to write in a 
conversational style, including as much detail as possible, and were reassured there 
were no incorrect responses nor was it necessary to correct spelling and grammatical 
errors. Symbols could be used to communicate emotions and feelings. Participants 
were e-mailed two to three questions at a time and interviews were conducted 
concurrently by sending a short list of interview questions to several participants. 
Breaks between cycles of questions allowed the researcher a period of ‘thoughtful 
follow-up’ (Hamilton & Bowers 2006, p. 830).  
Unlike previous studies (Dommeyer & Moriarty 2000; Oppermann 1995) this 
inquiry did not encounter a high number of undeliverable e-mails or low response 
rate. This is not surprising given the relatively small number of participants that 
selected e-mail as an interviewing method. There are, however, two possible 
explanations for this finding. Firstly, electronic methods such as listservs, servers, 
message boards and discussion groups 9 10 11  were not used for the purposes of 
recruitment and, secondly, the researcher personally contacted each participant prior 
to their recruitment to verify their contact details.  
(iii) Challenges with e-mail interviewing 
While e-mail interviewing had many practical advantages, it also posed a number of 
challenges. Consistent with previous research (Curasi 2001; Hamilton & Bowers 
2006; Meho 2006), the process lacked spontaneity and the time taken to complete 
each interview was highly variable. Similarly, the number of exchanges that occurred 
between the researcher and the participant also varied greatly. While some 
participants responded to a set of questions within days, others took weeks or months 
and did so only in response to probing and reminding. While Curasi (2001) has 
argued that the use of follow-up probes can elicit as much detail in e-mail interviews 
as with face-to-face methods, this was not the case. There was less information 
available in the e-mail interview transcripts than in transcripts of face-to-face and 
                                                 
9 A listserv is a type of electronic mailing list whereby messages are distributed to subscribers to the 
list. 
10 A server is a computer that handles requests for data, email and other network services from other 
computers.  
11 A message board is an online discussion site. 
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telephone interviews. The participants’ level of commitment to the study and the 
amount of time they were able to give to the interview process may have been 
contributing factors. It is also possible that e-mail interviewing, while convenient, is 
a medium that did not suit people who rely more on facial expression and body 
language and prefer to ‘tell’ a story (Mann & Stewart 2000). Poor computer and key 
boarding skills may have been a factor, although this is unlikely given the 
widespread use of computer technology in health care domains. 
When the e-mail interviewing process extended over some months, with periods 
of several weeks elapsing between responses, participants were offered the 
opportunity to complete the interview over the telephone. Six participants accepted 
this offer.   
3.6.3 Data Analysis 
In keeping with the tenets of the naturalistic inquiry paradigm, collection and 
processing of the data was ‘continuous and simultaneous’ throughout the inquiry 
(Lincoln & Guba 1985, p. 335). Data were analysed using content and thematic 
analysis strategies and the constant comparisons method (Braun & Clarke 2006; 
Glaser & Strauss 1967; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Patton 2002). Thematic analysis was 
used to identify, analyse and report ‘patterns’ or ‘themes’ in the data that 
encapsulated ‘something important about the data in relation to the research 
question’ and represented ‘some level of patterned response or meaning within the 
dataset’ (Braun & Clarke 2006, pp. 79-82).  
The specific steps taken to analyse the data were as follows: the verbatim 
transcription of the audio-recorded interviews; drafting summaries of the researcher’s 
field notes and memos; active reading of the data; annotating data and recording 
comments in the margins of the transcripts and summaries; developing tables and 
matrices; creating categories; sorting the material into categories; noting the 
variables and relationships between categories and the ‘negative case’; and, relating 
the analytic framework and findings to the literature (Creswell 2007; Lincoln & 
Guba 1985; Patton 2002).  
The study generated 1595 pages of interview transcript. Page-by-page and line-
by-line analysis of the data in the transcripts reduced the volume of the data to 238 
pages. Further analysis reduced to the data to just 74 pages, as contained in Chapter 4 
of this thesis. The collection of data from nurses working in a variety of clinical 
settings enabled the researcher to use the constant comparison method during the 
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processing of the data. While the constant comparison method is associated with 
grounded theory its application is not limited to this approach. This method involved 
comparing recent data with previous data in the search for consistencies, differences, 
variations, and negative cases within and between the data set for each clinical 
setting (Erlandson et al. 1993; Glaser & Strauss 1967; Lincoln & Guba 1985).  
3.6.4 Presentation and dissemination of research findings 
The findings of this study are presented in Chapter 4 of this report. During the course 
of the inquiry, preliminary findings were presented at three seminars sponsored by 
Deakin University. It is anticipated that the research findings will be further 
disseminated via the following processes: 
x provision of a final copy of the report to each of the participants; 
x provision of a final copy of the report to the specialist nursing groups  
representing nurses from each of the clinical settings of interest; 
x face-to-face report or presentation of the study’s findings to interested 
staff; 
x availability of a pdf version of the final thesis on the internet; 
x professional seminar and conference presentations; and 
x publication in professional peer-reviewed journals.  
3.7 Research rigour  
Four factors are critical to demonstrating ‘trustworthiness’ or rigour in a naturalistic 
inquiry (Lincoln & Guba 1985). The inquiry must (i) demonstrate its truth value, (ii) 
provide the basis for application in other contexts, and (iii) permit external 
judgements about the consistency of its procedures, and (iv) the neutrality of its 
findings (Erlandson et al. 1993; Lincoln & Guba 1985). Trustworthiness is 
established through techniques that provide truth value through credibility; 
applicability through transferability; consistency through dependability and neutrality 
through confirmability (Erlandson et al. 1993; Lincoln & Guba 1985). 
3.7.1 Truth value - credibility 
The truth value or credibility of a naturalistic inquiry ‘generally resides in the 
discovery of human phenomena or experiences as they are lived and perceived by 
subjects, rather than in the verification of a priori conceptions of those experiences’ 
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(Sandelowski 1986, p. 30). An inquiry is credible when the researcher’s descriptions 
or interpretations of a human experience are immediately recognised by the 
participants as being their own (Erlandson et al. 1993). Credibility is enhanced when 
others recognise the particular experience or phenomena, having read about it.  
In keeping with the recommendations of Lincoln and Guba (1985), Patton 
(2002) and Sandelowski (1986), a number of measures were taken to preserve the 
credibility of the inquiry. Firstly, the researcher maintained a stance of ‘empathic 
neutrality’ in regard to the phenomenon being examined, demonstrating interest in 
the participants while remaining neutral about their interview responses so as not to 
become ‘too involved, which can cloud judgement’ nor ‘too distant which can reduce 
understanding’ (Patton 2002, p. 50). Secondly, the data was not manipulated to fit a 
priori conceptions of how nurses manage gaps nor were constraints imposed on the 
outcome of the inquiry. Thirdly, the steps of the methodology (i.e. maintaining an 
audit trail, using constant comparison, looking for the negative case) were rigorously 
followed. The researcher remained immersed in the data, revisiting it ‘over and over 
again to see if the constructs, categories, explanations, and interpretations make 
sense, if they really reflect the nature of the phenomena’ (Patton 2002, p. 570).       
Specific techniques used to establish credibility were triangulation of the data 
source and method, referential adequacy materials, peer debriefing, and a reflexive 
journal. These are outlined briefly below. 
(a) Triangulation 
Triangulation involves the collection of information from different points of view. 
Triangulation of the data source was achieved by recruiting nurses from a variety of 
clinical settings in metropolitan, regional and rural hospitals throughout mainland 
Australia. These nurses performed a wide range of roles. As mentioned, three of 
these settings (emergency, critical care and perioperative) were rapidly changing, 
very acute and highly unpredictable environments while the other two 
(neurosciences, rehabilitation and transitional care) were more predictable, less acute 
and less rapidly changing. Triangulation was also achieved through the use of three 
methods of data collection (i.e. face-to-face, telephone and e-mail interviewing). It is 
argued that the triangulation of e-mail interviewing with other data collection 
methods can strengthen the credibility of a study’s findings (Curasi 2001). Finally, 
the involvement of the researcher’s supervisors in the data analysis contributed to 
researcher or analyst triangulation. 
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(b) Referential adequacy materials 
Referential adequacy materials are ‘context rich, holistic materials that provide 
background meaning to support data analysis, interpretations, and audits’ (Erlandson 
et al. 1993, p. 139). A range of annual and departmental reports, staff bulletins, 
patient safety bulletins, and publications relating to the issue of patient safety were 
reviewed in the course of this study. While they were not part of the analysis these 
materials assisted the inquirer in understanding the problem of patient safety and 
efforts to reduce the incidence of preventable adverse events in hospital contexts.  
(c) Peer debriefing 
Throughout the course of the inquiry the researcher met with a supervisory team on a 
regular basis to test working hypotheses and discuss methodological issues. This peer 
debriefing process also kept the researcher ‘honest’ by providing an opportunity for a 
professional peer to probe biases, explore meanings and clarify interpretations 
(Lincoln & Guba 1985). A written reflective paper summarising the issues discussed 
and the researcher’s reflections was developed.  
3.7.2 Applicability - transferability 
A study’s transferability refers to the extent to which its findings have application 
and ‘fit’ in other contexts (Lincoln & Guba 1985). While research within the 
conventional paradigm permits generalisability of a study’s findings to a broad 
population, this study sought to achieve ‘naturalistic generalisability’ (Erlandson et 
al. 1993; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Patton 2002). Stake (1978) argues that there is a 
natural basis for generalisation when the method of research is epistemologically in 
harmony with the reader’s experience. Lincoln and Guba (1985) concur, suggesting 
that ‘naturalistic generalisation’ is an intuitive type of generalisation. Those in the 
receiving context must interpret a study’s findings, make the necessary comparisons 
and arrive at a judgement about their ‘fit’ (Erlandson et al. 1993; Lincoln & Guba 
1985). A degree of ‘fit’ and ‘transferability’ exist between one context and another 
when the data parallel the reader’s actual experience and have direct relevance, 
meaning and application in their environment (Lincoln & Guba 1985).  
The study’s applicability and transferability were ascertained by presenting the 
preliminary results and findings at seminars and conferences within Deakin 
University, where the researcher is a PhD candidate. This allowed the researcher to 
track the transferability of the analysis and findings while the inquiry was in 
Chapter 3. Methodology & Method 
72 
 
progress. Colleagues at these events confirmed the resonance of the research 
findings. 
3.7.3 Consistency - auditability  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose that auditability be the measure of an inquiry’s 
consistency. An audit trail has been maintained such that an auditor could examine 
the process and product of the inquiry and determine if the conclusions, 
interpretations, and recommendations are supported and anyone following these 
steps would likely arrive at similar findings (Lincoln & Guba 1985).  
3.7.4 Neutrality - confirmability 
Confirmability refers to the degree to which the research findings are the product of 
the focus of the inquiry and not the biases of the researcher (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
It is achieved through truth value, applicability and consistency and confirmed 
through an audit process or the steps taken and described in this chapter.  
3.8 Ethical considerations 
In keeping with the ethical standards of research required by the National Health and 
Medical Research Council (NHMRC) approval for this study was obtained from the 
Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee. A formal ethics application, 
required by a participating metropolitan health service, was also approved. Nurses 
were invited to participate in the study either in person, by telephone or via e-mail 
communication. At this time, the purpose of the study and method of data collection 
were explained and the participants’ questions or concerns were addressed. Each 
participant’s registration and employment status were verified and those that 
qualified for inclusion received by mail or e-mail a plain language statement, consent 
form and demographic questionnaire (See Appendices 2, 3 and 4). Following receipt 
of a completed consent form, arrangements were made for a face-to-face, telephone 
or e-mail interview.   
3.8.1 Privacy and confidentiality 
Every effort was made to protect the privacy of the participants and their employing 
hospitals and the confidentiality of the data. The demographic questionnaires and 
envelopes were numerically coded and did not contain any personally identifying 
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codes or markings. The professional transcriber employed to transcribe the audio 
interviews signed a confidentiality contract regarding the subject matter. Any 
identifying information contained in the interview transcripts was seen only by the 
researcher and once noted was removed. 12 A numerical code was assigned to each 
interview transcript and these codes are used to quote from the transcripts throughout 
this thesis. The researcher maintained confidentiality while keeping a reflexive 
journal throughout the inquiry.  
In addition, a number of measures were taken to protect the privacy of 
participants in the e-mail interviews and the confidentiality of the e-mail responses. 
A password protected e-mail address was used to conduct all e-mail interviews and 
guard against the risk of loss, unauthorised access, modification or disclosure of the 
e-mail interviewing data (Mann & Stewart 2000). Participants were advised to take 
the same precaution and to delete their responses and empty their recycle bin once 
the information had been sent to the researcher. It is acknowledged, however, that 
participants retained ownership of their e-mail responses and may have decided to 
keep this information. All identifiers were removed from the e-mail responses and 
the text was cut and pasted into a word processing program which contained 
identifying codes known only to the researcher. Printing of the responses occurred 
only after this process was complete so that names and email addresses were not 
contained in hard copies. All e-mail responses were deleted once the text had been 
received and copied. These measures minimised the risk of identifying information 
being inadvertently disclosed while stored on a computer connected to the internet 
(Meho 2006). As with all electronic communication, transit confidentiality could not 
be guaranteed. 
3.8.2 Security of the data 
A high quality anti-virus program was used to preserve the integrity of all data 
throughout the study. Data were stored on the network systems of the University at 
which the researcher was a post graduate student. These systems provide high levels 
of manageable security and data integrity, remote access, and disaster recovery 
processes should a large scale incident occur. Data were backed up on a regular basis 
and portable devices and memory sticks were used for archiving, data transport and 
works in progress. 
                                                 
12 While the researcher’s supervisors read the interview transcripts, these were de-identified. 
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3.8.3 Risk assessment and management 
Participants in this study were not exposed to any physical, psychological or social 
risk above the everyday norm. They were asked to discuss their experience of 
managing gaps, a common feature of everyday clinical practice. Nonetheless, the 
study’s design included consideration of the appropriate response should any 
participant be unduly concerned about their answers to any of the interview questions 
or find participation in the project distressing. There were no participant withdrawals 
from the study nor did any of the participants find the interviewing process 
distressing. To the contrary, participants described the interview as a positive, 
cathartic, stimulating and empowering experience through which they developed a 
richer and deeper understanding of the problem of patient safety. Consistent with the 
tenets of the naturalistic inquiry paradigm, involvement in the study was not a neutral 
experience for the participants (Erlandson et al. 1993). One participant commented 
that the study provided a valuable opportunity to ‘prove that nurses contribute 
positively to the health care system because they do’ (57:26). Others thought that 
investigating and articulating the ‘behind the scenes’ work of nurses was an 
interesting and novel approach to patient safety research.  
3.9 Strengths and limitations of the study 
The key strength of this study was the naturalistic inquiry paradigm and the step-by-
step process followed, which enabled the researcher to capture a rich description of 
the phenomenon under investigation and answer the research questions posed. 
Nonetheless, consideration must be given to the limitations of the study and its 
findings. 
The first limitation relates to the data collection. An issue with any research 
relying on memory is that the recall of events may be inaccurate or incomplete and 
personal bias and emotions (i.e. anger, anxiety) might distort the participant’s 
responses.  
A second limitation concerns the finding that the processes of anticipating, 
identifying and bridging gaps occurred in a rapid sequence such that they were 
indistinguishable. Consequently, it was not possible to assign clearly delineated 
strategies to each facet of gaps management (i.e. anticipation, detection and 
bridging). 
A third limitation (although this could also be seen as a strength) is the 
considerable amount of interview data that was generated (i.e. 1595 of transcript as 
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well as field notes). As indicated in Section 3.6.3, a page-by-page and line-by-line 
analysis of the interview transcripts reduced the volume of the data to 238 pages. 
Further analysis of the findings across the clinical settings reduced the data to just 74 
pages, as contained in Chapter 4 of this thesis. During this process, decisions about 
what to include and what to exclude were based on the following considerations, as 
described by Johnstone and Kanitsaki (2005, p. 108): 
x the consistency of findings across clinical settings;  
x the consistency of the findings with other studies; 
x the identification of issues not raised or considered in the literature review 
for the study; 
x the identification of issues that added a different dimension or perspective to 
those identified in the literature review; 
x the identification of issues relevant to the improvement of patient safety 
outcomes. 
While some data was unavoidably ‘lost’ during this process, the findings 
presented in this thesis contain a ‘thick’ and faithful description of the participant’s 
knowledge, understandings and experiences (Johnstone & Kanitsaki 2005). 
The initial design for the study included nurses from orthopaedic settings. A 
fourth limitation relates to the unsuccessful recruitment of orthopaedic nurses and the 
recruitment of only two neuroscience nurses. In keeping with the emergent nature of 
qualitative research inquiry, the study design was amended to include nurses 
employed in rehabilitation and transitional care settings. These settings were selected 
because the nature of patient care (i.e. acuity, predictability and propensity to 
change) was considered comparable to neurosciences and orthopaedics.  
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has had as its focus a discussion of the naturalistic inquiry paradigm and 
the qualitative exploratory descriptive (QED) research method selected for this study. 
In advancing this discussion attention has been given firstly to a brief examination of 
the philosophic assumptions underpinning naturalistic inquiry and the QED research 
method. Attention has also been given to the steps taken to advance the study, 
including: sample selection (its type and size, the processes used for recruiting and 
accessing the sample selected, and the demographic details of the participants 
recruited); data collection and analysis; presentation and dissemination of the 
Chapter 3. Methodology & Method 
76 
 
research findings; and the processes used for ensuring research rigour and the 
credibility of the research findings. The processes followed for ensuring compliance 
with research ethics standards have also been considered along with the strengths and 
limitations of the study. Attention will now turn to the presentation and analysis of 
the data. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Yet, many patients safely move through complex acute and critical care 
settings without complication or difficulty. Their safe passage is due, in 
part, to the skilful, but largely invisible safety work routinely performed 
by nurses (Benner 1999, p.347). 
It’s interesting you can always remember the bad things because you 
learn from them. The good ones they tend to be just part of everyday 
(56:04). 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter an aggregate summary of the data obtained from interviewing 71 
participants is presented. The purpose of conducting the interviews was to obtain 
information about nurses’ knowledge, understandings, insights and experiences 
regarding: 
x patient safety and adverse events in a variety of clinical settings;  
x gaps in patient care; 
x how nurses anticipate, detect and bridge gaps; 
x the relationship between gaps, patient safety and nursing; and 
x the processes that are best suited to promoting safety and quality in health 
care. 
As previously discussed in Chapter Three, the Methodology and Method, data 
were analysed using qualitative methods of analysis, including content and thematic 
analysis and by making constant comparisons. In this chapter presentation of the data 
is organised around the four key research questions driving this study: 
x What are the gaps that are commonly anticipated, detected and bridged by 
nurses? 
x How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge gaps that are (i) familiar to 
them (ii) new and unfamiliar and (iii) familiar but whose characteristics 
have changed? 
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x What is the relationship between gaps management and patient safety 
outcomes? 
x What do nurses know and understand by adverse events? 
A summary of the findings made from analysis of the data is presented under 
separate subheadings, keyed to the above research questions. 
4.2 Gaps  
Nurses who succeeded in preventing adverse events had an acute awareness of what 
gaps were, which they described in the following key terms:  
x loss of the natural flow of events; and 
x the lack of a continuous and seamless approach to patient care from one 
carer to the next. 
Gaps occurred when: 
x things were overlooked or omitted; 
x there was a lack of follow through;  
x processes were not linked properly; and  
x procedures did not happen the way they should because nurses did things 
their own way and not in line with evidence-based guidelines.  
When gaps were present, patient care was disjointed, stilted, broken and lacking 
organisation such that the normal, expected or planned sequence of events was 
interrupted, delayed, disrupted or did not occur as it should: 
Discontinuity is, I suppose, the line of patient care that is interrupted, 
doesn’t flow, something’s missing. So instead of going on one continuous 
treatment plan it sort of becomes interrupted, that the line is broken 
(48:03).  
I believe the term 'discontinuities' to define a disjointed or stilted process 
where there is logic and organisation lacking.  Almost as if there is a 
broken process. I think this term also implies that the broken process has 
taken on an unrelated path for its completion (75:02).  
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To me, discontinuity means the abandonment of medical or nursing care 
for the patient, or the loss of information regarding patient care. When 
there are gaps regarding patient care, this is the break, disruption, delay 
or holdup of patient care (36:02). 
Well, when you say discontinuities, I would do discontinuities of care.  
So where there would be a lack of follow through, where processes aren't 
linked properly, procedures don't happen the way they should, that sort of 
thing. Gaps could be gaps in knowledge or they could be gaps in 
processes, so that's about not knowing (57:07).    
Participants described gaps in terms of their size. Some gaps, such as clinical 
deterioration, caught nurses unawares and were described as ‘big’ and difficult to 
foresee (73:06). Others were described as small but with the potential to ‘grow like 
topsy’ and ‘snow ball’, conveying a sense that if things are not picked up early they 
can gain momentum and evolve into something bigger that may be difficult to 
remedy and catastrophic for the patient (03:07; 47:23). The following case illustrates 
this point. In this case, a nurse set out to administer an intravenous antibiotic, left this 
task to attend to a more pressing need (i.e. the alarm on a monitor) and was called 
away again. Consequently, the initial task to administer the medication was 
overlooked and not completed: 
Yeah, I think it sort of snowballs.  I think people start out you know, with 
the intentions of everything lining up and going - doing it appropriately.  
But you know, they may have just started an antibiotic in this bedspace 
and the alarm goes off on the bed next door.  So they just pull the curtain 
back, start fixing the alarm, something else happens.  I think you know 
there's so much going on that you kind of have to check those things 
immediately if an alarm goes off, for example, and so things get missed 
and then you've forgotten to sign that drug or I don't think, you know 
anybody thinks that it should be acceptable to leave things like that 
unsigned or undone. Because when they're on the receiving end it's 
equally as frustrating for them (45:11). 
Gaps were created by shortcomings in processes, procedures, education and 
communication and when hospital systems were ignored. Gaps were described as 
points in the patient’s journey where there was an opportunity created for an error, 
adverse event or something to go wrong: 
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I think a gap is a point in a patient's journey that where there is room for 
something to go wrong, you know? It doesn’t necessarily always go 
wrong but it's a gap in either the transfer of information or 
communication. Something happening where you open the window for 
anything to happen - that's the way I see it (73:04). 
Well we’re aiming for seamless continuity of care so if there is a gap I 
guess there’s an opportunity for an adverse event so that’s I guess how I 
would view it (06:05). 
Processes, procedures or education, for example, have shortcomings or 
are incomplete so that errors or adverse events can occur (11:04) 
The bad ones really to me are probably system issues at the moment.  The 
gaps in care where you have got a system put in place and people just 
ignore it and then that may lead to an adverse event for a patient (60:20). 
While most participants used the terms ‘gaps’ and ‘discontinuities’ 
interchangeably, two described these terms quite differently. In their view, a gap was 
an omission or oversight or something that did not occur, while discontinuity was the 
fragmentation that ensued when patient care did not follow the expected path:   
I do see a bit of a difference between the two terms. I guess the gaps 
would be identified things that don’t occur, and the discontinuity for me 
would be a fragmentation of how that occurs (63:08). 
Discontinuity is something that doesn’t necessarily follow the usual path 
or continuum, the usual procedure that you would expect.  Gap, to me, 
suggests something that is almost omitted or overlooked (25:04). 
One of the key research questions driving this study is how nurses anticipate, 
detect and bridge gaps that are (i) familiar to them, (ii) new and unfamiliar, and (iii) 
familiar but whose characteristics had changed. Analysis of the data was undertaken 
to determine whether the gaps described by participants were familiar, new and 
unfamiliar, or familiar but whose characteristics had changed. The participants’ 
responses are presented under the following sub headings: 
x Which gaps were familiar to nurses? 
x Which gaps were new and unfamiliar to nurses? 
x Which gaps were familiar to nurses but their characteristics had changed? 
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4.2.1 Which gaps were familiar to nurses? 
Analysis of the data revealed that nurses were familiar with most of the gaps 
described in the context of this study. These familiar gaps are listed in Table 4.1 
below.  
Table 4.1 Gaps that were familiar to nurses 
Failure to recognise and respond to a deteriorating patient 
Examples included: 
x Nurses failing to recognise and act upon patient observations that were outside normal 
limits and indicative of clinical deterioration 
Failure of nurses to attend to the ‘simple’ or ‘little’ things  
Examples included: 
x Turning off the continuous blood pressure monitor and forgetting to turn it back on, so that 
the blood pressure was not checked for an extended period 
x Increasing the rate of an intravenous infusion to flush a drug through and forgetting to turn 
the rate back down 
x Incorrect positioning (e.g. hyperextension) or securing of limbs causing displacement and 
injury during anaesthesia 
x Misplaced filters and tubing causing eye injury and blindness during anaesthesia 
x Failure to check the pre-operative blood results 
x Failure to check a patient’s temperature prior to their transfer from the post anaesthesia care 
unit to the ward 
x Inappropriate disposal of soiled linen 
x An insecure connection on a central venous catheter 
x Failure to clamp the  intravenous line of an inotropic infusion prior to removing it from the 
infusion pump 
Failure to follow correct procedure  
Examples included: 
x Failure to complete the pre-operative checklist and identify  the patient’s allergies 
x Failure to x-ray a patient for a retained item when the surgical count was incorrect 
x Failure to apply evidence based guidelines to the nursing management of central venous 
catheters 
Failure to communicate the information required to plan and deliver care safely 
Deficiencies in clinical handover included: 
x The lack of a systematic approach to handover such that the oncoming shift did not 
understand the care required and why this care was important 
x A lack of priority accorded to clinical handover 
x The allocation of insufficient time such that handover was rushed 
x The omission of handover because of time constraints 
 
Chapter 4. Data Presentation & Analysis 
82 
 
 
 
x The perception that handover was an opportunity to socialise and not an important part of 
patient care 
x A flippant approach to handover when a procedure was perceived to be routine 
x The handing over of patients through an intermediary such as a team leader rather than 
directly from one nurse to the next 
The loss of important information or contextual details because: 
x Staff forgot, played down or very slightly altered the story or perceived that certain parts 
were not important 
x Hand over was taped or given by staff who spoke English as a second language 
x Staff were reluctant to volunteer information for fear of being humiliated by colleagues 
Gaps in patient information when the care of patients transferred to another service or facility 
included: 
x A lack of clarity and detail regarding the patient’s previous or current medical history, 
recent treatment, medications, and care needs 
x The use of standard post-operative instructions and care plans that failed to address 
individual patient needs 
x Failure to communicate the information required to provide safe care to the staff at the 
bedside 
Lapses in communication included: 
x Failure to communicate changes to a consent form to staff in the operating theatre 
Lapses in critical thinking  
Examples included: 
x Failure of nurses to think about what the patient needed, the care they were providing and 
the impact of their actions 
x Failure to question or challenge assumptions and the opinions of others 
Nurses cutting corners....taking short cuts  
Examples included: 
x Nurses not following established protocols and processes 
x Nurses using medical devices as the dominant assessment tool rather than an adjunct 
x Nurses performing ‘radar observations’, described as looking at a monitor and recording 
vital signs without assessing and physically interacting with the patient 
x Nurses not doing a full or thorough assessment and ‘filling in’ observations when they were 
busy to avoid the perception they were incompetent or not coping 
x Nurses not checking medications at the bedside and the patient’s identity 
x Nurses not taking the time to familiarise themselves with the medications they administered 
x Failure to provide essential care - mouth care, repositioning and sitting patients out of bed, 
maintaining and changing dressings 
x Failure to prevent pressure ulcers from endotracheal tubes, naso-gastric tubes and thrombo-
embolic deterrent stockings 
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4.2.2 Which gaps were new and unfamiliar to nurses? 
Analysis of the data revealed that new and unfamiliar gaps of which nurses had no 
knowledge or direct experience were rare. These gaps are listed in Box 4.1 below:  
 
Box 4.1 Gaps that were new and unfamiliar to nurses 
 
Examples included: 
x An equipment problem where the oxygen hose of the ventilator was not correctly 
attached to the boom of the oxygen supply. The ventilator did not have an inbuilt 
analyser to alert the staff to this problem. The patient developed respiratory 
distress from breathing room air.  
x A life support machine fell off the trolley and to the floor. The patient could not be 
not be resuscitated and died.   
x A life support machine reached the end of its battery life and shut down as it was 
plugged into the power supply. The patient was resuscitated and survived. 
 
4.2.3 Which gaps were familiar to nurses but their characteristics had changed? 
The study sought to identify gaps that were familiar to nurses but their characteristics 
had changed, however, careful examination of the data failed to identify any gaps 
with these attributes.  
4.3 How did nurses manage gaps? 
It emerged from analysis of the data that nurses used the same processes to 
anticipate, detect and bridge gaps, irrespective of whether the gaps were familiar or 
new and unfamiliar. The study also revealed that chance or serendipity played a role 
in the management of gaps and prevention of adverse events. Participants described 
how coincidence or happenstance placed them in a situation where they detected that 
something was wrong. As participants responded: 
It’s probably just coincidence. I’ve happened to come along or 
somebody’s happened to come along and see it (58:08). 
But that was just happenstance. I just happened to be walking past at the 
time and overheard that conversation (66:18-19).    
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It was one of those once in a blue [moon] situations, but they happen. I 
hadn’t met the patient before. I didn’t know why we were doing this; it 
was pure chance that I had walked in and yet it had a really good 
outcome for that mother and that child (64:14). 
Well I thought thank goodness for that.  I would have preferred it if I 
didn’t have to pick it up but I just happened to notice it, and it was just 
the fact that I walked into the theatre at that time (09:17). 
The processes used by nurses to anticipate, detect and bridge gaps are presented 
here under the following sub headings: 
x Knowledge and experience 
x Nursing surveillance  
x Communication 
x Teamwork 
x Serendipity or chance 
4.3.1 Knowledge and experience 
A key finding of this study is that nurses who succeeded in managing gaps and 
preventing adverse events had acquired necessary knowledge and learned from 
experience. This study has captured many examples where nurses anticipated gaps 
by watching out and checking for specific things that, based on experience, were 
commonly missed or overlooked. Nurses also made the necessary preparations and 
adjustments to minimise the impact of these oversights on patients. The ability of 
nurses to anticipate gaps and prevent adverse events was also a result of their direct 
and previous experience of such events as well as the things that happened or went 
wrong in patient care: 
I have seen adverse events happen, I have the foresight to see what might 
happen from my experience but how do you show that to the younger 
junior staff.  That is the challenge (18:20).   
Experience enabled nurses to develop foresight, an awareness of all the 
possibilities and situations where something might go wrong (18:20). Through 
experience, nurses also gained knowledge of their environment, the equipment used 
in their clinical context and the resources available for solving problems (72:13; 
70:18-19). The experience gained from working in a clinical setting for a long time 
enabled nurses to predict certain events or things that might go wrong and put 
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measures in place to minimise the impact on patients (47:19). An example was 
knowledge of the correct procedures and pointing this out to a colleague. Participants 
suggested that while learning on the job was not ideal, nurses never forgot these 
lessons. As participants responded:  
I think a lot of anticipation in nursing comes down to experience and 
whether that can be changed or not I’m not sure.  I think like anything, 
with time comes experience and you’re able to, in nursing, anticipate a lot 
more. Sometimes it is because of adverse events and outcomes that you 
learn, you know, on the job; but certainly that’s not the best way to learn, 
but it’s not something that you ever forget (25:14-15). 
But if you can be really diligent about the detail and always looking out 
for what could go wrong, which I think comes with experience, and when 
you’ve seen things go wrong you don’t forget them (70:11).  
I think trying to foresee things, it’s really helpful when you have worked 
in an area for a long time, you can predict some of the stuff that is going 
to happen and if you can predict or foresee that this could be a problem, 
you can start putting things into place to prevent it becoming a problem 
(47:19). 
Often it is not really intervening but potentially you can stop some things 
from happening, really simple things like knowing what the correct 
procedures are and if you see that it doesn’t look right pointing it out to 
someone (07:15). 
Experience informed nurses of the practices that were incorrect, overlooked or 
forgotten. Many of these omitted or flawed practices were described as ‘simple’ but 
fundamental. The diagnosis and reason for admission guided one participant as to 
specific areas of patient care that might be overlooked. Examples included out of 
range blood sugar levels that increased the risk of wound infection; monitoring of 
weight and fluid status; recommencement of diuretics post-operatively; incorrectly 
identified arrhythmias; and chest drains that had the inappropriate amount of suction. 
As a result the drainage was minimal and there was a risk the drains might have been 
prematurely removed (20:12).  
Based on their experience, nurses left nothing to chance (69:02-04). One 
participant described how she stayed late from the morning shift to source a patient’s 
anti-epileptic medication, aware of a recent situation where a patient had a seizure 
and was harmed because their medication had not been given. In that case the staff 
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noted the medication was out of stock but did not follow-up and obtain it from the 
pharmacy (70:19-20).  
Through experience, nurses developed the ability to detect gaps by skilfully 
questioning patients. This involved knowing what questions to ask and how to phrase 
questions in such a way that patients revealed their story (40:12). Nurses described 
themselves as the people that actually talk to patients and their family, capture how 
they are, and find out important details about their background and history (52:17). 
While the medical staff asked standard questions (i.e. Have you got any heart 
problems? Are you a diabetic?), nurses framed questions slightly differently (i.e. 
Have you ever felt this before?) and in a way that encouraged patients to disclose 
important information (i.e. I had this tightening in the chest). One participant 
described an occasion where a patient revealed crucial details of her medical history 
(50:14-15). The patient described an experience of being ‘in the corner of the 
ceiling’, watching people ‘pound her chest’. The nurse thought this an odd story and 
investigated further. It emerged that the patient had experienced four cardiac arrests 
during a previous anaesthetic. While this information was in the chart, it had not 
been picked up by the other staff. The participant commented that experience 
enabled nurses to pick up on all the little things that were required to safely care for 
patients: 
That’s where it comes in again, the experience of the nurse to be able to 
pick up all the little things.  Like taking a pulse without thinking, you just 
say oh that’s not quite right and sometimes you get the patients to 
elaborate more on something.  Instead of just […] doctors […] the 
anaesthetists will go up to the patient and go standard questions, you got 
any heart problems, are you a diabetic, have you had epilepsy, you got 
respiratory, and the patient will go no, no, no because I’m sick of all 
these stupid questions. But if the nurse goes up and says the questions in 
just a little different way, have you ever felt this or have you ever had 
that, and oh well last year I had this tightening in the chest and whatever, 
and you go okay right.  And you can dig up more, and you can find more 
bells to be aware of.  And you’ve got to talk about it and just say well by 
the way, we need to know this (09:20). 
(a) Expert nursing knowledge prevented adverse events 
This study has captured a number of instances where the expert knowledge and 
experience of nurses was critical to identifying and bridging gaps in patient care and 
preventing adverse events of a potentially catastrophic nature. A cogent example of 
this can be found in the response of one perioperative participant to a situation where 
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a patient became dangerously hypertensive (i.e. blood pressure 260mmHg) each time 
the surgeon touched the adrenal gland with the diathermy probe13 (06:07). Based on 
her knowledge of the available equipment and other diathermy systems, the nurse 
recommended an alternative system commonly used in neurosurgery. This was 
tolerated by the patient and the blood pressure stabilised, minimising the risk of 
perioperative stroke and death, and allowing the surgeon to close the wound.     
On another occasion, an emergency nurse’s prior experience of oculogyric crisis 
along with her knowledge of the patient’s medical history, current medications and 
side effects, gave her the ability to recognise this complication and initiate the 
appropriate treatment. The patient’s doctor, an intern, had not heard of the condition, 
failed to recognise there was anything wrong and did not know how to treat it:   
I realised that she was having an oculogyric crisis from the Stemetil and 
her doctor was an intern. I said to him ‘Look she needs some cogentin’. It 
turned out that he had never heard of it and didn’t know how to treat it. I 
said ‘well you know I’m going to get some and give it to her’. By this 
time she couldn’t swallow because her mouth was over her ear, so I gave 
it intramuscularly. I’m certainly not blowing my own trumpet but I think 
that somebody with less experience nursing wise and an intern who had 
no idea what to do, and by this time was panicking, would not have been 
a good situation for the patient. And after one dose of cogentin she was 
fine and she went home (03:03). 
(b) The knowledge and experience of critical care nurses 
An experienced critical care nurse revealed that he routinely checked twenty or so 
practices that, in his experience, were almost always wrong or overlooked. They 
included the tracing on the monitors, the presence of pressure areas, ventilator and 
alarm settings, abdominal and central venous pressure readings and, the placement of 
intravenous lines and endotracheal tubes:  
                                                 
13 A medical instrument where heat generated by electricity is used to cut tissue or seal bleeding 
vessels. 
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I now make it a routine practice that when I go and mind someone's 
patient while they go to tea, I quickly go through the ventilator and I 
know things that are almost always wrong.  So that the flow trigger for 
example is often set too high and it just makes it unnecessarily difficult 
for the person to initiate respiration. The alarms may be set 
inappropriately, which puts a person at risk. The central venous pressures 
will be generally inaccurate.  The lines aren't secured terribly well and 
just at risk of falling out […] the endotracheal tube just often isn't rotated 
or isn't secured at times […] So there's twenty or so things I check 
routinely [...] and I pick those things because I know that they will be 
routinely wrong or not looked at or something. Abdominal pressures will 
always be wrong.  If I ever hear someone's abdominal pressure's more 
than twenty, I'll go and recheck it and I usually find it's 10.  So it's way 
out (23:21-22). 
This same participant acknowledged that his many years of critical care 
experience had contributed to his scepticism and lack of trust in his colleagues. He 
constantly questioned and checked, making sure that all the ‘i’s were dotted and the 
‘t’s were crossed:  
I just don't trust anyone any more.  I don't.  I'm annoying.  It's just 
something that's developed over the years.  I'm just very sceptical and I 
think that's a fairly good characteristic in intensive care.  I think you have 
to be that thorough and get down to it and find out exactly what's going 
on.  So I think that constant questioning and checking to make sure all the 
i's are dotted and the t's are crossed is important (23:13). 
The wealth of experience of a critical care nurse was a factor in her ability to 
identify that an endotracheal tube was misplaced in the right main bronchus. The 
nurse recognised this error during a routine assessment of the patient, when she was 
unable to detect air entry above the patient’s clavicle. She commented that her 
medical and nursing colleagues were unaware that the absence of air entry above the 
clavicle was indicative of this problem. The medical staff waited for an x-ray to 
confirm that the tube was misplaced, but the nurse was in no doubt, based on her 
assessment of the patient’s breath sounds and her observation that the patient’s 
ventilation was slightly asynchronous:  
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She didn't have any air entry above her left clavicle. Intubated patient 
sitting upright. You've got to have air above [...] the clavicle [...] it was so 
easy.  But no one other nurse or medical staff on that shift knew that. 
Now, that was gobsmacking, you know, but that's the wealth of 
experience. Because you could listen to the chest and you could see that 
the ventilation was just nearly right. It was a slight rise and fall. It was 
asynchronous, though, and they said, ‘oh no, she's been asynchronous 
before’. I said, ‘No’. I just did a normal assessment and said, ‘oh, she's 
got a right main’ (57:13). 
(c) The knowledge and experience of emergency nurses 
Prior experience of patients being unsafely discharged from the emergency 
department, informed nurses of the things that were commonly overlooked and 
increased the risk of adverse events. Once again, participants used the term ‘simple’ 
to describe many of these oversights. One example was the checking of blood results, 
especially when the oncoming shift incorrectly assumed this had been done by the 
previous shift. Participants described their experiences of being informed that 
patients were safe to be discharged home only to discover serious problems such as 
dangerously high serum potassium levels and evidence of acute renal failure (04:15; 
05:13). One participant commented that initially she was unsure whether it was her 
role to follow-up results, but she soon realized that this required her attention 
because it was frequently overlooked and increased the risk of an unsafe discharge. 
Another participant stressed the importance of not taking anyone’s word for granted 
and checking and rechecking everything from blood work to x-rays and 
computerised tomography (CT) scans. He acknowledged the constant potential for 
things to get forgotten in acute, unpredictable and rapidly changing hospital 
environments (05:14).  
(d) The knowledge and experience of perioperative nurses 
In perioperative contexts, prior proper planning and knowledge of where gaps 
occurred were key to preventing adverse events. Prior proper planning involved 
consideration of the surgery to be performed, the skill mix of the available staff and 
the individual needs of each patient. It also involved trying to foresee all the 
possibilities in a surgical context and any problems that might arise such as 
difficulties with intubation if the patient had a short neck and a large chest (77:05-06; 
56:20): 
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Currently, where I’m working I actually go anticipating because I’m 
working with inexperienced people [...] I’m thinking okay, what things 
could happen today. I’ve got to be prepared for all of that. I really try 
hard to get everything set up so that whoever is working with me, those 
things can be avoided, to the point where I’ve said to them beforehand, 
right this case we’ll do this, this and this, this is a potential area where 
something might happen. This is how we may handle it or I want these 
extra things in the theatre (77:05-06). 
One participant made a routine practice of discussing the outcomes of coronial 
investigations with staff in her department. She acknowledged the importance of 
perioperative nurses being aware of the potential for rare accidents such as a patient 
catching fire on the operating table (56:02). She suggested that the medical staff 
would not know what to do in such a situation because they did not have the same 
level of training. Another participant described the importance of preserving the 
integrity of the instrument count in a complicated bowel surgery case. On this 
occasion, the nurse refused to go home, staying to complete the final surgical count 
because she knew from experience that she was the only person that could resolve 
any issues: 
A recent very fragile major bowel surgery that had a difficult to control 
bleeder and the patient’s life in the balance, I refused to go home and 
change staff over for the future counts for that case at the end of the day; 
even though I was due to go home. I felt that as the scout nurse I had 
counted in and I needed to count out, to ensure integrity for a case that 
had a lot of equipment and disposable items used. It’s just not worth not 
being there when I am the only one who can clarify the count for the 
scrub nurse when she may be tired and stressed (09:05). 
Through experience, recovery room nurses developed an awareness of variables 
outside their department that increased the risk of an adverse event. One participant 
described the need for patients to be ‘really stable’ before they transferred back to the 
ward (56:22). She was aware of the risk associated with sending a ‘barely stable’ 
patient back to a busy ward environment where the staff were not expecting signs of 
haemodynamic instability or clinical deterioration (56:24): 
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So the patients that leave here have to be really stable, not just stable, if 
that makes sense?  If you have been waiting for a blood pressure to go 
and suddenly it hits that magical number that you know is twenty percent 
of where it was, I always keep them for another couple of sets of 
observations to make sure it’s going to stay there.  Because you think 
they will go back to the ward and good grief its dinner time now and you 
know? You have got to be thinking of the variables down the line for the 
patient (56:22). 
(e) The knowledge and experience of rehabilitation and transitional care nurses 
 In rehabilitation and transitional care contexts, experience was a factor in the ability 
of nurses to detect that a patient was unwell and needed close monitoring. 
Experience also equipped nurses to anticipate and respond to the needs of patients 
during high risk periods, such as when their diet was advanced to thin14 fluids or 
their insulin regimen was changed. Nurses responded by observing patients closely at 
these times, taking extra observations and performing an overnight blood sugar level:   
You anticipate the need before it happens and that’s the game.  Then you 
go okay this person’s a higher risk for the next three days when they’re 
changing from a thick fluid to a thinner fluid, let’s do a few extra 
observations on this lady so she’s not aspirating. When someone’s 
changing from Lantus to a NovoRapid let’s do a 2.00am blood sugar 
level just to make sure that we’re not going off and they’re getting 
hypoglycaemic in the middle of the night (49:23). 
It was just the advantage of someone with different eyes, with those 
experienced eyes. I think as an experienced nurse you can actually walk 
into a room, into a four bed bay of clients, and you know immediately, 
just by looking at them, I think, who you need to go to (66:07).   
(f) Knowledge and experience of gaps and adverse events 
In spite of their knowledge and experience of gaps and adverse events, most 
participants had not undertaken any formal instruction in the principles and theory of 
patient safety and human error management. Nonetheless, they were unanimous in 
their view that adverse events encompassed unforeseen, unintended and unplanned 
events which had undesirable or negative consequences for patients. It was 
acknowledged by participants that adverse events complicated the patient’s 
hospitalisation, were not in the patient’s best interest, and contributed to poor, 
                                                 
14 People with dysphagia may aspirate ‘thin’ liquids (i.e. fluids with a low viscosity such as water, 
milk, tea and coffee). Thickened fluids may be used to prevent aspiration pneumonia.   
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detrimental and unfavourable patient outcomes. Participants’ experiences lead them 
to be aware that an adverse event was something going wrong or awry and not 
according to plan - an incident outside the expected that should not have happened. 
Participants recognised that adverse events varied in their scale and gravity, ranging 
from major or huge catastrophic incidents to events of a more minor nature. Adverse 
events were seen as interrupting the normal course of care and treatment and in many 
instances were preventable. Participants responded:  
An adverse event is something that shouldn’t have happened and wasn’t 
foreseen and isn’t desired.  So something went wrong and – but not 
necessarily, you know, it doesn’t have to be huge.  There would be grades 
of it, I suppose (70:03). 
An adverse event is an unwanted, undesirable, unintended, and 
unanticipated occurrence during or after the treatment for the patient. It 
can be preventable (36:01). 
An adverse event is something that's not in the general planned sequence 
I guess for that patient […] so something that goes awry in the plan that 
doesn't fit you know what we hoped for the patient (45:02). 
Most participants acknowledged that adverse events increased the risk of harm 
to patients and that harm was a frequent and unintended consequence of adverse 
events: 
Adverse event is a potentially harmful event to a patient which is 
potentially preventable.  So if you go by the book and everything is right 
it shouldn't have happened (39:06). 
Adverse event is obviously a poor outcome of some sort of intervention, 
generally a health care or clinical intervention. So usually unexpected 
[…] an adverse event is anything that could harm, or has harmed (50:02).   
Participants identified numerous adverse events, a summary of which is 
presented in Box 4.2 (page 94 of this thesis). 
(i) The emotionality associated with gaps and adverse events 
All but two of the participants had a direct experience of an adverse event. A major 
theme to emerge from the analysis was that participants were deeply affected 
emotionally by the constant potential for gaps and the occurrence of adverse events, 
especially those they believed could and should have been prevented. The range of 
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emotions described by participants included: ‘feeling sick’, ‘physically ill’, ‘awful,’ 
‘bad’, ‘horrified’, ‘scared’, ‘stressed’, ‘tense’, ‘disappointed’, ‘powerless’, ‘helpless’, 
‘angry’, ‘frustrated’, and ‘sorry’. The experience of adverse events left an indelible 
imprint on the memory of those directly involved and on others they worked with. 
Participants remarked on their ability to recall these adverse events and associated 
emotions quickly and in vivid detail, in spite of the passage of time, describing them 
as tragic and memorable. The cases that people talked about included: 
I felt sorry for the staff [...] in a lot of incidents [...] I often think oh thank 
god that wasn’t me because when you hear the whole scenario [...] I think 
gee I bet I could have made that mistake myself, you know I think gee 
given all of the same variables I could have done that (56:04). 
Look I felt really sick because as a parent you put yourself in that 
parent’s shoes and for me the frustrating part was, I think initially some 
responses that I heard were, well there’s no cosmetic defect, therefore 
really what are we fussing about? We were really fortunate that it was an 
internal procedure so you can’t actually see the difference. But as I tried 
to explain to people, we could have removed a digit, removed a limb, cut 
the wrong level in a spine, the principle where the error’s occurred is 
transferable to any procedure (67:06). 
Pretty bad because, you know, the patients expect that we always do the 
right thing by them.  Or they trust us, that’s the whole thing I think that 
sometimes gets me; that you come into hospital and you trust people 
(44:07). 
I don’t know what my blood pressure was but [...] certainly [...] 
tachycardic at that point in time and I was very scared for that patient; 
and could see that the nurse was terrified, absolutely terrified [...] The 
what ifs always get you, but at the time, when you’re dealing with it, 
they’re not really at the fore.  Like at the time you’re just dealing with 
what it is that you need to deal with.  It’s afterwards where you stop and 
think and my God (17:14). 
One participant suggested that it was a case of ‘when, and not if’ these harmful 
events occurred and used the analogy of waiting for a train to crash to describe the 
feeling (66:20). Another revealed that gaps created the potential for a catastrophe to 
occur in small community hospitals where the patients involved were inevitably 
family and friends. Of note was the considerable and continuing emotional impact of 
adverse events that were preventable or fatal. Participants described these as 
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distressing and tragic events that caused lasting and significant psychological harm, 
affecting the clinicians involved for the rest of their lives (31:02; 63:03).  
 
Box 4.2 Adverse events described by participants 
x Implantation of the incorrect intraocular lens 
x Incomplete sterilisation of surgical equipment (i.e. colonoscope) between cases  
x Displacement and injury to a patient’s arm because it was inadequately positioned and 
secured during surgery 
x Retention of a surgical item (i.e. diathermy pad) 
x Dropping a patient on the floor during transfer from the operating table to the bed 
x Patient falls from beds, chairs and trolleys 
x Anaphylaxis and cardiac arrest from contact with Chlorhexidine, an antiseptic agent 
impregnated in a central venous catheter  
x Anaphylactic response to an anaesthetic agent 
x Patient death from untreated inspiratory stridor following thyroidectomy  
x Surgery to the wrong side of the body (i.e. the incorrect knee or ear)  
x Intra-operative trauma to adjacent organs (i.e. the aorta)  
x Post-partum haemorrhage following caesarean section 
x Incorrect surgery (i.e. removal of the patient’s tonsils) 
x A patient catching fire on the operating table 
x Pressure areas from ill fitting thrombo embolic deterrant (TED) stockings  
x Skin tears from the use of manual razors to shave patients before procedures 
x Leg ulcers and lacerations from broken footplates on wheelchairs 
x Incorrect placement of a naso-gastric tube and failure to correctly check tube position 
x Cardiac arrest following failure of an extra corporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) 
machine 
x Massive haemetemesis following administration of a thrombolytic agent in a patient with a 
recent history of an endoscopic procedure  
x Failure to diagnose spinal cord injury and acute myocardial infarction 
x Massive blood loss from an ECMO cannular that had migrated out of the patient’s neck 
x Respiratory distress because the oxygen hose of the ventilator was not properly screwed 
into the boom of the oxygen supply 
x Bradycardia, hypotension and hypoxia during restrapping of an endotracheal tube 
x Death of a child from an undiagnosed blockage of a ventricular-peritoneal shunt 
Medication errors: 
x Cardiac arrest from administration of the wrong dose during anaesthesia 
x Cardiac arrest from the rapid infusion of potassium chloride 
x Patient death from administration of the incorrect concentration of heparin 
x Patient death from administration of a chemotherapy drug via the wrong route (i.e. 
intrathecal instead of intravenous) 
x Rapid infusion of heparin (i.e. intravenous pump set at incorrect rate) 
x Patient death from the intra-arterial administration of drugs (the position of the catheter was 
not checked and the nurses believed the line was venous) 
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The emotional impact of one adverse event was such that one nurse left nursing 
altogether, even though the patient survived:  
The saddest thing was that that nurse just became totally beside herself 
[...] We had to get her family to come in and pick her up. She thought 
she’d killed the patient, or that she could have so [...] from what I 
understood, she left nursing because of that (17:15).  
Two nurses were shattered by the death of a young man in the Emergency 
Department, one had not returned to work some three months after the event: 
It’s one of those things that is probably not preventable but those two 
nurses involved at the very start have belted themselves up for weeks 
over it […] The triage nurse and the nurse in the cubicles were absolutely 
devastated; one of them hasn’t been back to work since though it’s about 
three months ago now (07:12-13) 
A third participant described having very unpleasant memories and feeling upset 
and sad some months after the preventable death of a child: 
It was, you know, just a tragic outcome. And I was incredibly upset about 
it, and I’m still upset about it because you don’t come to work to do any 
harm to your patients, and I really feel that we missed something for this 
patient because we didn’t have all the facts [...] and it leaves a really 
nasty taste in your mouth and I feel incredibly sad for the parents because 
they lost a child that they loved and was beautifully cared for and [...] that 
child’s died and [...] that’s tragic (22:20). 
In perioperative contexts, participants described the added emotional burden 
when anaesthesia was a causative factor in an adverse event. They were acutely 
aware of the potential for things to go catastrophically wrong because of ‘something 
we’ve done’: 
It was an awful sinking feeling of oh no [...] Well I mean it could be a 
really poor outcome for a patient. Also with anaesthetics [...] it’s the 
biggest nightmare of someone who is well and breathing and then not 
well and not breathing or not having an output. It’s one of the big things 
of anaesthetics is that most of what we do, or a lot of what we do, is 
elective at that point in time. To actually have an outcome which could be 
death or disability […] it’s not like they presented to you in cardiac arrest 
because of something that’s happened to them. It’s something that we’ve 
done that’s caused this, so it’s a pretty huge thing (50:04). 
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Participants described feeling troubled and frustrated by adverse events that 
resulted from the failure of nurses to take that little bit of extra care. The preventable 
and unnecessary nature of these events was particularly disturbing. An example of 
this can be found in a case where the dressings on the back of a patient’s head and 
over a cannular site in the neck were overlooked. Oral secretions contaminated the 
cannular site and the patient developed candida sepsis that was almost fatal. This 
patient’s care was further complicated by surgery to repair an extensive pressure area 
under the head dressing. As participants responded: 
I was so disgusted, absolutely disgusted it frustrates me and it makes me 
feel terrible [...] I realise that there is only so much that I can do but I 
walk away pulling my hair out just thinking can't you use some common 
sense and have some initiative and can't you just see what you're doing? 
[...] Just everything about it, the area on the back of his head, the oral 
secretions [...] just disgusted in the sense that it had been let go for such a 
long period of time and no one had had the initiative to call anyone and 
say I don't know how to change it, can you show me how to change it? 
(35:19-20). 
I know we're supposed to be working in a no blame environment when it 
comes to incidents and errors but it's very frustrating when you know that 
that could have been prevented just because somebody just didn’t take 
that little bit of extra care or didn't have that knowledge base.  So it's very 
frustrating when those things happen because they are preventable 
incidents (62:02). 
(ii) Learning from adverse events 
In spite of the emotional distress associated with adverse events, analysis of the data 
suggested that these incidents provided valuable opportunities for nurses to learn. 
Participants described how nurses remembered the disasters and learnt from other 
people’s mistakes and the bad things that happened, while the good experiences 
became part of their everyday (21:12; 58:13). The experience of an adverse event 
motivated nurses to find ways to prevent its recurrence and provided the opportunity 
to change practice. One participant’s experience of an adverse event was the catalyst 
for significant personal and professional growth. Upon reflecting on the event she 
realised that she needed to know and understand more and so she undertook further 
post-graduate education in emergency nursing. As participants responded: 
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It’s the reason why I started – I did my graduate diploma of clinical 
practice in emergency nursing ten years ago. Now, I reflect often on that, 
that was the catalyst, that was one of the major events that made me 
realise that as a sole nurse practitioner in a department like that I had to 
be more assertive and I had to be able to argue my case to the doctor and 
not be as subordinate and submissive, you know, as nursing roles 
sometimes structurally place us in (52:03). 
It's interesting you can always remember the bad things because you 
learn from them. The good ones they tend to be just be part of everyday 
(08:11). 
I guess it was very disappointing that it happened, but at the same time 
[…] I hadn’t actually come across this as an issue before […] we had just 
been fortunate I guess, so it was like, what are we going to do?  We need 
to think of ways of preventing this (47:04). 
(iii) Positive experiences of gaps 
Participants also described their positive experience of gaps, feeling good and 
pleased about taking initiative, making a difference, detecting an early and subtle 
sign, and doing something to improve the patient’s wellbeing. An example of this 
can be found in a nurse’s decision to call the medical emergency team to assess a 
patient in severe pain with unstable vital signs. She revealed that while this was an 
unusual reason to call the team, she felt justified in doing so and ‘good’ for the 
patient:  
It was when a patient […] was screaming and crying in pain and the 
covering doctor couldn’t make it up […] the registrar couldn’t make it 
up.  The anaesthetist on call, for some reason, was busy too, so we ended 
up just calling a MET call for pain management. The patient was starting 
to become tachycardic, you know, and the blood pressure was increasing 
and they were in a lot of pain and we just had nowhere to go. Usually, 
you know, if you call a MET call and the team don’t think it’s for the 
right reasons they’ll sort of scoff at you and walk off, but they actually 
were okay.  I said ‘We’ve got nowhere to go, we just needed a doctor, we 
need someone here to get this patient comfortable’ and they agreed and 
they wrote up all the charts […] So it made me feel good for the patient 
(34:16).  
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I suppose you probably feel a bit good that you actually made a 
difference, that you picked it up, and that you actually pushed for it.  I 
think we picked it up really early and with a very subtle sign, so [...] I felt 
good about that […] I think we sort of jumped up and down enough to 
get attention quick enough (15:07). 
4.3.2 Nursing surveillance 
Nurses anticipated, detected and bridged gaps in patient care and prevented adverse 
events through surveillance of patients and their environments. Analysis of the data 
revealed that there were many components of nursing surveillance. These included: 
x A systematic, comprehensive, head-to-toe and ‘hands on’ approach to 
patient assessment; 
x Nursing vigilance; 
x Looking at and observing the whole patient; 
x Checking; and  
x Making sure.  
(a) A systematic, comprehensive, head-to-toe and ‘hands on’ approach to patient 
assessment 
This study has captured many instances where a systematic, comprehensive, head-to-
toe and ‘hands on’ approach to patient assessment was key to managing gaps and 
preventing adverse events. In one notable case, the diligence of a nurse in following 
the same systematic assessment process at the beginning of each shift was critical to 
identifying that the radial pulse was absent and the patient was at risk of losing their 
arm. Further investigation revealed that a large embolus was occluding the radial 
artery and surgery was performed urgently to remove the embolus and save the arm. 
The participant suggested that a systematic, head-to-toe assessment process enabled 
nurses to identify things that were wrong, eliminating reliance on memory:  
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That was a nurse being very diligent about checking everything on her 
patients every time she came in and when I asked her I said some nurses 
would have failed to see that; she said I follow the same systematic 
process every time I come on and I go from head to toe I never deviate 
from my systematic process of how I evaluate patients [...] I think that 
was the big 'ah ha' for me [...] when nurses do that they will pick up 
everything that could possibly be wrong with the patient that is kind of 
obvious and when nurses fail to do that then we have patients who might 
have lost their arm through an emboli.  I think that if nurses follow a 
standardised process [...] it won't eliminate everything but it will 
eliminate the human factor where people forget (31:11-12). 
In another case, routine nursing assessment of the patient’s heart sounds (while 
the Cardiologist was also at the bedside) revealed a ‘murmur’15. The murmur was 
judged by the nurse to be indicative of an arterial dissection and she reported it to the 
Cardiologist who listened to the patient’s heart and concurred. This finding 
necessitated an immediate change to the patient’s treatment plan to avert the risk of 
catastrophic bleeding from thrombolytic medication (14:06).  
Systematic and thorough assessment was key to the detection of two missed 
injuries in a trauma patient (60:17). The first injury, a pneumothorax, was evident 
when the nurse assessed the patient’s chest and could not detect any air entry. Upon 
hearing this, the anaesthetist at the bedside accused her of being silly, telling her she 
could not be right. However, he assessed the patient and concurred and another 
intercostal catheter was inserted. The second injury, a fracture of the forearm, was 
detected by the participant as she was washing the patient the next day. Interestingly, 
she described these pick-ups as the ‘little things that you do’.  
Participants disclosed that patient assessment was their first priority at the 
beginning of a shift and whenever care transferred to another nurse. The assessment 
process was a critical first step in the planning of nursing care and provided nurses 
with the opportunity to identify patient problems. Nurses used assessment data to 
identify and respond to changes in the patient’s condition and establish a baseline of 
the patient’s status, against which subsequent data could be compared. One 
participant acknowledged that while she had many years of experience in patient 
assessment prior to commencing her nursing career she felt ill prepared for this 
important aspect of practice (13:27). Participants suggested that patient assessment, 
both formal and informal, was undervalued, poorly understood and not widely 
                                                 
15  A sound heard via a stethoscope that may indicate disease or structural problems in the heart. 
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implemented. They were deeply concerned that, in the absence of thorough patient 
assessment, something might be missed resulting in an adverse event:  
I just can’t get them to understand the significance of doing a systematic 
review on a patient. So I think that’s probably the gap if we could class 
that as a gap. It’s not that the patients aren’t being assessed, but they are 
not being assessed properly.  That probably makes me feel the most 
distressed […] it’s absolutely necessary (60:22). 
We’re always looking to the patient, to the family, what’s going on?  
We’re looking at them – assessment, whether it’s a formal assessment or 
a visual assessment, we’re constantly assessing the patients on their 
journey through our department. I think that the importance of the 
nursing assessment goes unrecognised, the value of the nursing 
assessment in terms of patient journey through the department goes 
unrecognised... there’s no recognition anywhere in the system that those 
are the critical areas that prevent a patient from getting worse (52:20). 
Systematic and comprehensive patient assessment uncovered major problems 
and gaps in care. Examples given included misplaced endotracheal breathing tubes 
(i.e. not visible on x-ray) and pressure areas. In many instances the nurses at the 
bedside were experienced and everything appeared to be in order, but thorough 
physical assessment revealed many problems, often of a serious nature:  
We teach quite a comprehensive physical assessment [...] for patients. So 
I occasionally will go and do that with some of the nurses [...] and as we 
do that we're just amazed because every time we do it we find huge gaps 
in care.  So we find always, almost always one of those people will have 
an endotracheal tube on x-ray that's not visible because it's almost out.  
We find that someone's got a pressure area that wasn't noticed, we find 
multiple things [...] the educator and myself talk about how amazing it is 
that when we [...] sit down, everything seems to be good.  You've got 
very good experienced nurses.  But every single time you do a proper 
physical assessment you pick up some major problem that no one's just 
picked up on (23:09). 
The following case is an instructive example of an adverse event that resulted 
from the failure of nurses to perform a comprehensive patient assessment. On this 
occasion a diabetic patient with peripheral vascular disease developed stage two 
pressure areas and gangrenous toes. The participant described how anti-embolic 
stockings, contraindicated in a patient with these co-morbidities, had not been 
removed for several days and had damaged the patient’s skin. This participant was 
Chapter 4. Data Presentation & Analysis 
101 
 
especially bothered by the preventability of this unnecessary complication which was 
completely unrelated to the reason for the patient’s hospitalisation:  
You know doesn’t anyone look down and look at the feet?  They put 
them in the chair and that’s it, they just concentrate on everything from 
the hips up. It’s just observation. What was bad about that particular case 
was that no one else picked it up.  I had to walk in as an agency nurse and 
as soon as I walked in I did my assessment, which is a nose to toe one... 
looking for your peripheral pulses, and as soon as I went down to her 
feet, bang, oh my god (26:03). 
(b) Nursing vigilance 
Participants described many instances where nursing vigilance was critical to 
detecting and bridging gaps and preventing adverse events, often of a catastrophic 
nature. Nurses kept patients safe by paying attention to cues or signals; maintaining a 
sustained and watchful state of attention; being ready to detect events that occurred 
unpredictably; keeping careful watch for possible danger or difficulties; and 
performing tasks at a constant level of efficiency and effectiveness.  
Perioperative participants described the importance of never taking anything for 
granted and maintaining a sustained and watchful state of attention, ready to detect 
unpredictable events such as a patient that could not tolerate the drugs 
suxamethonium or propofol. This state of vigilance was required for every single 
patient, even seemingly young and healthy patients where the surgical procedure 
appeared straightforward. Being vigilant involved attending to the patient’s body and 
verbal language and appearance because patients were ‘too scared, drugged and 
incapacitated’ to think for themselves or give a comprehensive medication and 
medical history (09:03): 
There’s a certain percentage of people that we know cannot tolerate 
propofol or suxamethonium and if we give it to them then [...] they’re not 
going to have an airway for at least five minutes until the suxamethonium 
wears off, and you give them propofol well you’re really in trouble [...] I 
don’t like to see blasé-ness and people’s laziness, and yes we’re all 
imperfect humans and infallible and we may miss things, but by god in 
this situation in this career you have to be trying to be focused on these 
issues for every patient that comes through [...] Just because you’ve got a 
healthy forty five year old man come in with a nice ECG and it’s a very 
simple operation, still things could go wrong if his anatomy is wrong and 
once they get in there and they hit a bleeder and they can’t stop it.  So I 
never take anything for granted in this game (09:22-23). 
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The vigilance of a perioperative nurse was critical to detecting that a gold 
coloured clip (whose mechanical and technical characteristics are only for temporary 
applications) had been placed over a cerebral aneurysm rather than a long term, 
permanent clip (10:15-16). The cue to the problem was her fortuitous sighting of the 
gold coloured clip on the monitor as the surgeon informed the team that he was about 
to begin closing the wound. On advising the surgeon, the temporary clip was 
immediately removed and replaced with a long term clip. The nurse explained that 
temporary clips are not as strong and carry a risk of opening or slipping when the 
blood pressure returns to normal.  
Analysis of the data also revealed that being ‘on the ball’, alert, attentive and 
ready to detect and respond to clinical deterioration was a crucial defence against 
adverse events. This involved identifying alterations in vital signs, circulation and 
respiration (i.e. low blood pressure, low heart rate, poor peripheral return, respiratory 
complications and insufficiency) in their early phase and acting swiftly to prevent 
further clinical deterioration. When clinical deterioration occurred, nurses engaged in 
problem-solving, planning for all possibilities and thinking ahead about a range of 
issues - what else could be done for the patient, what else might be needed, why had 
the blood pressure dropped, and would another operating theatre be required (56:09): 
We look at alterations in vital signs [...] we act on low blood pressures 
and respiratory complications and respiratory inefficiency all the time [...] 
I talk to the staff a lot about [...] actually checking their peripheral return 
of their fingers so that you can see if they have actually been peripherally 
shut down [...] if they are starting to peripherally shut down then we 
would be running a hell of lot faster.  If you don’t pick up those things as 
they trending down in that early phase, that is when it will go pear 
shaped. You have to act upon those things really swiftly (56:07-09). 
I was standing on the right hand side of the patient.  Generally the 
anaesthetic nurse stands there, so you have a better line of sight to the 
monitor.  Because this person is on just three or five minutes cycles for 
their blood pressure, you didn’t pick that up straight away, but you all of 
a sudden notice that their heart rate has dropped down.  That was what 
alerted me to it, at which point I let the anaesthetist know and then, at 
which point they had no output very shortly after that (50:03).  
When concerned about a patient’s heart rate in light of his history of ischaemic 
heart disease a nurse responded by placing the patient in a monitored bed in a 
resuscitation bay and advising her colleagues to remain vigilant by being ‘on the 
ball’, ‘sticking’ with the patient and continuing with their assessments: 
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So […] his rate was about 140.  Got a known history of ischaemic heart 
disease so […] that rate was not going to be ever good for his cardiac 
muscle [...] I said ‘Look, I don’t know what to do. I’ve already been and 
suggested that we try and reduce the heart rate and he’s said ‘No’.  So 
there’s nothing we can do.  Let’s put him in resuscitation, monitor him 
just in case he has a cardiac arrest, and we’ll deal with it from there.  So 
we’ve just got to be on the ball and keep going with our assessments and 
stick with him and we’ll deal with whatever happens after’ (52:14).   
(i) Responding to signs 
Responding to a variety of cues or signs was a key component of nursing vigilance 
and a means by which nurses’ detected gaps and prevented adverse events. In many 
instances the cue was nurses knowing or feeling that there was something not quite 
right, that things did not add up or fit the picture. Many participants described a sixth 
sense of knowing, an instinct or profound clinical sense that there was something 
going on, the patient was about to ‘crash’ or not ‘travelling well’, even when the 
observations, test results and the data on the monitors all appeared to be normal. 
Participants disclosed that, at times, they did not feel they had a solid basis for these 
alarm bells (52:04) and found it difficult to pinpoint their concerns and articulate 
them effectively to other members of the team (66:04). As participants responded: 
I think a lot of it is because we are experienced, you have just got this 
sixth sense of knowing that something is not quite right.  You've got the 
ability to look at someone and think hey they're not travelling really well 
but you can't really put your finger on what's going on.  You might get 
someone and their observations are absolutely fine but you just know that 
they're not right and that is that, I don't know it is a sense I suppose 
(61:04). 
Like you become accustomed to having clinical senses about [...] you can 
look at someone and say that person is not well. You don't know why 
because their monitor might look all right and not be dinging and stuff. 
You get that very profound clinical sense that something is not quite right 
here (13:05). 
It might just trigger something in my head that oh this doesn’t seem right 
to me, I had better just go and check and see what is going on (60:10). 
In a number of instances a gut feeling or intuition, gained from years of 
experience and accumulated knowledge, alerted nurses to the presence of gaps in 
patient care. These internal responses indicated that something was not right (09:06); 
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that the patient might not follow the usual trajectory for a particular procedure; or 
that clinical standards were being breached. As participants responded: 
Sometimes you’ve just got this intuition [...] that this patient is not going 
to follow that [...] trajectory they’re going to go [...] on a different path, 
yeah, they’re not going to go on the path that they’re meant to, and 
there’s just the intuition of that. And that’s just those years of that 
experience and knowledge (55:18). 
Sometimes it’s hard to put your finger on it, but sometimes they just 
don’t look quite right and it’s a gut reaction (22:14).   
Other examples included a situation where the nurse felt that the medication 
chart did not fit the picture of the patient’s illness. On investigating further, she 
found the medications had been ordered on the incorrect chart (12:01). Other signals 
to the presence of gaps included the way in which a doctor observed a patient and the 
skill mix of nurses at the bedside: 
Just knowing from the way the anaesthetist is observing - is looking - is 
taking a little bit more time than what you anticipate to have an outcome 
then you know get the gloves on, get ready to step in and assist, that kind 
of thing (55:16).   
There were probably [...] two or three nurses there, but they were all only 
junior and [...] you just pop by because things don’t seem quite right. The 
patient was dyspnoeic, I wouldn’t have walked past without sticking my 
nose in (17:04). 
Participants also revealed that the ability of nurses to prevent adverse events was 
a function of them knowing the patient very well and knowing when they were not 
‘right’. In one notable case, over a period of time, ward nurses developed the ability 
to astutely recognise subtle changes in a patient with multiple, complex medical 
problems. These slight changes, while outside pre-advanced life support criteria, 
were indicative of clinical deterioration. When these occurred, a swift response was 
required to prevent the patient’s readmission to the intensive care unit. The ability of 
the nurses to recognise and act on these signs proved to be a key factor in the 
patient’s recovery and eventual discharge (20:20). 
Participants acknowledged that ignoring their intuitive responses was a 
contributing factor in adverse patient outcomes. One participant revealed that she 
was too concerned about completing tasks that, in hindsight, were not that important, 
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while another was deterred from asking a doctor to review a child for fear of 
overstepping clinical boundaries (11:12). She described feeling terrible when the 
child was admitted to the intensive care unit with airway difficulties and 
acknowledged the importance of listening and responding to her instincts:  
 I was coordinating in the paediatric intensive care unit at the time and 
this wasn't an intensive care unit (ICU) patient [...] I quickly considered 
asking the [...] consultant to listen to her but was concerned I would be 
involving another opinion and overstepping the boundaries. Six days later 
the child was in ICU and rushed to operating theatre with airway 
granulation covering nearly all of her trachea [...] I felt really terrible as I 
had a strong feeling that things didn't add up but didn't have the time to 
spend as my role that day was to ICU not technology dependent children 
[...] We make mistakes as humans but we need to listen to our 
instincts even if sometimes it means you might step on toes (get into 
trouble) to respond to them (24:07). 
(ii) The prevention of medication errors 
Nursing vigilance was critical to the detection of medication errors and prevention of 
adverse events. Nurses maintained a watchful state of attention and responded when 
they suspected something might be amiss. A powerful example of this can be found 
in a case where the vigilance and swift action of a perioperative nurse prevented a 
patient from receiving an injection of local anaesthetic with adrenaline into his penis. 
Adrenaline is contraindicated in these circumstances because of its vasoconstrictor 
effects and the risk of necrosis. Red labelling on the vial alerted the nurse to the 
adrenaline and she immediately placed her arm in front of the surgeon, 
contaminating the sterile field and preventing the surgeon from injecting the drug. 
The participant commented that she remembered the case well because it is the only 
time in her professional life that she has deliberately contaminated a sterile field. 
Initially the surgeon was angry but he later expressed his gratitude (06:11).  
On another occasion, an emergency nurse checked on a patient receiving an iron 
infusion, aware that adverse reactions are common and that the staff in her 
department were inexperienced with this type of infusion. On checking, she 
discovered that the post-infusion observations had not been taken and that the patient 
had indeed suffered a severe reaction (bright red face, swollen hands and legs) for 
which urgent treatment was required (37:16).  
In another case, the vigilance and prompt response of a critical care nurse 
averted a cardiac arrest. The nurse was baffled that a junior colleague had been able 
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to titrate a patient’s inotropic medication to zero in a very short period of time. 
Aware that the patient’s blood pressure was very sensitive to even minor changes in 
the infusion rate she felt compelled to investigate. On checking, she found that the 
patient had an extremely low blood pressure and the transducer reading the patient’s 
arterial pressure was incorrectly positioned: 
 Knowing that he’d been on five micrograms when I came on I’m 
wondering how she’s got down to zero when I was titrating it just by 
small amounts.  So I whizzed in and [...] the transducer’s hanging 
halfway to the floor; his mean arterial pressure was 54.  If I hadn’t 
intervened at that point with that low blood pressure and obviously 
urosepsis and an underlying heart condition and all the rest of it, it 
wouldn’t have been very long before he coded (26:05). 
(c) Looking at and observing the whole patient 
Further analysis of the data revealed that observing and looking at the whole patient 
was a component of surveillance and inextricably linked to patient assessment and 
vigilance. This entailed searching, examining, watching and directing one’s attention 
toward the patient while remaining open to what might emerge. In critical care 
settings, the inability of novice nurses to ‘see the big picture’ contributed to gaps that 
increased the risk of adverse events:   
They might be so focussed on, perhaps, their inotrope therapy and 
looking at what the appropriate outcomes for that are that they miss 
changes in their cardiac rhythms, or perhaps they are not keeping a close 
eye on their chest drain losses and so therefore your child is actively 
bleeding from that chest drain and they’re not looking at that. People that 
are junior within their area; they do, they get tunnel vision on particular 
issues, and they can’t see the big picture and they lose focus on that.  And 
some of that’s related to their knowledge deficit, but also some of it is 
because they’re not used to doing that multi-skilled care at a more 
complex level (22:13-14).  
In rehabilitation and transitional care settings, observing the patient closely and 
looking for symptoms were key to identifying that something was not right (48:15). 
Rehabilitation nurses described themselves as the quiet achievers in health care for 
their ability to identify a deteriorating patient in the absence of much of the 
equipment and medical input that is customary in acute care settings (49:22). They 
achieved this by being ‘in tune’ with everything about the patient (73:06). This 
involved watching the patient closely, paying attention to their body language, 
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colour, demeanour, cognition, balance, gait and underlying chronic conditions. As 
patients recovered and began to mobilise issues with cognition, communication and 
mobility created risk: 
We have to use our skills and we watch the body language, we watch the 
patient, we watch their colour, we watch more of that stuff and their 
demeanour.  Then we say something is not right and that’s how we pick 
up on it (49:23). 
 But as the recovery starts and the patient starts to mobilise and the 
patient starts to interact with the hospital environment they [nurses] need 
to understand mobility, they need to understand gait, they need to 
understand balance, cognition, communication, insight.  Because it’s the 
patient with poor insight that’s most likely going to get up and try and 
walk without assistance; it’s the patient with urinary retention that’s 
going to want the toilet all the time.  And if you add urinary retention to 
poor insight you’ve got a patient who wants to go to the toilet five or six 
times in six hours, they’re the ones that are at risk.  Even though they 
might be well, even though that acute phase may be over and they’re 
stable and the blood results are fine and the temperature and blood 
pressure is fine, you know, these other issues; cognition, communication, 
mobility, they’re the things that become risks (48:14). 
Two cases from ED contexts illustrate the importance of observation and 
looking carefully and critically at the whole patient (not just the physical aspects) and 
the bigger picture to determine what the patient needs (66:16-17; 73:19). On each 
occasion the patient’s treatment altered quite dramatically. The first case concerns a 
patient that presented to the ED with constipation. It emerged, during a discussion 
with the nurse, that the patient was unable to get out of bed because of back pain and 
that the constipation was a consequence of immobility. When probed further, 
however, the patient revealed that the back pain was a result of crush fractures in her 
spine. This information dramatically changed the care of the patient to treatment of 
these fractures. The participant commented that the gap in this case was the tendency 
for people to look at ‘one thing’ when there was a need to look beyond the presenting 
complaint to the bigger picture of what was happening to the patient (60:08). 
In the second case, a thorough assessment revealed clinical information which 
was critical to reaching an accurate diagnosis. While the team was focussed on the 
patient’s presenting complaint of back pain, the nurse was curious about why the 
patient was in pain. She observed that the patient’s knee was swollen (interestingly 
none of her colleagues had looked at the patient’s knees). It emerged that the 
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presenting complaint of back pain was secondary to the patient’s immobility from a 
collection of fluid in her knee (04:08). This participant stressed the importance of 
preventing adverse events by looking at the whole patient:  
Look the problem I find is that people want to know what’s wrong and 
isn’t that common sense that people want to know what’s wrong. But 
often it’s like, there’s nothing on the bloods, there’s nothing on x-ray, 
therefore there’s nothing wrong, it’s all in their heads and I can’t tell you 
how many times that’s happened either that doctors have tried to say 
‘look we can’t find anything wrong, you go and see them because they’re 
stressed, or you go and see them because they’re not coping’ and what 
you find is no there is something wrong clinically. It’s just that you 
haven’t found it yet [...] You know you can’t just be dismissive, you’ve 
got to look [...] but I find personally that a lot of the issues are just 
dismissed as being minor (04:12-14). 
(i) Failure to observe and look at the whole patient in the ED 
In ED contexts, the failure of nurses to look carefully and critically at the whole 
patient was a key factor in the emergence of gaps. Participants described the 
importance of ‘getting it right’ at triage, aware that this process ‘sets the scene’ for 
the patient’s journey through the ED, determining where the patient is placed within 
the department and the perceived complexity and urgency of their needs. Of equal 
importance, was the assessment conducted by the triage nurse. Participants conveyed 
a sense that triage nurses should conduct their own assessment (i.e. see for 
themselves) and not be overly influenced or guided by the ambulance staff. 
Furthermore, this assessment should not be too suggestive of the problem or 
diagnosis such that it might influence or constrain the thinking of the medical staff. 
As participants responded: 
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So it’s that, not accepting what you’re told and actually looking. That’s 
one of the things we try to get into our triage nurses heads [...] don’t take 
the patient for granted. Yep, listen to the ambos story but actually do your 
own assessment and don’t be guided by what they say or don’t be 
influenced by what they actually say [...] If there’s a poor decision made 
at triage then that can quite often progress through the department. That 
sets the scene for the patient’s journey through the ED [...] Our elderly 
patients with abdominal pain if they’re poorly triaged and end-up in our 
cubicle area, we’ve had a few near misses [...] So I think it all comes 
down to the placement of the patient in the emergency department [...] 
triage sort of sets the scene for their urgency. So if you're in the cubicles 
and they've run things - well they can’t be sick, someone’s put them in 
there, but they actually can be (43:03) 
I keep saying to the triage nurses, you need to understand that what you 
do and say at triage influences the patient’s journey through the 
department because the doctors will just see what you’ve written.  They 
think the theme that you are writing is this so they won’t look for 
anything else necessarily. So when you do your triage assessment just 
make it really general and subjective and don’t be saying that this is what 
the problem is.  Just say what the symptoms are so that we don’t get them 
thinking that, oh yeah this is just something simple so I don’t really need 
to worry too much about this [...] You have to make sure that you get it 
pretty right up here because it [...] influences what everybody thinks and 
unless somebody else challenges what you are thinking, then sometimes 
things can and do get missed (60:30). 
The following case is instructive of the types of gaps that may emerge in ED 
settings when the triage nurse fails to look carefully and critically at the whole 
patient and challenge the opinion of others. On this occasion the triage nurse 
accepted the view of the ambulance staff that the patient had a soft tissue injury and 
her leg was not broken. As a result, the patient was triaged to the waiting room, in 
spite of the fact that she was unable to walk and in pain. Concerned by the patient’s 
clinical presentation, the participant arranged for an x-ray to be taken. It revealed the 
patient had a fractured neck of femur: 
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I think of many instances where we miss something, initially, so 
classically people that are sent home. I had one lady waiting in the 
waiting room [...] the daughter [...] said ‘look I’m really concerned 
because she’s in a lot of pain and they seem to think she’s soft tissue and 
we’re still here in the waiting room, nothing’s been done’, she hadn’t 
even had an x-ray [...] she’s been here for 5 hours. Well turned out she 
had a fractured neck of femur and she’d been sitting in the waiting room 
[...] because the ambulance people had said to the triage people ‘oh we 
don’t think it’s broken’ (04:10). 
Another situation, described as a case of gaps ‘all over the place’ underscores 
the importance of the triage process and illustrates how it sets the scene for the 
patient’s journey through the ED and beyond (60:28). The key gaps in this case are 
summarised here. In the first instance, the patient was triaged to a low acuity area of 
the ED rather than a resuscitation bay, in spite of her involvement in a high speed 
motor vehicle accident. While staff attended to a laceration to the patient’s arm, there 
was a lack of concern about the patient’s hypotension and the fact that every time she 
sat up she fainted. A systematic head-to-toe assessment to look for other injuries was 
not undertaken and the nurse assigned to the patient did not seek medical review in 
regard to the patient’s fainting. Later in the evening the patient was discharged. 
 The patient represented to the ED the next day with abdominal and back pain 
and urinary retention. A series of further investigations confirmed a fractured pelvis 
and the patient was admitted to a medical ward. Over the next two weeks, however, 
she continued to feel unwell, nauseous and dizzy and was unable to mobilise. While 
an earlier CT scan had not imaged the patient’s entire abdomen, a second scan 
revealed that the patient had ruptured her spleen two weeks earlier in the motor 
vehicle accident. The participant considered this case a ‘complete miss by everybody 
the whole way through’ and was concerned by the failure of nurses and doctors to 
ask important questions - ‘Don’t we think we should go head to toe over this lady 
again?  We found this injury, did we miss anything else?’ She used this case to teach 
nurses about gaps in care:  
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So that’s one of my teaching stories where I teach the nurses about gaps 
in care and why questions weren’t asked and why did you send somebody 
home that was fainting and why didn’t you advocate more? That lady was 
just mismanaged from way to go and it wasn’t just ED it was also 
upstairs in the ward. So that’s one of my very, very bad case scenarios 
that makes me feel uncomfortable [...] So there were just gaps all over the 
place there and it was probably due to inexperience, probably due to an 
attitude problem of the triage nurse.  I would say a knowledge deficit.  
Then everybody just went with, nobody asked the question, don’t we 
think we should go head to toe over this lady again?  We found this 
injury, did we miss anything else?  Nobody asked that question.  So it 
was a just a complete miss by everybody all the way through (60:28). 
(d) Checking and making sure 
Careful and diligent checking and ‘making sure’ were closely linked to nursing 
vigilance and crucial to medication and equipment safety. Nurses described checking 
backwards and forwards; forever double and triple checking everything about a 
patient; acknowledging to colleagues the things that were being checked; checking 
again, no matter who had checked previously; and making sure that every piece of 
equipment was working and available and that everything was as it should be. While 
many of these activities were described as simple and straight forward, they were 
nonetheless extremely effective in preventing adverse events and keeping patient’s 
safe. Participants acknowledged that pressure to act quickly contributed to mistakes 
because nurses did not take the time to double check and  think about what they were 
doing (07:19). One participant believed there was nothing so important that nurses 
could not take ten seconds making sure their intended actions were safe. 
Examples of the medication safety work undertaken by nurses included a stock-
take at the beginning of each shift to cross reference all medications and infusions 
against the medication chart; making sure that all intravenous lines were labelled; 
making sure that medications were being given at the correct frequency, times and 
dosage; tracking of intravenous lines from the bags to the patient to ensure that each 
line was correctly labelled; and the supervision of junior or rotating medical staff as 
they wrote up medication charts. One participant cautioned against assuming that the 
label on the intravenous line is accurate, commenting that lines often get swapped 
around and that it is easy for someone who is tired to apply the wrong label to the 
wrong bag (26:24). Another participant checked medication charts thoroughly, 
paying careful attention to the administration times, remarking that in spite of the 
double checking process, things ‘still fell through the cracks’ (60:03-04).  
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 I think there is a fair level of expectation there because of the frequency 
that it occurs with, yes. We're always looking out for the doctors and 
making sure that someone is there with them while they are writing it up 
just to, because otherwise if you have to chase them or chase someone 
else you are just wasting your time. Yes and it's something that shouldn’t 
really need to happen but just out of practical experience we always do 
and nine out of 10 times it pays off because you are picking up on 
mistakes that they make (51:18). 
Careful and diligent checking enabled nurses to detect gaps in the prescribing 
and administration of medications. Examples of these gaps are listed in Box 4.3 
(page 113 of this thesis). 
One participant worked in an emergency setting that treated both children and 
adults and was acutely aware of the potential for a child to receive an adult dose of a 
medication (07:08). Nurses bridged this gap by always looking up and checking the 
recommended paediatric dosage of the medication, no matter what, and attending to 
simple things such as looking for the child’s weight and, if necessary, weighing the 
child. This process exposed prescribing errors on a daily basis. On another occasion, 
the process of checking with the patient, listening carefully, explaining the 
medication to be given and taking the time to ‘make sure’ averted a potentially 
catastrophic event. In the course of this process, nurses identified that the patient had 
previously received the drug (Streptokinase). The participant described this as a 
critical pick-up as a second dose of this drug carries the risk of a fatal anaphylactic 
reaction: 
 Yeah but if he had the Streptokinase they have huge anaphylactic 
reactions that basically would kill you quicker than the infarction that he 
has had, you just can’t have it twice.  So potentially they [nurses] have 
stopped a catastrophic event happening just by listening to what the 
patient says; explaining it to them and making sure. It is just that pick up 
- he already said he had it once before and they know that they’re only 
meant to have it once, how come it’s up there now?  Something so simple 
as that that’s probably […] that sort of thing (07:14) 
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Box 4.3 Gaps in the prescribing and administration of medications 
x Drugs prescribed in the wrong form 
x Drugs being administered at the incorrect frequency and time 
x The incorrect dosage (i.e. too high) of medication ordered for a child 
x Medication charts labelled with the incorrect patient  
x Failure to review the Warfarin (an oral anticoagulant) dosage daily and prescribe 
based on the result of an INR (international normalized ratio) blood test 
x Failure to order Gentamicin levels and adjust the dosage accordingly 
x Failure to order aperients for patients receiving opioid analgesics 
x Failure to review anticoagulant medications (i.e. Clexane, heparin) and change to an 
oral anticoagulant (i.e. Warfarin) when appropriate 
x Patients prescribed two anti-platelet drugs (i.e. Clopidogrel and aspirin) 
x Failure to review and reduce post operative pain medication  
 
In perioperative settings, the checking of equipment exposed gaps that placed 
patients at risk of harm (i.e. missing equipment on emergency trolleys and 
anaesthetic machines). Nursing surveillance involved making sure that medical 
devices were connected, running and cycling as they should be; bringing the 
anaesthetist’s attention back to the rate of drugs, vaporisers and intravenous fluids 
and checking these were correct  (i.e. ‘The intravenous is running full, do you want it 
running at that rate?’); monitoring the surgeon’s position in relation to the patient’s 
body; monitoring the length of time the patient’s legs were elevated in a lithotomy 
position; maintaining an awareness of the patient’s heart rate and oxygen level by 
tuning in to the pulse oxymeter probe even when engaged in other tasks and when 
the patient was out of the nurse’s line of sight; noting how the patient looked after 
the lines were in and the drugs had been given; and observing the heart rate, rhythm, 
blood pressure and oxygen level:. 
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I can tell you basically what their heart rate is and what their oxygen level 
is, just by the noise of the saturations probe […] I’ll be at the other end of 
the theatre and I can tell if the patient’s had an ectopic […] You’re not 
paying any attention, you’re doing something else, but you’re really just 
tuned in to it.  So you do [...] have a look at what the patient’s like to start 
with [...] what do they generally look like and do they still generally look 
like that after you’ve done all these, given them a whole bunch of drugs 
and done a whole bunch of things to them?  Do they still look in that sort 
of way? What’s their heart rate, what’s their heart rhythm?  Is it in [...] 
the range of [...] before they went off to sleep?  Has their blood pressure 
dropped too much?  Is their oxygen level still high?  It’s just that quick 
glance, getting that information and going, just checking on it that way 
(50:08). 
4.3.3 Effective and constant communication 
Participants disclosed that patient safety was dependent on effective and constant 
communication, particularly between medical and nursing staff. Prior to surgery, 
communication between the nurse and the surgeon focussed on the likely trajectory 
of the case so that nurses could plan accordingly. Speaking up and seeking 
confirmation that all was flowing correctly was important to preventing gaps in 
perioperative settings. As participants responded: 
Taking action to cover a gap immediately is vital, speaking up to avoid a 
near miss, seeking confirmation that all is flowing correctly within our 
clinical practice is required to avoid these gaps (09:06). 
Trying to plan ahead and identify what the needs are.  So, you know, 
finding out more about the patient, what exactly the surgeon wants for 
that procedure and asking the surgeon - so it’s all communication.  
Saying to the surgeon ‘Now, are you going to need that and this?’  
(55:15-16). 
One participant described how she communicated widely with different 
members of the team (i.e. nurse in charge, junior and senior medical staff), especially 
when she was concerned about a patient. Even though much of the information 
discussed was also documented in the patient’s notes, this form of communication 
kept channels open and ensured that the issue was at the forefront of everyone’s 
thinking: 
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I suppose communicating to who was in charge to make sure they’re 
aware, and [...] the junior neurosurgical staff tend to be on our ward so 
you sort of keep sort of chatting to them and just sort of tell them our 
concerns so although they’ve said there’s no further orders, or no change, 
you’d say ‘I know, but it is bothering us’ or, you know ‘What do you 
think it is?’  So then they will then go to the registrar or whatever when 
they come around.  So, you know, everyone’s constantly aware, keeping 
those channels of communication not just what we’re writing down 
because they don’t often read the nursing notes (15:10).   
A rehabilitation nurse revealed that most of her time was spent promoting 
communication within the team and setting up processes and strategies to prevent 
gaps in patient care and things not being picked up. She attributed the significant 
decrease in readmissions to her unit (from 10 percent to one percent) to the 
successful implementation of many of these strategies, most notably a ‘daily 
scrum’ 16  that was used to foster interdisciplinary communication and discussion 
about the needs of individual patients: 
I think the best experience is having that daily scrum, just setting that 
process up and they really were resistant to it the allied health and the 
nurses.  At that daily scrum we can talk about the patient and talk about if 
there were any immediate changes, because what used to happen was it 
used to only be once a week we talk about the patients, and then things 
would get missed before the next meeting and the goals would change.  
But now we can talk about patients [...] that daily scrum really has 
changed our whole unit (49:09). 
Nurses were frustrated by poor communication with medical colleagues and 
expected to be told when medication or treatment orders were written up:  
And I just say ‘Look, you have to tell us.  We don’t know.  We can’t give 
it if you don’t tell us.’  You know, fair enough we do look but, you know, 
when you go to do a set of observations you’ll see ‘Oh, the patient’s 
actually for a litre of fluid’ or ‘they’re for some Lasix’ or whatever; some 
Panadeine and a Nurofen.  They don’t come and tell you, that’s what I 
find completely frustrating.  So I think, you know [...] safety [...] is 
dependent also on good communication (44:21). 
                                                 
16 A scrum refers to a formation in the sport of rugby where players from each side form a tight pack 
in a contest for the ball. In health care contexts, a scrum is a brief and informal meeting between 
health care providers to review and discuss the care of individual patients. Typically, the meeting 
occurs within the clinical setting rather than in an office environment.  
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(a) Assertive communication 
Nurses that were successful in managing gaps revealed that assertive communication 
was key to positive patient safety outcomes. Participants described the importance of 
being confident; not following orders when they believed something was not right; 
being willing to question ‘absolutely everything’; challenging the things that needed 
to be challenged; and taking a firm stance, confidently speaking up and saying no 
when it was unsafe to proceed. Age and experience gave nurses the resolve to ‘stick 
to their guns’ and be strong even when being growled at and pressured to do 
something they knew was not right. As participants responded: 
So you do have to have the communication and assertiveness skills that 
when you think there’s a gap, you’re willing to actually investigate it 
even if you’re told, don’t worry about that, that’s nothing...having sort of 
the right skills to be assertive enough to ring someone about it and get to 
the right person and not be fobbed off by someone else (70:20-22).  
Well what would be of great concern to me was, if you weren't a bit 
older, and a bit stronger and a bit prepared to stick to your guns and 
probably even half scared to do the wrong thing, you know.  When 
you’re older, you’re more inclined to say look I'm just not budging on 
this and you can growl at me and tell me to send a patient back to the 
ward and do what you like but I just know it’s not right.  If I had been 
younger or less experienced, I would have done what I was instructed to 
do, and that wouldn't have been a good outcome for the patient I don't 
believe (56:14). 
 You should go with your gut feeling, you do not move.  She is a senior 
nurse but young.  She has all of the skills and the knowledge but she 
didn’t have the confidence, she just thought the consultant knew what she 
was doing and I said no.  Just trying to get them to feel assertive about 
themselves.  If you feel something isn’t right then say something (18:19). 
This study has captured many instances where nurses bridged gaps and 
prevented adverse events by communicating in an assertive manner. One participant 
described how she ‘put her foot down’ and emphatically declared to the resident 
medical officer that they were aborting a head CT scan on an agitated patient (40:18). 
The doctor wanted to sedate the patient further but the nurse knew that he was 
inadequately skilled to perform an intubation and that the patient’s life would be in 
danger should he lose his airway without the back up and resources of the 
Emergency Department. Another participant described how she had to ‘push the 
point’ and beg a doctor to order a blood test on a patient with chest pain. The test 
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revealed that the patient was having a myocardial infarction (45:21). When doctors 
were reluctant to leave rounds or handover to review deteriorating patients, nurses 
responded by presenting and arguing a case. They described needing to be rude and 
confrontational at times: 
 You know, it was just absolutely so bad that in the mornings, when you 
went and did your first round and looked at people, if someone was 
having chest pain, you’d ring the doctors and they’d say, well, I can’t 
come now, I’m in handover, and I’d say well, put it this way, would you 
like to come now or would you like me to call a medical emergency team 
call?  You know, you had to be really sort of rude in your face about it. It 
took me a little while to settle down from that because I take it very 
seriously (70:06). 
In spite of her confidence in her nursing ability and years of experience, one 
participant acknowledged that speaking up and being appropriately assertive was not 
always easy and something she consciously worked on. She commented that some of 
her medical colleagues refused to work with nurses that were in their view 
perpetually aggressive (50:20): 
I’ve been there for a while, so you know how you get a bit older and 
bolshier.  But it’s funny [...] I’m reasonably confident in my nursing 
ability and I’m very confident in my anaesthetic nursing ability but I still 
[...] sometimes have issues speaking up and saying things [...] so it’s 
something I’ve been consciously working on. What is an appropriate 
assertive way of just saying something which needed to be said? Because, 
as nurses, we do dance around the topic quite a lot of, maybe we should 
and what do you think and all those sorts of things (50:10). 
(b) Change the framework 
Emergency nurses prevented unsafe discharges by changing the framework from 
admission criteria and bed availability to one of patient safety. Nurses achieved this 
through skilful and direct questioning (Is this patient going to be safe at home?) and 
by personalising the situation (What if this was your mother?) (05:16). They 
advocated for patients to be admitted and used clinical data (i.e. the patient 
desaturating or being unable to walk or weight bear) to support their argument: 
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And so often I’m giving the medical staff data or reasons, actual reasons 
why they can’t go home.  Whether it’s a walk test and showing that their 
saturations are actually dropping off, you know, and they might go 5 
metres and then it starts to deteriorate. Physically proving that someone 
can’t do something, wait bear or walk (05:12). 
So I asked three different doctors to check the x-ray because she couldn’t 
walk and they all said there’s nothing wrong with the x-ray we’re going 
to send her back to the next of kin flat. And I said you can’t send her back 
to her next of kin flat because she can barely stand, I don’t care if you’re 
telling me that the x-rays are normal, clinically she can’t walk (04:11). 
On another occasion, a nurse changed the framework to the lack of diagnosis 
and understanding of what was ‘wrong’. She was concerned the patient’s care would 
be of poor quality and unsafe:  
And I was saying ‘look there’s something wrong here, I don’t quite know 
what it is but I don’t feel comfortable about sending him home because 
we don’t know what the problem is. I was saying to the doctor ‘look I’m 
not happy about sending him home, even if he becomes not for 
resuscitation there’ll be issues of pain relief, eating, he won’t be able to 
eat, he’ll become obstructed, like you know, we need to do something. 
We can’t just send him home like this, I’m not happy sending him home 
just to know he’s going to perforate his bowel and die. That’s not a good 
outcome (04:09-10). 
4.3.4 Teamwork 
Participants described many attributes of teams and teamwork that were important to 
bridging gaps, solving problems, getting the work done, and ensuring that patients 
received adequate care. These qualities included co-operation, communication, 
respect, rapport, trust and faith; being able to depend and count on other members of 
the team; and the ability to pull together, support each other and approach the care of 
the patient as a team. As participants responded: 
We do a lot of team work. We count on [each other] - I see us as all being 
a link in the chain and that we’re professionals and that we have to be 
able to trust our co-professionals [...] we have to trust that that link in the 
chain is going to work (64:13). 
It’s very much a team game. I mean it’s a spiral, you all depend on each 
other to get the work done (03:07) 
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If there is a haemorrhage [...] everyone’s got to pull together, you know 
it’s the only way you’re going to save the patient (10:07). 
The teamwork’s important because you need everybody to know each 
other’s role [...] and you need to have cooperation, communication and 
trust in each other’s expertise [...] and you also need to be able to support 
each other and back up (55:10-11) 
One participant suggested that teamwork was a learned skill. While the 
experience of working with some of her colleagues was intuitive, natural and 
rewarding, she could not rely on all of her co-workers to function as a team. She 
commented that a lack of teamwork worsened discontinuity of care (13:18). Others 
acknowledged the importance of supporting and backing up colleagues, knowing that 
somebody will look after their patients, and yours, if necessary (13:16; 55:10-11). 
One participant described a situation where a medical colleague asked that she watch 
closely for any problems with his practice: 
I actually had a registrar yesterday say to me, I’ve been sick the last few 
days, can you just keep an extra eye and make sure that you check on me, 
that I’m doing stuff right and let me know if you see a problem?  I went, 
wow, that’s how the culture is actually changing. People are speaking up 
and saying, watch my back, this is where I’m at today, I want to let you 
know so that we are all working together (50:23). 
Nurses managed gaps by liaising with medical staff, trouble shooting problems, 
co-ordinating the care of patients and ensuring that things were not missed. This 
involved making sure that medication and supplies were available and following up 
to ensure that planned x-rays and procedures actually occurred. As participants 
responded: 
I think nurses are the ones sorting out all of the bullshit at the bedside.  
They're going “shit I can't do this because I haven't got this, I can't do 
this, I haven't got this drug, this drug is wrong I have to call someone 
they have to come fix it”.  You have to be a medical liaison and trouble 
shooter all day every day (13:21).   
It is the work of the nurses.  We coordinate the care; we coordinate just 
about everything that goes on in the department.  So our coordination is 
really important as well; like being on the ball, not letting things slip, 
because you can have a list of ten things in your brain and you’re 
prioritising which one is more important (52:18).  
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It’s prompting too, it’s chasing the doctors up and saying remember on 
the ward round you said you were going to do such and such, well such 
and such hasn’t happened, it could be an x-ray it could be a procedure, it 
could be chasing up someone from the home team, it could be 
commencing a Lasix infusion that hasn’t been written up, things like that.  
So you have to go and find them and say look I need this done, I need 
that done (26:17). 
While teamwork and close professional relationships were a strong feature of 
many perioperative settings, participants described feeling awful, sick and incredibly 
frustrated when their repeated requests for patients to be reviewed were challenged 
or ignored by their medical colleagues (56:14; 66:05). They described feeling fearful 
about being in conflict with the people whom they worked closely with every day. 
One nurse commented that knowing other team members well and feeling valued 
was essential to speaking up when something was wrong: 
In relation to positioning the patient [...] monitoring and [...] aseptic 
practices [...] if you see a breach in any of those, or a potential for 
something to be wrong, you need to be able to speak up.  So if you’re in a 
team where you feel that you’re valued and your input is valued, then 
you’re able to do that.  Whereas if you feel - if you’re new to a team or 
you don’t know the people very well it’s much more difficult to have 
input, to be able to say, you know, ‘Why did you put that prep over there 
underneath that trolley?  You need to re-gown and glove’ [...] A team 
member might struggle to say that if they don’t know the surgeon 
(55:11). 
Interpersonal tensions and dynamics contributed to discontinuity in 
communication and undermined teamwork. When nurses felt embarrassed or 
humiliated by the nasty behaviour of a consultant they ‘shut down’ and were 
reluctant to volunteer that ‘vital little tip’ described as being important to the 
patient’s care. Potentially, a whole trail of communication was lost (26:32). One 
participant acknowledged that it was dangerous when nurses perceived that other 
members of the team were not listening to their concerns (66:09), for example, when 
a change in a patient’s neurological status is dismissed by the medical staff and 
attributed to incompetence or inconsistency in the nursing assessment of patients 
(15:09-10).  
The following case illustrates the impact of emotions and interpersonal tensions 
on teamwork and patient safety. The participant described a situation where a 
doctor’s anger and mistrust of her as a nurse was a factor in his delayed assessment 
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of a deteriorating patient. Ultimately, the medical team was called when the patient 
suffered a cardiac arrest. The nurse was extremely distressed by the patient’s death 
and upset by the doctor’s behaviour. She felt that he wanted to teach her a lesson and 
that he did not want her telling him what to do:   
We’d had another episode where someone had chest pain and the resident 
was trying to cannulate her and she had aphasia so she couldn’t say 
anything, and he just kept sticking her for like 10 times and I said, look 
you’ve got to stop, and then so I got the registrar and he came and tried to 
cannulate but he got flustered because this had gone on for some time, 
and I’m saying, look will I ring the anaesthetic person to come down?  
All I said to him was, look, if you let her arm dangle a little while and 
then put the tourniquet on, which was the wrong thing to say to the 
registrar because they’re a senior doctor, but it was out before I had a 
chance, you know, and he was just really angry with me. So then this was 
a couple of days after that and when I went to him and said, look, I don’t 
like the look of this man.  This is his observations, this is his EEG, can 
you have a look at him?  He just looked at me and more or less said, 
yeah, when I’m ready.  That man coded and, you know, not long after he 
hadn’t been seen.  He got seen then because the met call brought the 
whole team down and the doctor came and everyone sorted him out, we 
brought him back [resuscitated] and took him upstairs from rehabilitation 
into the cardiac care ward, and an hour later he died (70:05) 
The risk of poor or adverse outcomes increased when the team was ineffective 
and did not meet the patient’s needs. This was especially evident in emergency 
situations when people went off on tangents, creating many little teams: 
People go off on their own little tangents and stuff and things don’t 
happen and you get adverse outcomes [...] You end up with a whole lot of 
little teams but they’re not working together. They’re off on their own 
little tangents and not meeting anywhere near the patient’s needs (43:10). 
If the teamwork is poor then you can have poor outcomes and not be very 
effective in what you’re doing (55:10-11). 
4.4 What were the gaps identified by nurses? 
The gaps identified by nurses are presented under the following subheadings: 
x Failure to recognise and respond to a deteriorating patient 
x ‘Simple things can cause incredible adverse outcomes’  
x ‘A lapse in critical thinking...we seem to be on autopilot’ 
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x Cutting corners, taking short cuts 
x Failure to communicate the information required to plan and deliver care 
safely 
4.4.1 Failure to recognise and respond to a deteriorating patient 
In the context of describing their experiences of responding to gaps and preventing 
adverse events, participants revealed catastrophic incidents that arose from a failure 
of nurses to recognise and act upon patient observations that were outside normal 
limits and suggestive of clinical deterioration. While nurses were diligent about 
observing patients and documenting their observations, they often failed to reflect on 
the significance of their findings and, when necessary, undertake further assessment 
or seek review of the patient (43:01; 66:18). One participant remarked on the ability 
of nurses to observe someone to the ‘death’ and document ‘beautifully’ but not act 
on the findings (21:07), while another disclosed that failure to attribute physiological 
signs to clinical deterioration was too common (58:05). As a member of an intensive 
care outreach team, one participant frequently ‘stumbled across’ patients in ward 
settings that were very, very sick and in need of urgent attention (23:01-02). He 
commented that frequently the team was not called about these patients. In some 
instances the signs of clinical deterioration were glaringly obvious, on other 
occasions they were more subtle and manifested as trends or incremental changes in 
physiological parameters. Examples provided by participants included:  
x Severe hypotension or the BP starting to trend down 
x Changes in skin colour i.e. the patient looked grey or stressed 
x Abnormalities in the ECG tracing - i.e. ST elevation 
x Tachycardia or the heart rate trending up a little 
x Dyspnoea, an increase in the respiratory rate, the oxygen mask fogging up 
x Poor urine output 
x Confusion. 
Of note are many instances where the signs of clinical deterioration were 
overlooked by a series of people - nurses from different shifts and a team of medical 
staff on patient rounds. While the many case examples of failure to recognise and 
respond to clinical deterioration were given by participants, three salient cases are 
presented for the purpose of this thesis.  
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Case 1 
In the first case, a patient presenting to the ED with infected feet was found to have 
an extremely low blood pressure on arrival (i.e. 70mmHg systolic). The patient was 
described as a ‘frequent flyer’17, a person who visited the ED regularly and was well 
known to the nursing and medical staff. While the doctors and nurses were aware of 
the low blood pressure, it wasn’t reassessed or acted upon for many hours until the 
patient deteriorated further and required urgent medical treatment, which failed to 
save his life. It emerged that, some hours earlier, the patient had suffered a 
myocardial infarction and developed cardiogenic shock: 
I remember coming in and seeing him there and he was someone who 
came regularly [...] you know they term the ‘frequent flyer’ [...] He was 
written down as having infected feet [...] and I thought nothing more of it 
but I remember as I was leaving that afternoon they [...] had the crash cart 
over by his bed [...] He'd come in with a low blood pressure and that 
wasn't considered by the nurses [...] or the medical staff looking after him 
as to what was causing that. It wasn't investigated really, it was just 
looked at in terms of his infected feet and at the end of the day he had had 
a myocardial infarction and was in cardiogenic shock and died [...] It was 
kind of a glaring obvious thing that apart from not doing anything about 
it, they didn't recheck it [...] for hours (45:03). 
Case 2 
In the second case, the medical team and nurses from two shifts failed to recognise 
that a patient was deteriorating in spite of the fact that he was grey in colour, puffing, 
tachycardic and his oxygen mask was fogging up. Upon walking into the patient’s 
room it was immediately evident to this participant that the patient was very unwell. 
An ECG, inadvertently filed away without being reviewed, showed that the patient 
was having a massive myocardial infarction. It was of great concern to this 
participant that the staff did not really think anything of the fact that the patient was 
tachycardic and dyspnoeic some hours earlier:  
                                                 
17 The term ‘frequent flyer’ is widely used to describe patients that are frequently admitted to the 
Emergency Department for medical care. These patients are known by name to the staff, are often 
elderly and have serious medical conditions. 
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I took the enrolled nurse [...] to assess this man [...] the medical team had 
done a full round, two groups of nurses, the outgoing night shift and the 
incoming morning shift had all assessed this man and you just had to 
walk in the room, they had him sitting in a chair and he was grey and he 
was puffing, you could see his oxygen mask was fogging up [...] I had 
another look at his rhythm and his ST segments looked elevated [...] so I 
went and checked the ECG that had been performed two hours earlier and 
he was having a massive anteroseptal infarct.  He went into cardiogenic 
shock [...] within 20 minutes and we intubated him well before that 
(20:04-05). 
Case 3 
In the third case, the nurse and anaesthetist recognised and treated a patient’s 
hypotension but missed the fact that this was unusual and that in the normal course of 
events there was no reason for this to occur after laparoscopic surgery. The patient 
was transferred to the ward and shortly after arrival had a hypotensive cardiac arrest. 
It emerged that the cause of the hypotension was internal bleeding:  
The patient had had a laparoscopic cholecystectomy and was really 
hypotensive post-op and needed all these bags of gelofusine (an 
intravenous colloid used for therapeutic hydration replacement)  and was 
just holding their blood pressure at like 100 systolic.  And this sort of 
went on back and forth between the nurse and the anaesthetist for 
probably like two hours.  And eventually they decided to discharge the 
patient to the ward where they promptly had a hypotensive arrest.  Now 
the thing that was missed was after laparoscopic surgery there’s no 
reason that a patient should be that hypotensive because they haven’t 
really lost any blood […] which is an obvious thing but it didn’t occur to 
people at the time that this patient shouldn’t be so hypotensive after a 
laparoscopic procedure. And it turns out the patient was bleeding 
internally (33:16). 
When asked why the staff failed to recognise the patient’s hypotension as a sign 
of clinical deterioration, the participant suggested they may have focussed on the 
individual signs at the expense of thinking about the ‘big picture’ and why the patient 
was hypotensive. She commented that it was difficult when the nurse and 
anaesthetist both agreed that it was safe for the patient to be transferred to the ward. 
She explained that situations such as these are challenging because nurses are 
required to step back, think for themselves and challenge the view of their 
colleagues. The case was complicated by the incorrect placement of the drains (of 
which the nurses and anaesthetist were unaware) which meant there was no blood in 
the bottles to serve as a cue to the possibility of internal bleeding (33:16-17). 
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4.4.2 ‘Simple things can cause incredible adverse outcomes’  
Participants that described the importance of vigilance in managing gaps and 
preventing adverse events revealed that inattention to the ‘simple, basic, very, very 
small’ or seemingly insignificant things resulted in incredible and sometimes 
catastrophic adverse outcomes: 
It often is simple things that can cause incredible adverse outcomes 
(06:06). 
It sounds really simple but [...] even though it is intensive care it is the 
most basic things that make the biggest difference.  It comes down to 
basic things (28:11). 
I think I’ve got very much an awareness of the potential significance of 
something that might seem insignificant to someone [...] what can 
actually transpire as a result of something very, very small [...] I’ve seen 
what happens at the other end when something bad does happen (67:22). 
On two occasions gaps described as ‘trivially minor’ and ‘nurse initiated’ 
created the potential for a catastrophe to occur (17:13-15). In the first instance, the 
nurse failed to secure the luer lock connection between a central venous catheter and 
intravenous line such that they disconnected and the patient developed a pulmonary 
embolus. While the patient survived, the nurse was distraught and left nursing, 
believing she had killed the patient. On the second occasion a graduate nurse 
removed a noradrenaline18 line from an intravenous pump and left it running free and 
unregulated. The patient, who was eighteen hours post repair of an abdominal aortic 
aneurysm, became dangerously hypertensive (i.e. blood pressure of 320mmHg) but 
was stabilised within a short period without any complications. The participant 
acknowledged that a number of factors contributed to this incident including the 
inexperience of the graduate nurse and knowledge gaps with regard to the care of 
patients receiving this type of therapy. The participant commented that this patient 
was considered to be the most stable and ‘easiest’ assignment in the unit for that 
shift. 
On another occasion, failure to check a patient’s temperature in the recovery 
room had serious consequences. On receiving the patient in the ward, the nurses 
identified that the patient was hypothermic and so proceeded to rewarm the patient. 
                                                 
18 Noradrenaline is a drug that increases blood pressure.  
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Over a thirty minute period the patient developed chest pain and became severely 
hypotensive, requiring emergency management. While blood pressures would be 
recorded every five minutes during patient rewarming in the recovery room, in the 
ward environment patient observations were taken only every half hour: 
What they didn’t do, was they didn’t take the patient’s temperature.  
Everything else was stable [...] and so they sent the patient back to the 
ward. When the patient got to the ward, they took the patient’s 
temperature and realised that it was 34/35, so clearly they needed to be 
re-warmed.  They rang the theatre and said could you please send the 
[medical device to prevent and treat hypothermia] and they were so busy 
nobody even asked why and so they sent it up there.  Of course the ward 
put this on the patient and were at this stage doing half hourly 
observations whereas us in recovery would be doing 5 minute blood 
pressures and record a full set of observations every 10 minutes, the next 
thing the patient complained they had chest pains and when they took 
their blood pressure the blood pressure was 64 systolic (56:03). 
4.4.3 ‘A lapse in critical thinking...we seem to be on autopilot’ 
Participants strongly suggested that a lack of critical thinking, planning and 
questioning, on the part of nurses, contributed to gaps in patient care. Many  
described a robotic approach to patient care where nurses are on ‘autopilot’, focussed 
on the physical doing without thought to what the patient needs, what they are doing 
and the impact of their actions. Factors that contributed to lapses in critical thinking, 
included nurses being busy and rushed, nurses not being given permission or 
perceiving there was no time to reflect on the patient’s needs, workplace cultures, 
and lack of a cohesive team approach to patient care such that nurses felt 
disempowered. As participants responded: 
I find that the more busy we are the more we tend to become task focused 
sometimes.  The more gaps, ironically, that there are, I think we sort of 
zone in on, perhaps, the physical doing, doing, doing, doing; and it's that 
planning and that questioning and that really thinking that tends to suffer 
[…] In  my experience, the more busy we become the more task focused, 
the more robotic it tends to be, the more gaps we have (66:13-14). 
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Well as I was saying, I think people just do the daily activities of their job 
often without a lot of thought and I don't mean that in a bad way.  I just 
mean they're rushed, they're in the zone of I've got to get this person 
ready or whatever it is, they have to get this job done.  I don't think 
they're given permission to step back and say, why am I doing this or 
there's a perception that people don't have time to [...] think about what 
they're doing and ultimately what the impact of that is (74:15). 
What I see is [...] a lapse in real, critical thinking about patients. Really 
just trying to concentrate and focus on every bit of a patient, do you know 
what I mean? [...] I think that’s  what nurses need to do, is really critically 
look at a patient and decide what that patient really needs. I actually don’t 
believe that happens, I really don’t [...] Sometimes we seem to be on auto 
pilot and rehabilitation is no more auto pilot than any other strand of 
health care (73:19). 
One participant believed that nursing had been reduced to tasks, describing how 
nurses administer medications in a somewhat mechanical and programmed manner, 
‘doling out pills’ while engaged in conversation and without knowledge of other 
factors that might be relevant (i.e. the patient’s blood pressure or other therapies). 
She suggested that priority was given to getting the task done rather than educating 
patients about their medications. Another participant expected nurses to examine and 
scrutinize a medication chart, but acknowledged that a significant number of nurses 
in her unit would not be able to do this. She was especially concerned by a recent 
occurrence where nurses failed to identify that a patient with heart failure was not on 
a diuretic. As participants responded: 
Well I suppose I have an expectation that my nurses will analyse a 
medication chart. Not just read it though but actually look at it and say, 
oh [...] why have we increased this drug? Well, we've ceased that 
therefore we've put that on instead. But [...] I don’t think that happened 
and while I have a few nurses that would think, oh this guy has been in 
intensive care and he had heart failure, it's funny he's not even on a 
diuretic. I don’t have a significant number of people that would question 
that (73:07). 
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We seem to [...] have been reduced to going back to tasks [...] I see my 
nurses all around the hospital [...] wherever I go, standing at a pill trolley 
at the desk having a conversation with a couple of other people while 
they dole out pills in a cup, and then they walk along to the end of the 
ward, past another 10 patients, and drop that pill cup on the bedside; 
‘There you go, Mr Jones, there’s your pills’.  They don’t know what the 
pills are, the patient doesn’t know what the pills are, we’re not even sure 
if it’s the right patient because we were having a chat when we filled out 
the pills [...] The task was to deliver the pills, it wasn’t to check whether I 
had an anti-hypertensive and [...] what their blood pressure was like or 
were there a combination of other therapies that might alter things? [...] 
They haven’t looked at the information in the context of everything else 
because it wasn’t about that, it was just about getting that task done at the 
time (20:21-22).  
Participants identified a number of factors that detracted from the ability of 
clinicians to focus their attention (63:07). These included high noise levels associated 
with busy acute environments, nurses being constantly interrupted during important 
tasks (i.e. administering schedule four and eight drugs, triaging a patient), and nurses 
being taken away from the bedside by telephone calls (i.e. pathology, radiology, 
family members). Models of care in ward environments encouraged gaps when team 
leaders changed on a daily basis without the opportunity to get to know the patients 
or the strengths and weaknesses of their nursing colleagues. As participants 
responded:  
So all of this activity, all those really critical - the thinking parts, the 
diagnostic parts and the interaction parts for all clinicians occur two steps 
away from where you’ve got ambulances lined up with all the associated 
staff that are with them. The ambulance officers, with family members, 
often milling around as well, and it’s just chaotic, and not conducive to 
good quality health care. I think without doubt I guess anecdotally and 
observationally and it detracts from the clinician’s ability to focus their 
mind on the task at hand (63:07).  
Well if you're triaging a patient you can often have several colleagues 
talking to you about other patients that are in the department at the same 
time.  There's always noise - cardiac monitors alarming.  Then you might 
have - our ED, like everyone else, is always full so there's always 
something going on. So you might be in - and - oh look, there's 
distractions everywhere (41:04). 
The environments nurses work in and a focus on patient throughput and 
attending to tasks promoted gaps. One participant believed that while organisational 
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management groups paid ‘lip service’ to the importance of patient centred care, the 
real drivers of health care were bed management and patient flow considerations. She 
described many instances where staff were forced to move patients to a lower level 
of care (i.e. from critical care to the ward) even when ‘red flags’ indicated that the 
patient was not ready or needed additional  services:  
So I think the culture and the environments that nurses are working in 
now [...] promote [...] discontinuity because the driving forces are 
different; it’s about beds, it’s about getting tasks ticked off [...] We’ve got 
a different person each day leading each of the teams who doesn’t know 
the patients, who doesn’t know the rest of their colleagues, so they don’t 
know their strengths and their weaknesses, all of those sorts of things [...] 
Whilst organisational management groups give a lot of lip service to the 
importance of clinical care and the patient comes first and we’re patient 
centred and all of those sorts of things, it isn’t about that in many, many 
areas, it is about making a bed.  The patient isn’t a name, they’re a 
number, and if they don’t have a whole lot of things stuck in their body, 
they can go (20:22). 
4.4.4 Cutting corners 
A significant finding of this study is the extent to which nurses cut corners in patient 
care. The theme of taking short cuts and cutting corners emerged during an early 
participant interview. In keeping with the emergent nature of qualitative research 
inquiry, participants in subsequent interviews were probed to describe (i) what they 
understood by the term cutting corners, (ii) whether staff cut corners and, if they did, 
(iii) what corners were cut, and (iv) the implications of cutting corners. Participants 
defined cutting corners as taking short cuts; not doing things properly, fully or 
completely or the way they should be done; not following protocol or process; and 
doing things a faster and easier way to save time and effort. It was suggested that 
cutting corners was a common practice and something that nurses lived by and 
passed on to others. There was a strong view that cutting corners increased the risk of 
adverse events, although participants acknowledged that it did not always have 
negative consequences. As participants responded: 
They find the shortcuts that they think work and if nobody comes to harm 
they just keep going.  We are all very creative in finding shortcuts and 
ways to do things quicker.  Nurses are very, very creative in that way, but 
we must always be mindful that there are policies, procedures and 
protocols in place there to protect not only the patient but ourselves 
(37:13). 
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When you cut a corner you don’t follow, say a protocol or a process as 
you should because you think for whatever reason [...] it's okay and [...] 
you think you’re saving some time or some effort.  But I always find that 
those basic processes and when we don’t follow them that’s when things 
just all fall apart (67:16). 
Having that safety culture of just checking and rechecking and making 
sure that you’re not cutting corners; that sometimes processes are actually 
there for a reason. I think sometimes it’s what everybody else does. 
Sometimes we just watch how other people do things and often we train 
people by showing them our favourite corners, don’t we? (50: 24-25). 
Participants revealed that junior nurses adopted the corner cutting practices of 
their senior colleagues by observing their behaviour. Nurses also cut corners ‘on the 
run’, to manage their workload, unaware their actions might compromise patient 
safety (14:09). As participants responded:  
A lot of it is just from observing the behaviour of […] the more senior 
staff so […] the junior staff tend to think you know I saw ‘Jane’ doing 
that […] she’s been here for years it must be all right. So they’re almost 
copying bad practices (07:07). 
I think they do it on the run. I don’t think they consciously plan I’m going 
to cut a corner today; I think they just do it without even realising they 
are doing it sometimes, it’s just a fact of life if you have to get from A to 
B to C to D and you’ve got to do it in a limited time you have got to say 
well what are the priorities; how do I prioritise my day (12:19). 
I think they decide according to their level of experience.  I think...less 
experienced clinicians don’t know what they don’t know so they don’t 
realise that the corners that they’re cutting might actually be integral.  
And, you know, that’s along a spectrum of interventions.  You know, it 
might be mouth care, brushing their teeth, might be integral but they 
don’t know that it’s important along the whole spectrum (29:11). 
(a) Cutting corners in patient assessment 
Of note is the extent to which nurses cut corners in the assessment of patients by 
using medical devices as the dominant assessment tool rather than an adjunct. When 
these devices were available nurses performed radar observations, described as 
looking at a monitor, plotting and graphing the vital signs and other data without 
physically interacting or assessing the patient (37:28), or making the observations up. 
The practice of taking radar observations was described as unacceptable and 
unethical because critical treatment decisions (i.e. whether a head injured patient 
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required a craniotomy) were based on the observations documented by nurses 
(57:18). Other examples of corner cutting in patient assessment included nurses not 
checking pulses properly, ‘touching the surface’ and not doing a full or thorough 
pulse count, and filling in observations when they were busy to avoid the perception 
they were incompetent or not coping: 
It’s come to my attention a few times as the nurse in charge that a nurse 
will come onto a shift and say “I found this patient, they’ve got no pulse 
and the last nurse and all the nurses said they had a pulse”.  And so you 
get it reviewed by the doctor, because that’s an acute change and then the 
doctor will come up and go “Oh, I can’t find it either, call the registrar”.  
And the registrar will say “Oh, no, they never had a pulse there, 
ever”...The inference that I have from that is that the nurses have cut 
corners, gone “Oh well the foot is pink, it’s still got good return, so I’m 
not going to do the observations because it takes too long”.  So yeah, that 
happens.  I’ve had doctors alert me to that a couple of times that “That 
patient never had a pulse, why aren’t your nurses checking properly?” 
(34:21). 
Participants were strong advocates of ‘hands on’ patient assessment techniques. 
They considered these irreplaceable and were concerned that an over reliance on 
technology had deskilled nurses in the areas of patient assessment and critical 
thinking, making them complacent. Participants explained that taking note of the 
subtleties; talking to the patient; observing body language and demeanour; assessing 
the limbs, skin colour, respiratory effort and body position; feeling for the pulse 
volume; and listening to the chest and gut provided invaluable assessment data not 
available from machines or monitors. As participants responded: 
Machines make staff complacent [...] they’re just relying on machines to 
do all the work for them [...] they don’t actually do any assessments [...] 
they look at the numbers but not look at the patient, which would give 
you a lot more information than anything a box with numbers and 
patterns on it will tell you (11:15). 
I think we cut corners a lot when it comes to taking observations.  We use 
a lot of technology rather than getting back to basics and looking – just 
thinking and really touching our patients, talking to them, we just whack 
a non-invasive blood pressure cuff on, we do their respiration from the 
reading that comes from the saturation probe instead of counting [...] I 
think hands-on assessment techniques you can never replace (38:13-14).    
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Cutting corners in patient assessment increased the risk of adverse events 
because nurses focussed overly on data from the monitors and overlooked cues that 
might indicate the patient was deteriorating. The early signs of myocardial infarction 
(i.e. drowsiness, sweating, pain and dizziness), for example, might not be evident on 
the ECG tracing or monitor but may be detected using ‘hands on’ assessment 
techniques: 
Someone who’s had a myocardial infarction [...] might have a second 
episode [...] and the heart rate on the monitor said 65 the whole time [...] 
the patient’s [...] getting progressively more drowsy or becoming quite 
clammy and then all of a sudden their blood pressure’s gone from 160 to 
89, he’d had a heart attack but it wasn’t detected on ECG [...] there 
wasn’t actually anything to say he’d developed more pain or [...] had felt 
dizzy or [...] started feeling very sweaty (11:15). 
When asked whether technology had deskilled nurses in the area of patient 
assessment, one participant expressed concern at bedside observations being 
performed by assistants in nursing and non-nurses with no higher level health 
education or diagnostic training and limited ability to interpret the data (63:29). 
(b) Cutting corners in critical care 
Numerous other examples were given of nurses cutting corners and failing to 
perform tasks at a constant level of effectiveness. A common theme to emerge from 
these examples was the occurrence of gaps and preventable adverse events from the 
failure of nurses to provide essential nursing care, described as the ‘simple’ or ‘little’ 
things. While nurses attended to the complex and highly technical aspects of patient 
care (i.e. balloon pumps, infusions), other things not perceived as being urgent or 
important were overlooked or ignored in spite of them being equally important. 
Examples included failure to follow evidence based guidelines for the management 
of central venous catheters and increasing the risk of nosocomial infections (i.e. 
clostridium difficile, MRSA) by placing dirty linen on the floor. Aspects of patient 
care described as ‘basic’ (i.e.  mouth care, repositioning of patients, sitting patients 
out of bed) were not accorded priority, in spite of their role in the maintenance of 
bodily function and prevention of complications (i.e. ventilator acquired pneumonia, 
pressure ulcers). Pressure ulcers from endotracheal tubes, nasogastric tubes and ill 
fitting thrombo-embolic deterrant stockings (TEDS) caused unnecessary pain and 
suffering and, in some cases, required corrective surgery. As participants responded:  
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What surprises me is that the things that are simple are the things that are 
overlooked or ignored or just not taken enough care with.  You know, the 
complex things - looking after a patient on [...] a balloon pump or 
whatever.  Yes they will do [...] the blood tests every hour that they're 
meant to do.  They will check all the parameters and do all those things - 
but it's a nosocomial infection that might kill the patient. The patient 
might develop methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) or 
clostridium difficile as a result of dirty linen on the floor and that might 
kill them (69:05).  
I think just the sense of urgency is sort of missing - and I know it’s not an 
urgent thing to do.  But the sense of importance - the little things like 
mouth care and positioning that help prevent ventilator acquired 
pneumonia, just aren’t viewed as important. It doesn’t matter how many 
times you tell them that this is why you do it - it just doesn’t seem to sink 
in or [...] resonate with them. It’s just so easy to do and they just don’t 
bother (58:07). 
I know we're supposed to be working in a no blame environment when it 
comes to incidents and errors but it's very frustrating when you know that 
that could have been prevented just because somebody just didn’t take 
that little bit of extra care or didn't have that knowledge base.  So it's very 
frustrating when those things happen because they are preventable 
incidents (62:02). 
The risk of patient harm increased when nurses cut corners by ignoring systems 
and evidence based protocols and performing procedures their own way. The 
following case provides a powerful example. While investigating the causes of 
central venous catheter (CVC) infection, one participant uncovered a range of unsafe 
practices. One of the most concerning was the practice of nurses using tissues 
‘dabbed’ in Chlorhexidine to clean the catheter site rather than a sterile dressing pack 
and gloves (57:23). In response, an extensive education and consultation process was 
undertaken. Nonetheless, nurses continued to cut corners in the care of CVCs, 
prompting the participant to comment that ‘nurses will get away with what they can’. 
In critical care settings, essential nursing care was overlooked when nurses were 
overly distracted by the diagnostic process. The handover period might be dominated 
by discussion of the medical plan with less attention given to assessment of the 
patient’s nursing needs and the nursing plan. This participant commented that 
planning for nursing care was equally as important as planning for the patient’s 
medical needs:  
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Everyone's focused on what the doctor's doing and usually they're 
focusing on diagnosis.  They talk about how interesting this is to 
diagnose and they can't work out what it is.  Everyone gets all caught up 
with that.  Then you go and you focus on the nursing things and you find 
things like the endotracheal tube's not in the right spot. To me [...] they're 
so different but they're just as important and it seems people get whisked 
away by the other things and dazzled by the interesting nature of that 
condition.  Then they miss out on the more important things [...] So that it 
seems like there's a big practice gap that I can see and there has to be a 
better practice for developing a nursing plan for a person through the 
course of a day. I've seen this in all ICUs that I've worked at (23:19-20). 
Participants suggested that nurses cut corners judiciously in emergency 
situations where preserving life was a greater priority. Clinical judgement and 
expertise played a role in determining the priorities and which corners could ‘safely’ 
be cut. Nurses prioritised the care of patients with multi-system problems to maintain 
respiratory and cardiovascular function at the expense of, for example, repositioning 
the patient to prevent pressure ulcers. While a pressure ulcer in these situations was 
undesirable, there was a perception that it could be dealt with later if the patient 
survived: 
I just know [...] from my perspective if I’ve got a patient that has multi-
system problems then I have to prioritise which it is that I have to do first, 
and so some things will get missed [...] This lady had resistant 
streptococcus and was so respiratory compromised that no pressure area 
care could be done.  Her position changes just weren’t tolerated; it would 
compromise her respiratory and cardiovascular status way too much.  So 
in those circumstances cutting corners, I guess it just becomes [...] about 
what it is that you want to deal with first.  And had she got, you know, 
stage three or stage four damage from pressure, that could be dealt with 
later, but she would still be alive to deal with it (17:17-19).   
(c) Cutting corners in perioperative care 
In perioperative settings nurses cut corners in an effort to save time and meet the 
demands of surgeons and anaesthetists. This sometimes involved changing their 
routine and  not following established protocols and processes (i.e. allowing a patient 
into the theatre before dirty equipment from the previous case had been cleaned) so 
as to avoid public humiliation at the hands of their colleagues. One participant 
revealed that nurses felt ‘rushed’ and ‘bullied’ in these circumstances:  
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There’s an element of pressure in that, you know, sometimes you’ve got 
surgeons and anaesthetists saying “Come on, come on, we’re bringing the 
next patient in” when you’ve still got dirty equipment from the previous 
patient.  So there’s a fair bit of that happening and newer people might 
[...] feel pressured into changing their routine or cutting corners to avoid, 
you know, being publicly humiliated by other staff members, I guess 
(25:12).   
In theatre there is the potential for many things to go wrong usually they 
are picked up before any damage is done and they usually relate to not 
doing things the way you would normally do them, allowing yourself to 
be rushed or bullied by others to not follow the process you would 
normally (08:03). 
It was suggested that time pressures in perioperative settings were a function of 
doctors being business oriented and hurrying so they had more time to consult 
privately. One participant believed that adverse events were almost guaranteed when 
corners were cut: 
The doctors are under the pump, I understand that, they’re wanting to get 
out there and consult more because it’s their business.  And I guess that’s 
the difference between doctors and nurses.  They’re running a business 
and even if they’re in the public sector they’re still going to be consulting 
privately.  So they’re focused on that and making a dollar.  We’re 
focused on process and making sure that we’ve got patient safety.  Now 
they are too, but they know that their consulting rooms are building up 
and if they can hurry things along a little bit they will.  Some of them just 
won’t conform to protocol and that’s where you need a good medical 
director in a hospital to help drive it a bit.  But you can almost bet on it, if 
they cut corners there’s going to be an adverse event.  You can almost 
guarantee it (06:15). 
Of note was the fact that two instances of blatant corner cutting were either 
sanctioned by senior management or described as routine procedure, even when the 
nurse argued stringently that the practices should not be allowed. On the first 
occasion, the blood bank refused a request for a bag of blood to be relabelled with 
the patient’s correct name and the nurse was directed by the hospital coordinator to 
administer the blood: 
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I’d ordered some packed red blood cells for a patient in recovery and the 
blood came and it had the right UR number but the wrong name.  And 
anyway, I called the blood bank and said “I’m sending you this blood 
back, it’s got the wrong name on it” and they said “No, no, it’s the right 
blood.  We’re not relabelling it, you have to give it”.  And I said “No, I 
can’t possibly do that [...] I can’t give the blood and she needs blood so 
you’re going to have to send me different blood with the correct label on 
it”, and they refused.  They rang the hospital coordinator and the hospital 
coordinator came up to me and said “We’re giving this blood, I’ve had 
the okay from blood bank” and so we gave the blood (33:09).   
On the second occasion, the anaesthetist left to go to another hospital while the 
surgeon was closing the wound, explaining that this was a routine situation that 
occurred regularly. The nurse was left to manage the patient for the remainder of the 
case and take the patient out to the recovery room:   
Another one I would say that I would call a massive corner cutting was a 
shift I was doing in a private hospital doing anaesthetics for a caesarean 
list and it came to the end and they were sewing up - they had just started 
the final layer, which is skin, and the anaesthetist said to me, “I’ve got to 
go to the [private hospital] now, can you take the patient out to 
recovery”?  And I said “No.  No way, I can’t […] I don’t know whether 
you’re aware that that’s completely not allowed”.  Anyway, he said 
“Look, it’s routine procedure here, we do it all the time” and I said “Well 
I’m not comfortable with it” and he left anyway.  So I took the patient out 
to recovery.  Yeah, to me that’s - I mean that’s totally wrong (33:14-15).   
(d) Cutting corners in emergency care 
Many of the EDs described in the context of this study were operating well above 
capacity and frequently experienced periods of ‘bed block’19 with long waiting times 
for inpatient beds. One participant described feeling like she was ‘out on a wavy sea 
in a rubber dinghy’ at these times (52:16). During times of bed block the patient load 
of ED nurses increased substantially as they looked after their ‘core business’ along 
with the overflow of patients awaiting admission. In this busy and demanding 
environment the ability to get things done quickly was highly valued. Cutting corners 
was described as a ‘workaround’ and way of getting ‘through the day’: 
                                                 
19 Bed block’ is a situation in which a patient stays in hospital because there is no other suitable place 
where they can be looked after. This means that beds are unavailable for others that might need them. 
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There are patients coming and going […] it's also a very busy and 
demanding environment where the potential to cut corners is huge, and 
just to try and get through the day.  It's kind of the culture to get through 
and to work around, this corner cutting.  It just leaves yourself wide open 
(68:02). 
4.4.5 Failure to communicate the information required to plan and deliver care 
safely  
Participants described numerous deficiencies in the communication of information 
critical to the safe delivery of patient care. Inadequacies in the clinical handover 
process (i.e. shift to shift, transfer to another agency) and a lack of communication 
between nursing and medical staff increased the risk of adverse events because 
nurses were not equipped with the information required to plan and deliver care 
safely. Nurses described their common experience of patient information being lost, 
incomplete, unclear, vague or not properly handed over. As participants responded: 
If you ever look back and look at something that has gone wrong, it has 
always been that there has been a lack of continuity or information that 
hasn’t been passed on (56:10).   
From a nursing angle, nurses are giving handover but they’re not 
selecting the information that the next shift need not only to plan their 
care but to actually match the staff to the needs of the patient [...] the fact 
that a drain is bubbling and there’s a massive air leak isn’t communicated 
[...] What to do if the person with an organ level wound and no sternum 
actually arrests or why they need to have cardiac monitoring isn’t 
communicated.  And so that doesn’t adequately equip those at the bedside 
to know why they need to do levels of observation, what they need to be 
observing for, and then how they should respond (20:08-09).  
In some organisations, direct patient care was seen as a higher priority and 
omitting parts of handover was acceptable if there were time constraints. One 
participant explained that gaps emerged when handover was poorly understood 
because it was taped or staff spoke English as a second language. Participants were 
of the view that handover was a key part of patient care that should be taken 
seriously and was not an opportunity to socialise: 
Just really good communication [...] and really giving that clinical 
handover priority and showing people that it is serious, this isn’t just a 
chance to have a chat and a catch-up and a cup of coffee, that this is 
clinical handover, this is part of the care (70:24). 
Chapter 4. Data Presentation & Analysis 
138 
 
Then there’s the Chinese whispers20  kind of gap where you’re doing 
handover and you might be taping it or you might have someone who has 
got a really heavy accent.  So you’re not understanding half of what is 
being said or, you know, someone saying to you, look you can’t listen to 
that any more, you have to come on the floor now, or you’ve been called 
in because someone is sick or whatever and you haven’t got time for a 
handover.  That’s when problems happen because you don’t know, so 
you assume and you do the best you can and other people assume that 
you know something else, and you don’t.  So that’s how I sort of see 
those gaps and that’s what results in the gap in care because everyone 
thinks that someone else did that for that person, but they haven’t had it 
done (70:07).  
Important contextual details might be lost because staff forgot or played down 
some of the information, perceived that it was not that important, or very slightly 
altered the story (45:21; 11:08). Participants revealed that a slight alteration in the 
story created the potential for gaps in the patient’s treatment and for things to be 
missed because the person receiving the information did not have the ‘full picture’ 
(i.e. was not fully informed of the patient’s needs). On one occasion a doctor was not 
aware of the whole picture, having been told that the patient was vomiting, but not 
that their heart rate was increasing and blood pressure decreasing: 
Somebody’s been vomiting and vomiting and vomiting and the doctors 
know they’ve been vomiting.  But nobody hands over that yes, their heart 
rate is going up and their blood pressure’s dropping.  So yeah, they’re 
probably dehydrated.  So the doctor just says, yeah they’re nauseated and 
vomiting, but they haven’t been given the whole picture (58:08). 
I suppose the potential for things to get missed; that’s probably the 
biggest thing, that’s the biggest concern [...] if there’s a constant chain 
[...] most patients are verbally handed over [...] to the next person, so that 
opens up room for people to forget things or sort of just very slightly alter 
the story and [...] you know just a slight alteration in the story can lead to 
big changes in the treatment plan or big gaps in the treatment plan, I 
suppose (11:08). 
Participants described many gaps in the information provided to services and 
agencies when patients transferred. These included a lack of clarity and detail 
                                                 
20 The term ‘Chinese whispers’ refers to the process whereby a story is distorted or exaggerated as it 
passes from person to person. Retrieved on 17 October 2011, < from http://www.usingenglish.com>. 
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regarding the patient’s medical history, recent treatment and care needs; half hearted 
verbal handovers; and the use of standard post-operative instructions and care plans 
that failed to address individual patient needs: 
The care that was required wasn’t always clear or wasn’t specific enough 
and yet when I would contact the hospital to clarify, there was always 
more information than that which was provided.  So there was like huge 
gaps in the information that came to me, the head clinician, to provide 
that service [...] it’s worrying because of the things that could occur for 
the patient [...] if the care in the community or the care in our program 
isn’t transferred across, then there is a risk to the patient that things won’t 
be right or a risk of harm in respect to the patient as well if you’re not 
aware of what the care requirements are (59:03-06). 
(a) Communication lapses contributed to adverse events 
Lapses in communication contributed to preventable adverse events such as incorrect 
surgery, the use of unsterile equipment and patient falls. On one occasion, staff left 
their posts for a break without handing over that a colonoscope needed to be 
sterilised and the dirty equipment was used on a patient. Another participant 
described an incident where crucial information regarding a change to the patient’s 
consent was not handed over to staff in the theatre. Consequently the incorrect 
surgery was performed on a child: 
I would have to say one that really comes to mind is [...] an instance 
where a paediatric patient had a procedure that they were not meant to 
have done [...] really crucial information that was identified 
preoperatively was never actually handed over to the people who should 
have known [...] so that somebody would have stopped and gone “oh 
hang on a minute, we shouldn’t be doing this”. The consent was changed 
but none of that information was communicated to the theatre staff. When 
the child was brought into the operating theatre, they didn’t check the 
consent (67:04). 
Participants identified a number of factors that contributed to these events, 
including the need to maintain high levels of patient throughput in the operating 
suite, the perception that the surgery or procedure was routine and that simple 
checking procedures were mundane and repetitive, the scheduling of many cases 
within a short period, and failure to follow proper procedure by checking the consent 
prior to commencement of the case: 
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Really helping people to understand that something as simple as why do 
we check certain bits of paperwork, what are the implications when on a 
busy, busy day as often happens when you’re doing a routine procedure, 
what happens when you don’t follow through with those processes. It 
seems so mundane and repetitive. Well this is what unfortunately can 
happen. You end up with tragic results (67:06). 
The following case illustrates the tragic consequences when vital contextual 
information is lost. In this instance, the triage nurse did not pass on important details 
about the severity of the patient’s fall, the damage to the bicycle helmet and the 
patient’s neurological status at the scene of the accident. Consequently other staff 
believed the injury to be of a minor nature and discharged the patient home after a 
short period of observation. It transpired that this information was critical to the 
planning and delivery of safe care to this patient. The patient deteriorated and was 
brought back to the hospital deeply unconscious some three hours later before he 
died from an epidural haematoma:  
It’s not that long back a young chap […] fell off a pushbike [and] cracked 
right through his helmet, which the Triage Nurse saw […] it actually 
divided his helmet, he hit the ground that hard.  He had a minor loss of 
consciousness at the scene and […] that information wasn’t passed on, it 
was completely lost.  He went home with a head injury card thinking it 
was a very minor thing and actually came back deeply unconscious three 
hours later with an epidural haematoma and in fact died about four days 
later from that.  I mean it may not have been preventable but […] those 
two nurses involved at the very start have belted themselves up for weeks 
over it.  So there is that potential loss of information that really did and 
would’ve made a difference to his ongoing care while he was in the 
Emergency Department and may not ever have been sent home in such a 
short period of time (07:12). 
In another notable case, a series of gaps, mostly relating to a lack of complete 
and accurate information at the time of transfer, culminated in the death of a child 
because of a blocked ventriculo-peritoneal shunt (22:18-19). Comprehensive notes 
were not available to the hospital taking over the child’s care nor were staff informed 
of the child’s shunt. When asked about neurological issues the parents did not 
mention the shunt. These gaps were compounded by the fact that a CT scan 
performed prior to the child’s transfer was reported as being normal. It later emerged 
that this particular scan was compared with a previously abnormal scan rather than 
earlier normal scans. The participant acknowledged something was missed for this 
patient because the staff did not have all the facts and described the case as a really 
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tragic example of poor communication. On another occasion, the information 
required to provide safe care did not translate down to the direct care providers. 
These staff had a poor understanding of the patient’s care requirements and need for 
supervision and as a consequence, the patient was inadequately supervised and fell, 
fracturing their hip: 
There was a client [...] who was an elderly person who had some memory 
impairment that required one person standby supervision with transfers 
and mobility [...] The level of support wasn’t given to the client and that 
person fell and had a hip fracture [...] In this situation the information 
regarding the need to have one person supervising the transfers and 
mobility didn’t appear to get translated down to the worker level in 
the...aged care organisation [...] So there didn’t appear to be the level of 
understanding around the kind of care requirements that were needed for 
this particular patient (59:02-03). 
(b) Communication lapses in the ED 
A number of salient themes emerged in relation to clinical handover in the ED. In 
ED settings patients were moved frequently in order to maximise patient flow and 
achieve established benchmarks for the delivery of emergency care. This movement 
was unpredictable and often occurred without consultation with the nurse responsible 
for the patient’s care. When the ED was very busy there wasn’t always time for a 
formal handover and while the team leader focused on the most important things, 
participants acknowledged that important things could be forgotten. At times, 
handover occurred through an intermediary rather than as a continuous process from 
one care provider directly to the next. In these situations the nurse responsible for the 
patient’s care received a very truncated version of events without much of the 
relevant background. Participants described situations where they discovered a 
patient had been moved and then had to set about finding and communicating with 
the nurse taking over the care: 
You come back from the ward and you find you’ve got a patient that you 
know nothing about other than (a) what the ambulance sheet tells you and 
(b) what the patient tells you if they are in a condition to tell you anything 
at all (03:22). 
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But the ambulance then take the patient to the bedside and it's really 
beneficial if the nurse at the bedside can then get the handover.  It doesn’t 
always happen because they're in with other patients.  So they may come 
out and the patient's already settled on the bed and the coordinator just 
says, oh you know that's a respiratory distress or whatever.  You know, 
and they have to start from scratch.  And they see that this patient's 
having trouble with their breathing and they start to intervene 
appropriately.  But they haven't got all the background relating to that 
patient that's required, that even the - you know the first nurse actually 
had that. And if - you know if the nurse at the bedside had been able to 
hear directly from the ambulance, you can get so much more (45:17-18). 
So sometimes people haven't even got a handle on what's going on with 
their patient and they're moved to another area, sometimes before they've 
had a chance to hand over to the next lot of nurses (45:07). 
4.5 What is the relationship between gaps management and patient safety 
outcomes? 
The management of gaps by nurses was viewed as being vital to the realisation of 
patient safety outcomes. In many instances nurses stood as the last ‘causally and 
critically linked person’ to an unintended consequence or outcome (Johnstone & 
Kanitsaki 2006b, p. 369) and provided the conditions, both necessary and sufficient, 
for the patient’s safety. On these occasions, nurses were a necessary condition for 
patient safety because had they not acted when they did, an adverse event most 
certainly would have occurred. Examples are included in Box 4.4 (page 143 of this 
thesis). 
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Box 4.4 Examples where nurses were a necessary condition for patient safety 
 
 
x During a ‘head to toe’, systematic assessment a nurse detected that the patient’s radial 
pulse was absent. Further investigations revealed that a large embolus was occluding the 
radial artery and the patient was taken immediately to the operating theatre for surgery. 
This action saved his arm (31:11-12). 
 
x During routine assessment of a patient’s heart sounds prior to administration of a 
thrombolytic medication, a nurse detected a ‘murmur’ (a sound heard via a stethoscope that 
may indicate disease or structural problems). This murmur was judged by the nurse to 
indicate that the patient may have had an arterial dissection. This finding was reported to 
the senior cardiologist in the room who concurred and immediately changed the patient’s 
treatment. The planned thrombolytic medication was cancelled to avert the risk of 
catastrophic bleeding and further investigations were arranged (14:06). 
 
x A nurse realised that a surgeon was about to inject local anaesthetic with adrenaline into a 
patient’s penis. Adrenaline carries the risk of necrosis of the penis because of its 
vasoconstrictor effect. To avert this adverse outcome she placed her arm in front of the 
surgeon, deliberately contaminating the sterile field and forcing the procedure to be 
abandoned (06:11). 
 
x A nurse detected that a temporary clip (whose mechanical and technical characteristics are 
only for temporary purposes) had been inadvertently placed over a cerebral aneurysm 
rather than a long term, permanent aneurysm clip. She immediately spoke up and informed 
the surgeon who was about to begin closing the wound. The clip was replaced with a 
permanent clip and the risk of haemorrhage from the clip opening or slipping when the 
patient’s blood pressure returned to normal was averted (10:15-16). 
 
x A nurse recognised that a patient who was being discharged was experiencing an 
oculogyric crisis from the administration of stemetil. The junior doctor was not aware of 
the condition or how to treat it. The nurse informed the doctor about the condition, 
retrieved and administered the appropriate medication and arranged for a senior doctor to 
review the patient (03:03). 
 
x A nurse identified that a patient had previously received the drug Streptokinase and 
prevented the patient receiving a second dose of the drug which carries the risk of an 
anaphylactic reaction. Streptokinase cannot usually be administered safely a second time 
within 6 months, because it is highly antigenic and results in high levels of 
antistreptococcal antibodies (07:14). 
 
x Nurses working in a setting that cared for both children and adults prevented children from 
receiving an ‘adult’ dose of medication by always checking the recommended paediatric 
dosage and weight of the child against the order. This process uncovered incorrect 
medication orders and prevented adverse events on a regular basis.  
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On other occasions, however, the management of gaps was a sufficient condition 
for the realisation of patient safety outcomes, meaning that the nurse’s actions were 
enough to prevent the adverse event, although not exclusively. It was possible that 
other variables may have interceded. Examples are included in Box 4.5 below: 
Box 4.5 Examples where nurses were a sufficient condition for patient safety 
 
Looking for specific, commonly overlooked things and making necessary preparations or 
changes to minimise their impact on patients: 
x making sure that a drain had the appropriate amount of suction and was being 
correctly observed so it was not inappropriately removed;  
x ensuring that arrhythmias were correctly identified and actioned;  
x checking blood sugar levels so that patients did not develop wound infections;  
x checking for patient allergies;  
x checking the accuracy of ventilator and alarm settings, and abdominal and central 
venous pressures; 
x checking that intravenous lines and endotracheal tubes were correctly positioned and 
secure;  
x monitoring the patient’s weight and fluid status and ensuring that diuretics were 
recommenced postoperatively; and  
x checking blood and x-ray results before patients were discharged. 
Observing patients closely when their diet was advanced to thin fluids and performing an 
overnight blood sugar level when their insulin regimen was changed. 
Identification of a deteriorating patient. 
Identification of pressure areas and missed injuries or problems (e.g. pneumothorax, forearm 
and spinal fractures, a fluid collection in the knee) during comprehensive patient assessment.  
The routine checking and double checking of medications prevented medication errors and 
adverse events.  
 
4.6 Education in patient safety and human error management 
In spite of their critical role in keeping patients safe, almost a third (N=24) of the 
participants in this study revealed that they had not undertaken any formal instruction 
in the principles and theory of patient safety and human error management. 
Furthermore, the education and training of many was limited to hospital based in-
services on specific patient safety issues (i.e. the deteriorating patient, the surgical 
safety checklist, falls prevention, clinical handover) and risk management software 
programs (See Table 4.2, page 145 of this thesis). Nurses revealed that they kept 
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abreast of patient safety issues through ‘word of mouth’ conversations with 
colleagues and were discouraged from attending patient safety education on the 
grounds that it would be uninteresting. In sharp contrast, a participant from the 
United States revealed that, in her organisation, attendance at a three day university 
program on patient safety was compulsory.  
 
Table 4.2 Types of patient safety education described by participants 
 
Type of education session No of participants  
  
Human error and patient safety (HEAPS) course 
 
6 
Root cause analysis training 
 
7 
Hospital based in-services on specific patient safety 
topics (i.e. the deteriorating patient, surgical safety 
checklist, falls prevention, interdisclipinary 
communication tools)  
 
12 
Patient safety as a component of  post-graduate 
education  
 
8 
Attendance at seminars, conferences, external 
programs  
 
11 
Training in incident and risk management software 
programs (i.e. Risk man, AIMS) 
 
12 
No formal patient safety or clinical risk management 
education 
 
24 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, data obtained and analysed from interviewing emergency, critical 
care, perioperative, neuroscience, rehabilitation and transitional care nurses have 
been presented. A composite depiction of participant’s knowledge, understandings, 
insights and experiences regarding the following processes has also been presented:  
x how nurses anticipate, detect and bridge gaps; 
x gaps in patient care; 
x patient safety and adverse events in a variety of clinical settings;  
x the relationship between gaps, patient safety and nursing; and 
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x the processes that are best suited to promoting safety and quality in health 
care. 
In the next chapter of this thesis, attention will turn to a discussion of these 
findings.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
It's interesting you can always remember the bad things because you 
learn from them.  The good ones they tend to be just be part of everyday 
(08:11).  
I think what you’ve chosen to study is going to make an incredible 
contribution to the body of nursing knowledge because it’s such an 
important area and talking to just my own colleagues even in my hospital, 
it’s something that we all spend so much time doing, you know, in 
varying degrees; some days it’s the big safety net, other times it’s small, 
but if it wasn’t caught then it would become something big, you know, 
that would either impact on life or add to the cost of the health care 
system, length of stay, any number of things (20:26). 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The key purpose of this study has been to explore and describe the relationship 
between patient safety and the management of gaps by nurses. Specifically, the study 
has investigated how nurses anticipate, detect and bridge gaps in patient care and 
protect patients from harm. In keeping with the aims and focus of this study, the 
findings will be discussed with a view to presenting new insights regarding 
participants’ experience of gaps, the management of these gaps and the implications 
for patient safety. These findings have been synthesised into the following core 
themes, namely:  
x Nurses, gaps, complexity and resilience 
x Chance, serendipity, luck 
x How nurses managed gaps 
x The gaps identified by nurses 
x Education in patient safety and human error management 
x The emotionality associated with adverse events 
x Near misses and emotional distress. 
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Each of these themes will be addressed separately by firstly presenting a 
synthesised understanding of the findings and an explanation of each theme. 
Relevant literature will then be introduced and discussed as a means of challenging 
emergent views and, where appropriate, proposing possible alternatives to the views 
which constituted the themes identified in this study. 
5.2 Nurses, gaps, complexity and resilience 
The ‘New Look’ approach to safety holds that humans are active creators of safety 
and integral to the safe and sustained functioning of complex systems (Cook, Woods 
& Miller 1998; Hollnagel 2011; 2012a; 2012b). This approach is concerned with 
enhancing the adaptive capabilities that enable people to create safety in the face of 
production pressures, resource constraints, gaps, hazards and competing goals 
(Dekker et al. 2008; Nemeth et al. 2008; Woods & Hollnagel 2006). Previous 
research has investigated the role of nurses in the management of risk (Groves, 
Finfgeld-Connett & Wakefield 2012), recovery of medical errors (Henneman, EA et 
al. 2006; Henneman, EA & Gawlinski 2004; Henneman, EA et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 
2008) and nursing surveillance (Schmidt 2010). The current study builds on this 
research and extends the knowledge on how nurses create safety.  
It has been argued that there are valuable lessons to be learned from research of 
successful performance and what goes ‘right’ (Woods & Cook 2002; Hollnagel 
2012a; 2012b). Through the investigation of how nurses anticipate, identify and 
bridge gaps and get it ‘right’, the current study has generated valuable insights into 
successful everyday nursing performance. It has also deepened understanding of how 
nurses cope with complexity and the processes that increase system resilience. 
Furthermore, the study has captured resilience in its different forms as described by 
Westrum (2006). Westrum’s taxonomy encompasses nurses, individually and 
collectively, (i) foreseeing and preventing bad things from happening; (ii) coping 
with instances of failure by preventing their evolution into something more serious or 
catastrophic; and (iii) recovering and returning to normal operations in the aftermath 
of failure. These acts of resilience which supported the delivery of safe patient care 
in this study will be discussed throughout this chapter. 
5.3 Chance, serendipity, luck 
Chance, serendipity and luck, in the form of an unknown or unpredictable element or 
fortunate discovery, played a part in the management of gaps and forestalling of 
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harm. Luck, ‘the random combination of circumstances’ (van der Schaaf, Lucas & 
Hale 1991, p. 5) is recognised as a mechanism by which harm may be averted in 
patient safety incidents (Hollnagel 2011; Reason 2008). A study of factors by Jeffs, 
Affonso and McMillan (2008, p. 491) revealed that ‘chance’, ‘luck’ and 
‘randomness’ were associated with near miss occurences in hospital settings. 
Participants in the current study revealed that ‘coincidence’, ‘happenstance’ and 
‘chance’ placed nurses in situations where they noticed or heard something and thus 
acted to forestall patient harm.  
Chance, luck and serendipity cannot be designed into health care systems, nor 
can they be relied upon to prevent adverse patient outcomes. Nonetheless, in some 
instances, these factors provide an explanation for how patient harm is avoided. 
These cases serve as a reminder that health care professionals cannot control all 
aspects of health care delivery nor are they always responsible for everything that 
goes ‘right’ in patient care. 
5.4 How nurses managed gaps? 
In accordance with Cook, Render and Woods (2000), the anticipation, identification 
and bridging of gaps is based on nurses’ knowledge and experience of: where gaps 
occur; the types of gaps that occur; the things that happen, go wrong and are 
overlooked; the clinical environment; available equipment; and correct processes and 
procedures, as shown in Figure 5.1 (page 150 of this thesis). Analysis of the data 
revealed that the anticipation, identification and bridging of gaps occurred in a rapid 
sequence such that it was not possible to assign strategies exclusively to each aspect 
of gaps management. Similarly, Hurley and colleagues (2008, p. 223) identified 
cases where the identification, interruption and correction of medical errors was a 
rapid and ‘nearly indistinguishable’ process. However, sufficient data were collected 
in the current study to make inferences about the relationship between patient safety, 
nurses and the management of gaps. Significantly, the study has also revealed that 
the same strategies were used by nurses to manage gaps, irrespective of whether the 
gaps were familiar or new and unfamiliar. These strategies will now be discussed 
under the following subheadings: 
x The nursing safety net 
x Knowledge and experience 
x Higher order thinking skills 
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x Nursing surveillance 
x Enhancement of nursing surveillance 
x Effective, constant  and assertive communication 
x Teamwork. 
 
Figure 5.1 Model of gaps management by nurses 
5.5 The nursing safety net 
The current study found that the management of gaps was a function of nurses’ 
knowledge, experience, intuition, higher order thinking (critical thinking and clinical 
judgement) and key processes such as surveillance, teamwork and communication. 
Collectively, these attributes and processes increased system resilience and protected 
patients from the harmful, and, on occasions, potentially catastrophic effects of gaps. 
They might therefore be characterised as the ‘nursing safety net’. The dimensions of 
the nursing safety net are depicted in Figure 5.2 (page 151 of this thesis). 
The term ‘nursing safety net’ was coined by Rothschild and colleagues (2006) to 
describe the role of critical care nurses in protecting patients from the harmful effects 
of medical errors. Their study yielded important findings with regard to the nature 
and extent of medical errors recovered by nurses in critical care settings (Rothschild 
et al. 2006). It revealed that a large proportion of the errors recovered by nurses were 
medication related and that most were intercepted before reaching patients. 
Extrapolation of the findings from the study by Rothschild and colleagues (2006) 
suggests that, in a ten bed critical care unit, as many as 7,300 medical errors may be 
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recovered annually. The current study builds on the notion of ‘the nursing safety net’ 
in two respects. Firstly, it provides a characterisation of the nursing safety net. 
Secondly, it suggests that the notion of the nursing safety net has application and 
relevance in a range of clinical contexts. Strong congruence was found across all 
clinical settings for the components of the nursing safety net identified in the context 
of this study. These elements might thus be considered core elements of nursing 
practice that create safety and increase system resilience.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 The nursing safety net 
5.5.1 Knowledge and experience 
The ability of nurses to anticipate, detect and bridge gaps was a result of their direct 
and previous experience of the things that happened or went wrong; specific things 
that were commonly incorrect, overlooked or forgotten; and their knowledge of the 
correct procedures and available equipment in their environment. Knowledge and 
experience alerted nurses to where gaps were likely to occur and the types of gaps 
that might occur. Experience also formed the basis for nurses’ intuitive awareness of 
gaps.  
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(a) Intuition 
Nurses in the current study revealed that a feeling or ‘gut reaction’ alerted them to 
the presence of gaps. They counselled their junior colleagues to ‘always go with their 
gut’ and ‘never let go of it’. Intuition, a uniquely human quality, has been defined as 
a form of reasoning (Winkler 1996), an instinctive knowledge of or belief about 
something without conscious reasoning (Collins Dictionary of the English Language 
2010). Intuition, a ‘legitimate and essential aspect of clinical judgement’ (Benner & 
Tanner 1987, p. 23), develops through the experience of similar and dissimilar 
situations (Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis & Stannard 1999). In line with the work of 
Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis and Stannard (1999), nurses’ intuition encompassed a 
sense of salience and concern in certain situations, an awareness, for example, that 
the patient was about to deteriorate in the absence of any physiological signs.  
The importance of intuition has been highlighted by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, 
p. 31) who argue that an important aspect of reliable performance is trusting intuitive 
feelings because they are a ‘solid clue that your model of the world is in error’. 
Research has established that intuition plays a key role in nurses detecting clinical 
deterioration (Andrews & Waterman 2005; Minick & Harvey 2003; Odell, Victor & 
Oliver 2009). Efforts to reduce communication failure and rates of in-hospital 
cardiac arrest have given legitimacy to the intuitive ‘something is not quite right’ 
feelings experienced by health care practitioners (Bellamo et al. 2003; Leonard, 
Graham & Bonacum 2004). In one Australian hospital, for example, feeling 
‘worried’ about a patient is a valid and common reason to activate the medical 
emergency team (Bellamo et al. 2003). Likewise, a neonatal critical care unit in the 
U.S.A. has an established process whereby doctors are required to attend an infant, 
without question or hesitation, whenever a nurse is concerned (Leonard, Graham & 
Bonacum 2004).  
(b) Pattern recognition 
The feeling or ‘gut reaction’ that alerted nurses to the presence of gaps may be an 
example of pattern recognition. Being able to make an immediate and intuitive 
interpretation of an undefined clinical situation is a result of prior experience of 
similar clinical situations and the ability to recognise a pattern (Benner & Tanner 
1987; Benner, Tanner & Chesla 2009; Tanner 2006). Pattern recognition is a mental 
process whereby an individual matches the salient aspects of a situation against a 
‘mental library of prior experiences’ (Leonard, Graham & Bonacum 2004, p. i87). 
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Pattern recognition is widely recognised as an important attribute of expert nursing 
practice (Benner & Tanner 1987; Brykczynski 1998; Orsolini-Hain & Malone 2007) 
that enables nurses to identify early and subtle changes suggestive of patient 
problems (Minick & Harvey 2003). Of note, research has found that ‘diligent and 
vigilant’ recognition of patterns in the delivery of care contributes to the recovery of 
near misses in clinical domains (Jeffs, Affonso & MacMillan 2008).  
(c) Priming 
It is posited that nurses’ experience of gaps and the things that went wrong or were 
overlooked ‘primed’ them to anticipate, detect and bridge gaps. Priming, a 
phenomenon widely studied in the field of cognitive psychology, is subconscious and 
pervasive in everyday life (Tulving & Schacter 1990). Priming occurs when the 
presentation of a stimulus or task results in processing of that stimulus or task 
(Dennis, Minas & Bhagwatwar 2013; Marsolek 2003). This processing involves the 
activation of a mental representation of certain aspects of the task (i.e. concepts, 
attitudes, beliefs, behaviour) in a person’s working memory. Research has 
demonstrated that these mental concepts can then influence an individual’s behaviour 
and judgement in future unrelated tasks without the person concerned even being 
aware of this effect (Dennis, Minas & Bhagwatwar 2013; Teunissen et al. 2009). 
When these mental concepts are assimilated, the individual’s behaviour and 
judgement accord with the original stimulus or task that was primed. In summary, 
priming refers to an increased sensitivity to certain stimuli as a result of prior 
experience and the tendency for humans to consistently see a phenomenon after an 
initial exposure to it. It is suggested that the effects of priming can be long lasting 
and salient.   
Priming has been identified as a useful method for developing mindfulness, an 
awareness of one’s mental processes (i.e. thoughts and processes) in everyday life 
(Epstein 1999; Epstein 2003). Priming has also been used in clinical education to 
develop patient care and learning goals and prepare students for clinical tasks 
(Epstein 2003; Paulman 2002). In the context of the current study, and with reference 
to the work of Tulving and Schacter (1990), it is hypothesised that the ability of 
nurses to antipate, detect and bridge gaps was a function not only of their perception 
but also of their experience and subsequent memory of health care gaps. The priming 
effect was not directly observed or researched thus it is only possible to speculate 
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about its role in the management of gaps. It is, however, an area for further research 
and inquiry. 
(d) Foresight training as a counter to inexperience 
The inexperience of health care practitioners has been identified as a contributing 
factor in cases of safety failure (Toft 2001). It has been noted that novice 
practitioners may not possess the requisite knowledge and experience to anticipate 
situations where there is a heightened risk of error or harm (Reason 2004). Thus, 
Reason (2004) has argued that foresight training is a means of developing ‘basic 
mental’ (as distinct from technical) skills that allow a novice doctor or nurse to 
prospectively analyse risk in any given situation.  
Foresight training has been widely adopted by other safety critical industries (i.e. 
aviation, nuclear power, off-shore oil and gas organisations) (Boakes 2009) and the 
National Patient Safety Agency (2008) in the United Kingdom. A key benefit of such 
programs is increased awareness of the factors that contribute to preventable adverse 
events in the absence of direct or first-hand experience of such events (Boakes 2009). 
The program, based on Reason’s (2004) ‘three bucket model of error likelihood’, 
highlights three system factors that contribute to health care risk in any given 
situation. These include:  
(i) Self - the level of knowledge and experience of the individuals and 
other factors such as fatigue, stress or poor health; 
(ii) Context - interruptions, distractions, issues with equipment, time 
constraints; and  
(iii) Task - the complexity of the task and the potential for error (p. ii31).  
Foresight training focuses on skill development such that staff can make an 
assessment of the ‘bad stuff’ in a clinical situation - the negative factors in each 
‘bucket’ that increase the risk of an error or adverse event (Boakes 2009; Reason 
2004). While not a definitive measure of the risk of an unsafe act in a given clinical 
situation, the presence of many factors in one or more buckets serves as a ‘red flag’ 
that the risk is increased. Similarly, the apparent absence of any identifiable risk 
factors does not guarantee safety (Boakes 2009). 
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5.5.2 Higher order thinking skills - critical thinking and clinical judgement 
Higher order thinking skills (i.e. clinical reasoning, critical thinking, clinical decision 
making and clinical judgement) are widely recognised as being fundamental to the 
delivery of quality patient care and achievement of patient safety outcomes (Benner, 
Hughes & Sutphen 2008; Bittner & Tobin 1998; Edwards 2003; 2007; Hurley et al. 
2008; Mottola & Murphy 2001; Simmons 2010). The current study has revealed that 
critical thinking and clinical judgement were key elements of the nursing safety. 
Clinical judgement, a form of thinking, has been defined as the ability to reach 
an ‘interpretation or conclusion about a patient’s needs, concerns or health problems’ 
in situations that are ‘underdetermined [and] ambiguous’ (Tanner 2006, p. 204). It 
encompasses important subconscious elements such as intuition and is derived 
though experience (Benner, Tanner & Chesla 2009). Critical thinking encompasses 
the use of situational and practical knowledge (i.e. knowledge acquired through 
clinical experience) (Bittner & Tobin 1998) to recognise patient problems, make 
clinical judgements and weigh up alternative courses of action (Benner, Hughes & 
Sutphen 2008).  
A case described in Chapter 4 of this thesis (page 124) captures an act of 
resilience where a nurse identified failure and prevented its evolution into something 
catastrophic. In this case, critical thinking and clinical judgement were crucial to the 
nurse detecting and bridging the gap, the patient’s unrecognised clinical deterioration 
from a large myocardial infarction. In accordance with the work of Cook, Render and 
Woods (2000) the nurse possessed a mental catalogue of (i) the clinical conditions 
that pointed to the presence of gaps (i.e. the patient’s colour; a blood pressure that 
did not ‘match up’ with the patient’s tachycardia; low urine output; abnormalities in 
the patient’s ECG tracing), and (ii) the gaps that may be present (i.e. variations in the 
placement of electrodes for continuous ECG monitoring; inadequate patient 
assessment; the possibility that an ECG might be filed away without review). The 
nurse promptly checked the ECG (completed some hours earlier) and immediately 
identified that the patient had suffered a large myocardial infarction. She seamlessly 
escalated the patient’s care to minimise the adverse consequences - advising the 
doctor that he needed to review the patient immediately, and arranging for the patient 
to be moved to the main part of the unit where the necessary resources were readily 
available.  
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In line with the work of Patterson and colleagues (in press) the skill and 
expertise of the nurse in successfully identifying and bridging the gap, minimised the 
impact of the gap on the patient and also reduced its visibility and significance. In the 
absence of the nurse’s action, this is said to suggest the patient’s condition would 
have rapidly deteriorated. Reason (2008) points out that the work of front line 
clinicians in forestalling harm ‘conceals’ the system weaknesses and faults that 
contribute to failure. Similarly, a participant in the current study remarked that the 
successes just become part of the everyday.  
5.5.3 Nursing surveillance 
Knowledge, experience, intuition, and higher order thinking skills were key features 
of the nursing safety net described in this study. In accordance with the conceptual 
framework of surveillance advanced by Kelly and Vincent (2011, p. 656), these 
characteristics were also antecedents, ‘prepossessed abilities, knowledge or training’ 
that positively influenced the process of nursing surveillance.  
Surveillance has been described as one of the most fundamental activities 
undertaken by nurses (Page 2004). Furthermore, it has been posited as a factor in the 
relationship between higher levels of registered nurse staffing and superior patient 
outcomes (Aiken et al. 2003). There is a paucity of research, however, on the process 
of surveillance itself (Henneman, EA Gawlinski & Giuliano 2012; Kelly 2009; 
Kutney-Lee, Lake & Aiken 2009; Schmidt 2010). An important finding of this study 
is that nursing surveillance was an integral component of the nursing safety net and a 
key process used by nurses to manage gaps and create safety. The rich, descriptive 
data presented depict effective nursing surveillance ‘in action’ and deepen 
understanding of this important process. To this end, the findings represent a new 
contribution to the field of knowledge.  
In keeping with definitions of surveillance advanced by Dougherty (1999), 
McCloskey Dochterman and Bulechek (2004), Kutney-Lee, Lake and Aiken (2009), 
Schmidt (2010), Kelly and Vincent (2011), Henneman, Gawlinski and Giuliano 
(2012), and a study of nursing surveillance (Schmidt 2010), effective nursing 
surveillance was a complex process with behavioural and cognitive components. The 
components of surveillance identified in this study included: vigilance; a systematic, 
comprehensive, head-to-toe and ‘hands-on’ approach to patient assessment; 
observing and looking; checking; and making sure. These components and their key 
features are summarised in Table 5.1 (page 157 of this thesis).  
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Table 5.1 Components of nursing surveillance 
Remaining vigilant 
x never taking anything for granted 
x maintaining a sustained and watchful state of attention 
x being alert and attentive to unpredictable and infrequent events 
x keeping careful watch for potential dangers and clinical deterioration 
x paying close attention to patient cues 
x performing tasks at a constant level of efficiency and effectiveness 
 
A systematic, comprehensive, head-to-toe, ‘hands on’ approach to patient 
assessment 
Observing and looking  
x carefully and critically  
x at the whole patient and broadly (i.e. the ‘big picture’) 
x included elements of searching, examining, watching, observing, and 
investigating 
Checking 
x backwards and forwards 
x double and triple checking everything about a patient and their 
environment 
Making sure 
x making certain, leaving no doubt 
 
(a) Vigilance 
Nurses that successfully managed gaps approached their work with a sustained and 
watchful state of attention and thus were highly vigilant.  Vigilance was a pivotal 
element of the nursing safety net that increased resilience. Vigilance encompassed 
being ready to detect events that occurred unpredictably; keeping careful watch for 
possible danger or difficulties; and performing tasks at a constant level of efficiency 
and effectiveness. Vigilance has been defined as the ‘intentional and knowledgeable 
watchfulness of the patient, the care environment and one’s own thinking’ (Kooken 
cited in Ebright et al. 2006, p. 346). Vigilance has been described as the ‘essence’ of 
nursing (Meyer & Lavin 2005) and one of the most important attributes of a safe 
practitioner (Long et al. 2011). A range of studies have revealed that vigilance plays 
a role in the recovery of nursing and medical errors (Balas, Scott & Rogers 2004; 
2006; Henneman, EA et al. 2006; Henneman, EA et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 2008), the 
mitigation of near misses (Jeffs, Affonso & MacMillan 2008), the safe administration 
of medications (Eisenhauer, Hurley & Dolan 2007) and recognition of the 
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deteriorating patient (Clarke 2004). These studies, however, reveal little about the 
process of vigilance itself. A small number of studies have investigated the 
phenomena of vigilance in health care contexts (Carr 1998; Howard et al. 2003; 
Mahoney et al. 2003; Meyer 2002), the most informative of these being a study of 
the vigilance experiences of cancer patients, families and nurses (Kooken 2008). 
Kooken (2008) found that nursing vigilance was a complex, multi-dimensional 
process that involved monitoring and tending to the small but essential aspects of 
patient care: 
Vigilance is often not about large, noticeable, or even unusual symptoms. 
Vigilance is about tending to and monitoring the small, on a daily basis. 
Vigilance, is about watching the mundane, just in case (p. 173). 
In line with the work of Kooken (2008), the findings of this study indicate that 
vigilant nurses were knowledgeable and experienced; used different forms of 
communication (i.e. questioning, listening and watching) to elicit information; went 
to the patient to ‘see’ for themselves; were acutely aware of what they needed to be 
vigilant about; and were able to think broadly, gather information from many 
sources, consider all possibilities and seek answers. A key element of vigilance in 
Kooken’s (2008, p. 168) study was the ability to ‘notice small things in the moment’. 
Similarly, nurses in the current study were aware of the salience of the ‘simple’ or 
‘little’ things and their potential to evolve into something larger and possibly 
catastrophic. As noted in the previous chapter, inattention to the simple, essential or 
small aspects of patient care (i.e. checking a patient’s temperature) created the 
opportunity for preventable adverse outcomes. 
(b) Mindfulness 
The intentional watchfulness that was key to managing gaps and creating safety 
might also be characterised as mindfulness. Mindfulness has been discussed in a 
number of different contexts in the health care literature. Collective and individual 
mindfulness have been linked to safety and resilience and identified as positive 
attributes of high reliability organisations (Reason 2000; 2008; Weick & Sutcliffe 
2007; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld 2008). In this context, mindfulness encompasses 
‘a set of cognitive processes that allows individuals to be highly attuned to the many 
ways things can go wrong in unkind environments and ways to recover from them’ 
(Henriksen et al. 2008, p. 15). These processes include vigilance for the possibility of 
Chapter 5. Discussion of Findings 
159 
 
failure; the reluctance to simplify interpretations; sensitivity to operations; the 
commitment to resilience; and deference to expertise. Indeed, a trait shared by nurses 
in the current study was their acute awareness that something might go wrong and 
the danger of being complacent about the possibility of failure. Nurses described 
feeling uneasy about the widespread nature of gaps in health care and their potential 
to cause preventable patient harm.  
In health care contexts, mindfulness has been used as an intervention to reduce 
stress and burn out in health care professionals (Cohen-Katz et al. 2005; Dimidjian & 
Linehan 2003; Irving, Dobkin & Park 2009). It has also been conceptualised as a 
practice that health care practitioners can constructively apply to all aspects of their 
work (Epstein 1999). In this context, mindfulness is a form of self reflection with 
origins in the philosophical-religious tradition (Epstein 1999). Even so, Epstein 
(1999) explains that it is pragmatic, underpinned by the interrelated processes of 
action, memory, cognition and emotion and thus relevant to health care providers. 
While Epstein (1999) writes largely for a medical audience, the views expressed hold 
equally for nurses. A mindful practitioner is described as someone who: 
attends, in a nonjudgmental way to his or her own physical and mental 
processes during ordinary everyday tasks to act with clarity and insight 
(Epstein 1999, p. 833). 
According to Epstein (1999, p. 835), mindfulness involves attending to ‘the 
ordinary, the obvious and the present’. A degree of overlap is noted between 
mindfulness and the notion of vigilance, as described by Kooken (2008), namely, 
attention to the ordinary or commonplace in everyday life. While mindfulness was 
not directly observed or researched, nurses that successfully managed gaps in the 
current study displayed two key habits of mind, ‘attentive observation’ and ‘critical 
curiosity’, as described by Epstein (1999; 2003). 
Critical curiosity has been described as a dimension of learning power, the 
capacity to learn how to learn (Crick 2007). Curiosity has also been identified as an 
attribute of resilient teams and organisations (Dekker et al. 2008). It appears that 
nurses in the current study demonstrated some of the attributes of critically curious 
individuals identified by Crick (2007). These nurses possessed a strong desire to find 
out what was going on; they asked questions, preferred to see for themselves, came 
to their own conclusions, and were reluctant to uncritically accept the views of 
others. They highlighted the importance of really looking at the patient.  
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In the context of patient safety, mindfulness has been advanced as a useful 
strategy in addressing cognitive biases that contribute to diagnostic and medical 
errors (Sibinga & Wu 2010). A recent analysis by White (2013) concluded that the 
integration of mindfulness into nursing holds important benefits for the health of 
nurses and quality of nursing care. The findings of this study suggest that 
mindfulness may also be of use to nurses in coping with complexity and managing 
gaps. Further research and inquiry is required to explore this idea. 
(c) Vigilant patient assessment and observation 
The importance of observing and assessing patients was first formally recognised by 
Florence Nightingale, the British nurse reformer and founder of modern nursing 
science. In her book, Notes on Nursing. What it is, and what it is not, Nightingale 
(1969) writes of the importance of teaching nurses what and how to observe patients:  
The most important practical lesson that can be given to nurses is to teach 
them what to observe - how to observe - what symptoms indicate 
improvement - what the reverse - which are of importance - which are of 
none - which are the evidence of neglect - and of what kind of 
neglect...But if you cannot get the habit of observation one way or other, 
you had better give up the being a nurse, for it is not your calling, 
however kind and anxious you may be’ (p. vii).   
Patient assessment is widely recognised as a vital first step in the planning and 
delivery of nursing care (Fennessey & Wittmann-Price 2011; Munroe et al. 2013; 
West SL 2006). The findings generated through patient assessment form a baseline 
against which the effectiveness of treatments can be evaluated and further 
assessments can be compared. Nonetheless, the notion of physical assessment as 
distinct from the taking and recording of observations (i.e. vital signs) is a contested 
notion in the nursing literature (Birks et al. 2013; Fennessey & Wittmann-Price 2011; 
Giddens 2007; West SL 2006). The increasing complexity and acuity of patients in 
hospital settings and the significant patient safety problem of failure-to-rescue have 
drawn attention, however, to the importance of patient assessment (Buist & Stevens 
2013) and the need for a systematic, comprehensive, head-to-toe approach (Baid 
2006; West SL 2006). Research has revealed that ‘looking’, ‘watching’, and the 
‘close, direct observation’ of patients are important components of nursing 
surveillance (Schmidt 2010). Likewise, previous studies of error recovery 
(Henneman, EA et al. 2006; Henneman, EA et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 2008) have 
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identified the important role of vigilance, observation and assessment in protecting 
patients from harm.  
The findings from this study indicate that three interrelated processes, amongst 
others, were integral to the identification and management of gaps in patient care: 
systematic, comprehensive, head-to-toe, ‘hands on’ patient assessment; observing 
and looking; and, remaining vigilant. Collectively, they underscore the importance of 
observing and assessing patients closely, attentively and thoroughly, using a careful, 
well organised and systematic approach. These processes protected patients from the 
serious effects of health care gaps and increased system resilience. In line with 
Westrum (2006), these strategies enabled nurses to (i) foresee and prevent bad things 
from happening; and (ii) cope with instances of failure by preventing their evolution 
into something more serious or catastrophic. Examples of nurses preventing bad 
things from happening included: a nurse identifying that a patient’s radial pulse was 
absent and that the patient was at risk of losing their arm; a nurse detecting the 
presence of a heart ‘murmur’ which was found to be indicative of an arterial 
dissection; and, a nurse preventing the injection of local anaesthetic with adrenaline 
into a patient’s penis. Similarly, examples of nurses preventing the evolution of 
failures into something more serious included the detection of: two missed injuries in 
a trauma patient (i.e. a pneumothorax and fractured wrist); a misplaced endotracheal 
breathing tube; pressure areas; the placement of a temporary clip over a cerebral 
aneurysm which carries the risk of opening and slipping when the blood pressure 
returns to normal; an adverse reaction to an iron infusion; the failure to recommence 
diuretics post operatively; and incorrectly diagnosed cardiac rhythms. 
(d) A ‘hands on’ approach to patient assessment 
Ebright (2006, p. 345) contends that ‘vigilance is a function of human beings’ and 
that the role of machines is to augment rather than substitute this vital function. Thus 
a key consideration for the nursing profession in an era of rapid technological 
advancement is determining which nursing practices are still relevant (Ebright 2006). 
Participants in the current study highlighted the importance of ‘hands on’ assessment 
and cautioned against over reliance on technology, arguing that human hands are 
irreplaceable. They expressed concern that the use of medical devices had evolved 
into the dominant method of patient assessment and called for a return to the ‘basics’ 
of looking, thinking, touching and talking to patients. This view concurs with 
research by Schmidt (2010, p. 404) who identified that ‘close, direct observation of 
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patients’ using the eyes, ears and hands was a key element of surveillance. 
Furthermore, research has suggested that the use of electronic monitoring equipment 
is common in patient assessment and that much of this work is undertaken by health 
care assistants (Wheatley 2006). Wheatley (2006) concluded that the taking of 
observations and basic physical assessment of patients in ward settings was 
superficial and looked upon as a ‘task to be done’.  While Wheatley’s (2006) study 
was exploratory in nature and involved a small sample, its findings offer valuable 
insights on how patient assessment has evolved from a ‘hands-on’ activity to one that 
is more reliant on technology.  
(e) Gaps in the vigilant assessment and observation of patients 
Patient assessment plays a critical role in the identification of clinical deterioration, 
maintenance of physiological safety, and decision making about patient care (Cioffi 
2000; Considine & Botti 2004). Participants in the current study suggested, however, 
that in spite of this, nurses took short cuts in patient observation and assessment by 
fabricating observations and not assessing patients thoroughly. Participants conveyed 
a sense that patient assessment generally was undervalued, not widely implemented 
and a process for which nurses may be inadequately skilled. A number of studies 
have drawn attention to gaps in the assessment and observation of patients in hospital 
settings, revealing significant variation in the documentation of vital signs (Buist & 
Stevens 2013; Hands et al. 2013; McGain et al. 2008; National Patient Safety 
Agency 2007). A small qualitative study, undertaken by the National Patient Safety 
Agency (2007) in the U.K. revealed that routine observations were rarely taken 
during the night (i.e. between 10.30pm-6am) and performing observations was 
considered a ‘low priority’ task (National Patient Safety Agency 2007). Analysis of a 
large cohort (i.e. almost 1 million sets of patient observations) revealed that 
overnight observations on unwell patients were not repeated in a timely manner and 
in line with the hospital’s escalation policy (Hands et al. 2013). Where the 
recommended interval between observations sets for a ViEWS21 value of 9 or more 
(suggestive of critical physiological disturbance) is 30 minutes, almost a third of 
patients with these values did not have vital signs recorded in the following six hour 
period.  
                                                 
21 The ViEWS system is a type of early warning system (EWS). The system calculates a weighted 
value that is a measure of the patient’s level of physiological variation from a predetermined ‘normal’ 
range. In most EWS protocols, higher values trigger more frequent observations.   
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Research studies in the U.S.A. and Australia point to a large discrepancy 
between the number of physical assessment skills taught in undergraduate nursing 
programs (as many as 121) and the number used in clinical practice (Birks et al. 
2013; Giddens 2007).  Furthermore, research conducted in a simulated environment 
has revealed significant gaps in the assessment skills of final-year nursing students 
during patient deterioration (Cooper et al. 2010). Many students performed poorly on 
basic assessment tasks and while they possessed knowledge of the management of 
deterioration they were unable to apply this knowledge in a clinical context. 
Furthermore, the skills performance of the students declined as the clinical 
deterioration worsened. A key question raised by these research studies is whether a 
reduction in the overall number of physical assessment skills taught in undergraduate 
nursing programs might allow for greater focus on those skills essential in 
identifying clinical deterioration or a change in the patient’s health status (Birks et al. 
2013; Giddens 2007). 
(f) The promotion of vigilant patient assessment and observation 
An important consideration raised by this study is how the process of vigilant patient 
assessment and observation can be enhanced to create safety benefits for patients. 
Maria Montessori (1964, p. 228), the originator of the Montessori educational 
method that is used throughout the world, has written that the key to creating 
observers is ‘giving them the power and the means for this observation […] through 
education of the senses’. Similarly, Pellico and colleagues (2009, p. 648), with 
reference to the work of Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990), contend that the 
skill of observation is not ‘bequeathed but earned through diligence in the skill of 
looking and seeing’. A study by Pellico and colleagues (2009) explored the use of 
novel environments (i.e. observing artwork in a museum) to enhance the ‘process of 
clinical seeing’ through the development of nurses’ observational skills. The study 
found that, when presented with a series of patient photographs, students that 
participated in the museum experience provided more written observational data and 
identified a greater number of differential diagnoses.  
Recently, Buist and Stevens (2013) argued that health care professionals have 
lost sight of their ‘core business’, the practice of diligent observation and monitoring 
to detect patient problems and inform appropriate action. The ‘New Look’ approach 
to patient safety acknowledges that the addition of technology may create new and 
unintended gaps and error opportunities (Nemeth et al. 2008; Patterson et al. in 
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press). Thus, it is posited that the widespread availability of electronic monitoring 
equipment in health care settings has created a gap, a diminished perception of the 
value of thorough observation and assessment of patients using a hands-on, well 
organised and systematic approach. A key challenge lies in convincing health care 
practitioners, including nurses, that a hands on approach creates safety and makes a 
difference to patient outcomes. In the context of the current study, and with reference 
to the work of Buist and Stevens (2013) and Florence Nightingale (1969), further 
research and inquiry is required to determine how health care systems can provide 
the conditions for vigilant patient assessment and observation to occur. 
(g) Vigilant checking and making sure 
Checking and rechecking are important safety skills in health care contexts (Long et 
al. 2011; Shillito, Arfanis & Smith 2010) with studies in emergency and critical care 
settings identifying ‘double-checking’ as a useful strategy in the recovery of medical 
errors (Henneman, EA et al. 2006; Henneman, EA et al. 2010). Similarly, 
participants in the current study revealed that checking encompassed constant 
‘double’ and ‘triple’ checking, ‘backwards and forwards’ of the patient and their 
environment. Checking was not a routine or automated process, however. Checking 
had behavioural and cognitive elements evidenced by nurses constantly returning to 
the patient, methodically and systematically checking the patient and their 
environment and also checking their own thinking. Some overlap is noted here with 
the notions of vigilance and mindfulness, previously discussed in this chapter. 
Vigilance and mindfulness both encompass a watchfulness or attention to mental 
processes (Epstein 1999; Kooken 2008). Participants also indicated that nurses 
‘mental checklists’ (as opposed to textual checklists) of the things that were 
commonly overlooked or might go wrong informed the checking process.  
To make sure of something is to make certain and be free from doubt (Collins 
Dictionary of the English Language 2010). The term ‘making sure’ appeared 
frequently throughout the interview transcripts. Making sure involved looking and 
checking in a purposeful and intentional way. Of note, a grounded theory study of 
nursing surveillance revealed that ‘making sure’ was the basic social process through 
which nurses watched over patients (Schmidt 2010). 
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(h) Nursing surveillance during periods of ‘going solid’ in the ED 
Participants in this study revealed that, during periods of ‘going solid’, nurses 
increased their level of patient surveillance to prevent bad things from happening and 
maintain the safe and sustained operations of emergency departments. ‘Going solid’ 
is a term from the nuclear power industry used to describe a ‘shift in operations’ 
where the functioning of one department or unit becomes ‘critically dependent on 
seemingly insignificant events in seemingly distant areas’ of an organisation (Cook 
& Rasmussen 2005, p. 130). The phenomenon of ‘going solid’ is seen in complex, 
tightly coupled systems such as hospitals which operate close to capacity. When 
hospitals experience periods of ‘going solid’, the risk of patient harm increases.  
Participants suggested that ‘going solid’ was evident when EDs became 
overcrowded due to a lack of inpatient beds in other parts of the hospital. They 
revealed that, at these times, triage nurses increased their levels of surveillance to 
manage the risk of caring for a large group of patients (as many as 30) with 
undiagnosed problems. Nurses observed and assessed patients at regular intervals to 
determine whether their need for care had changed; provided pain relief; and, where 
possible, arranged for investigations to be completed. They described the importance 
of acknowledging patient’s concerns, providing reassurance, ‘telling patients what is 
going on’ and avoiding ‘platitudes’. These actions contributed to the smooth and 
sustained operations of the department during periods of ‘going solid’.  
5.5.4 The enhancement of nursing surveillance 
The current study has found that nursing surveillance was a critical process used by 
nurses to manage gaps that created safety and increased system resilience. Attention 
will now turn to a consideration of how nursing surveillance might be enhanced in 
hospital settings. 
(a) Checklists and worksheets 
Formal tools (i.e. electronic or paper-based checklists, transfer forms) have been 
widely implemented in hospital settings to bridge well known gaps (Cook, Render & 
Woods 2000; Patterson et al. in press) and improve the management of critically 
important elements of care (i.e. central venous catheters) (Pronovost, Needham, 
Berenholtz et al. 2006). It is suggested that the use of checklists may be a means of 
enhancing bedside nursing surveillance (Henneman, EA Gawlinski & Giuliano 
2012). Checklists are designed to encourage consideration or action with regard to 
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specific items or criteria and also provide for documentation of their absence or 
presence (Hales & Pronovost 2006). Checklists are widely accepted as tools that may 
improve performance, increase adherence to evidence-based guidelines, and decrease 
the incidence of errors and preventable adverse events (Hales & Pronovost 2006; 
Pronovost, Needham, Berenholtz et al. 2006; Halm 2008; Leape 2009; Jeffs, 
MacMillan & Maione 2009).  
Checklists are common place in other safety critical industries such as aviation 
and aeronautics. Nonetheless, research suggests that as many as half of all aeroplane 
checklists are not completed and that pressures to meet operating targets are a 
contributing factor (Degani & Wiener 1993). The translation of checklists into health 
care has proved slow and challenging, not least due to resistance by health care 
providers to their introduction (Bosk et al. 2009; Hales & Pronovost 2006). 
Explanations put forward for this resistance have included perceptions that checklists 
replace and devalue intuitive clinical judgement and slow down decision making and 
action (Bosk et al. 2009; Hales & Pronovost 2006; King & Appleton 2008; Shillito, 
Arfanis & Smith 2010). It has also been suggested that overuse of checklists may 
contribute to checklist ‘fatigue’ (Hales & Pronovost 2006, p. 234)  
A key limitation of formal checklists and tools is their inflexibility and inability 
to support the adaptive capacity of health care providers in situations that are 
complex, novel and undefined (Hunte 2010). A notable finding of this study is that 
textual checklists and tools did not feature in participants’ accounts of how they 
managed gaps. Participants revealed that individual, internal, ‘mental checklists’ 
informed nurses of the gaps, risks and hazards in their clinical environments. In 
emergency, perioperative and critical care settings where the margins of error are 
narrow and clinical deterioration can progress rapidly, these checklists supported 
swift decision making and action. Mental checklists, as participants suggested, were 
accessible and effective, alerting nurses to gaps and the increased risk of patient 
harm. Thus, it would appear that mental checklists, as described in the context of the 
current study, enhanced the adaptive capacity of nurses and increased resilience in 
hospital contexts.  
Further research might focus on studying the concept of mental checklists in 
greater depth. Key areas for further research and inquiry include how these checklists 
are acquired and how they might be passed on to novice nurses. 
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(b) Surveillance and nurse staffing 
Surveillance and its impact on patient outcomes are difficult concepts to measure 
directly. Research has suggested that lower rates of failure-to-rescue in hospitalised 
patients are a function of lower nurse to patient ratios and more effective nursing 
surveillance (Aiken et al. 2002; Clarke & Aiken 2003; Needleman et al. 2002). The 
findings of this study suggest, however, that the quality of nursing surveillance is 
influenced not only by the number of nurses per patient but other factors such as 
knowledge, experience and expertise. These attributes have been identified as 
important antecedents of nursing surveillance (Kelly & Vincent 2011) and essential 
elements of the ‘nurse dose’22 (Brooten & Youngblut 2006). Furthermore, research 
has suggested that the presence of well educated, expert and experienced nurses is 
associated with quality care and lower rates of patient falls and nosocomial infection 
(Kutney-Lee, Lake & Aiken 2009).  
A recent policy framework, developed by the American Nurses Association, 
recognises that an evidence-based approach to nurse staffing is critical to the delivery 
of safe and quality patient care (American Nurses Association 2012). Nonetheless, 
the achievement of appropriate nurse staffing such that the expertise of the registered 
nurse matches the needs of the care recipient is a complex and challenging task 
(Weston, Brewer & Peterson 2012). In complex and dynamic environments such as 
hospital settings, unforeseen fluctuations in the census and patient acuity can disrupt 
even the best staffing plans and compromise patient safety (Weston, Brewer & 
Peterson 2012).  
(c) Nursing care delivery 
Participants in the current study expressed concern about the safety of patients 
transferred out of critical care settings during periods of ‘going solid’. Similarly, a 
study by Dykes, Rothschild and Hurley (2010a) revealed that nurses are troubled by 
this issue. At times of ‘going solid’, patients are moved to a lower level of care to 
create room for those with a greater need for the resources of a critical care unit. 
While the phenomena of ‘going solid’ is well recognised in acute hospital 
environments (Cook & Rasmussen 2005) nurses expressed the view that existing 
                                                 
22 The nurse dose is a nursing measure that comprises three equal elements: ‘the dose (number of 
nurses or amount of care by nurses), nurse (education, expertise, and experience), and host response 
(organizational or patient receptiveness)’ (Brooten & Youngblut 2006, p. 94). 
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models of nursing care delivery in Australian hospitals may not adequately protect 
critical care patients at these times. Participants also conveyed a sense that the real 
focus of many acute hospitals is efficiency and through-put rather than the provision 
of patient centred, compassionate and safe care, a concern also raised by Benner, 
Hughes and Sutphen (2008). Important considerations raised by these views include 
the planning of nursing care and implementation of care models that minimise 
discontinuity and support patient safety outcomes. 
The role of the nursing safety net and nursing surveillance in managing gaps and 
creating safety suggests that the organisation and delivery of nursing services (i.e. 
model of care) is an important consideration. While methods of patient allocation can 
promote continuity and surveillance by ‘enhancing the accumulation of knowledge 
about a patient’ (Kutney-Lee, Lake & Aiken 2009, p. 220), participants in the current 
study suggested that models of care may also inadvertently contribute to 
discontinuity and fragmentation in patient care. Contemporary models, described in 
the context of this study, were characterised by a task oriented approach to patient 
care and the daily turnover of the shift co-ordinator or nurse in charge such that the 
person in this vital leadership role lacked knowledge of the patients and the strengths 
and weaknesses of the nurses. Consequently the critical task of matching the needs of 
the patient to the skill level of the nurse (Duffield et al. 2010) was difficult and 
fraught with risk. Participants revealed that in critical care settings, shift coordinators 
responded to the lack of experienced, specialty qualified and permanent staff by 
placing inexperienced nurses next to an experienced colleague and reassigning 
patients throughout the shift as their care requirements changed. In line with the 
work of Cook, Render and Woods (2000), participants revealed that these measures 
created gaps because patients were handed over mid-shift placing experienced nurses 
in a position of needing to divide their attention between critically ill patients.  
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(i) Australian research 
Research in Australian hospital settings has identified high variability in the models 
of nursing care adopted by ward nurses with patient allocation and team nursing23 
being the most common (Duffield et al. 2010). Likewise, participants in the current 
study suggested that the model adopted on a daily or shift basis was in line with 
pragmatic considerations such as patient needs, the skill mix of the nursing staff, and 
characteristics of the ward environment.  
Nursing leadership and models of nursing care delivery have been the subject of 
recommendations by a Special Commission of Inquiry into acute care services in the 
state of New South Wales (Garling 2008). The Commission identified a lack of 
nursing leadership in relation to the safety and quality of patient care and 
enforcement of standards in unit and ward settings, urging Nurse Unit Managers to 
take a greater role in the supervision of patient care. Of note, an examination of the 
roles and educational levels of Nurse Unit Managers revealed that over 40 percent 
had not undertaken any further education beyond their direct entry level qualification 
(NSW Health 2009). 
(ii) Models to improve patient safety 
The organisation of nursing care and effective nursing leadership at a ward or unit 
level are important considerations in efforts to improve patient safety (Tregunno et 
al. 2009). Participants in the current study proposed that surveillance and patient 
safety might be enhanced through access to a clinical nursing support service, 
especially during after hour periods. An example of such a service is the Early Nurse 
Intervention Team (ENIT), a nurse-led team that provides clinical advice and support 
to ward nurses (Daly et al. 2007). Based on the concept of a rapid rescue or medical 
                                                 
23 (i) Patient allocation or total patient care where a registered nurse assumes responsibility for the full 
care of a group of patients. (ii) Team nursing where a team, under the direction of a ‘team leader’ 
provides care to a large group of patients. Members of the team may be assigned specific patient care 
tasks (i.e. medications, dressings, observations, showers) and supervision is provided to lesser-
qualified or inexperienced staff. The team leader plays a role in the coordination of resources, 
personnel and patient care. 
  
 
Chapter 5. Discussion of Findings 
170 
 
emergency team, the ENIT uses regular ward rounds to identify those patients ‘at the 
edge of instability’ and pre-empt further deterioration (Daly et al. 2007, p. 18).  
Concerns about the quality and safety of patient care at the unit level have lead to 
the development of alternative models of nursing care delivery such as the ‘12-Bed 
Hospital’ (Kimball et al. 2007) and ‘Primary Care Team’ (PCT) (Batcheller et al. 
2004; Kimball et al. 2007) and the creation of new roles such as ‘The Clinical Nurse 
Leader: Point-of-Care Safety Clinician’ (Reid & Dennison 2011). The ‘12-Bed 
Hospital’ involves the creation of many small hospitals, each of 12-16 beds, within 
the larger hospital (Kimball et al. 2007). A registered nurse performs the key role of 
patient care facilitator or ‘clinical CEO’ for each unit with responsibility for directing 
and supervising the care of individual patients; mentoring junior staff; and 
communicating with the interdisciplinary team, patients and families.  
In the ‘Primary Care Team’ model the experienced registered nurse performs a 
‘primary oversight role’ as team leader, care manager and mentor (Batcheller et al. 
2004; Kimball et al. 2007). Designed for a variety of clinical settings, the key 
principles underpinning this model included the premise that every patient deserves 
an experienced registered nurse and every novice nurse deserves mentoring from an 
experienced registered nurse. This model has sought to maximise the contribution of 
the experienced registered nurse to patient care. This model and others identified in 
this discussion may have application in Australian health care settings given the 
important role of knowledge and experience in the management of gaps. This is a 
fruitful area for further research and inquiry.  
5.5.5 Effective, constant and assertive communication 
Efforts to improve patient safety have focused on safety culture (Page 2004) and the 
shared values, attitudes, beliefs and competencies that underpin an organisation’s 
approach to safety management (Sammer et al. 2010). It is suggested that assertive 
communication and the ability to speak up are critical components of such a culture 
(Clarke, Lerner & Marella 2007; Sammer et al. 2010). Assertive behaviour has been 
defined as ‘a person giving expression to his/her rights, thoughts and feelings without 
denying the rights of others’ (Timmins & McCabe 2005, p. 62). Participants in the 
current study revealed that effective, constant, and assertive communication was 
critical to managing gaps. They highlighted the importance of being willing to 
question and challenge; take a firm stance; speak up and say no when it was unsafe 
to proceed. Indeed, the study captured instances where assertive communication on 
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the part of nurses prevented bad things from happening and increased system 
resilience. An example of this can be found in a case described in Chapter Four (page 
114) of this thesis where a junior doctor wanted to sedate an agitated patient during a 
CT scan. On this occasion the nurse ‘put her foot down’ and insisted they return to 
the ED. She was acutely aware that the doctor was inexperienced in intubation and 
that the patient’s life would be in danger should he lose his airway without the back-
up and resources of the ED. The patient safety literature contains similar cases where 
assertive communication was key to forestalling patient harm (Carthey et al. cited in 
Reason 2008; Weinstock 2007).  
Nonetheless, participants acknowledged that the ability to speak up and ‘stick to 
their guns’ came with knowledge and experience and often met with resistance from 
colleagues. Perioperative participants, in particular, expressed concern about being in 
conflict with colleagues with whom they worked closely each day. This view is 
supported by research which suggests that while many nurses have the necessary 
skills for assertive communication they prefer to avoid conflict with colleagues in the 
workplace (Timmins & McCabe 2005). Research on team communication in the 
operating room has revealed that a wide range of communication strategies (i.e. 
questions, commands, stories and non-verbal signs) are used by perioperative team 
members (Lingard et al. 2002). The authors characterised these as a ‘complicated 
“dance” that maintains relationships and minimises tension while still achieving 
goals’ (Lingard et al. 2002, p. 235). 
Further research and inquiry might focus on how to build the capacity of 
younger and less experienced staff and make it easier for them to be assertive. 
(a) Teamwork 
Cross monitoring of performance has been identified as an important attribute of 
effective teams that enhances patient safety (Baker, DP et al. 2003; Baker, DP, Day 
& Salas 2006; Manser 2009; Xyrichis & Ream 2008). On this point, Benner and 
colleagues (2002) write that:  
Errors are often the result of a chain of events that might have been 
interrupted at many different points if team members shared a culture of 
speaking up, asking questions and cross monitoring each other’s 
performance (p. 282).    
The current study captured many cases where cross monitoring of nurses’ 
performance, especially by experienced nurses, was a key factor in the identification 
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and bridging of gaps such as unrecognised clinical deterioration. Furthermore, the 
ability of nurses to pull together, count on each other, and approach the care of the 
patient as a team was crucial to getting the work done and ensuring that patient’s 
received adequate care. Kalisch and Lee (2010) note that interdisciplinary teamwork 
as opposed to nursing teamwork has been the primary focus of the patient safety 
literature. They argue, however, that nursing teamwork is equally important given 
the acute, unpredictable and rapidly changing nature of many health care 
environments. A study undertaken by Kalisch and Lee (2010) revealed that nursing 
teamwork was an important determinant of omitted nursing care in hospital settings. 
Higher scores for measures of team function (i.e. trust, team orientation, leadership, 
and shared mental models) were associated with less omitted care.  
Maintaining constant communication with medical staff and other members of 
the interdisciplinary team was found to be an important aspect of teamwork in the 
current study that enhanced vigilance and prevented gaps in patient care. Similarly, 
research has indicated that vigilance resides not only in individuals but also in teams 
and that communication between team members creates partnerships that enhance 
vigilance (Kooken 2008). Nonetheless, it is argued that ‘planned’ and ‘collective’ 
vigilance whereby  ‘clinicians proactively mitigate potentially harmful errors by 
watching over or consulting colleagues’ is both a ‘safety net’ and ‘safety threat’ 
(Jeffs 2010; Jeffs et al. 2012, p. 124). Jeffs and colleagues (2012) contend that this 
form of vigilance may discourage professional accountability, creating a situation 
whereby health care providers come to rely on colleagues to identify and correct their 
errors. The current study found that gaps in medication safety were anticipated, 
detected and bridged by nurses proactively checking medication charts, educating 
doctors in how to write medication orders, and being physically present while orders 
were written. These actions created safety by preventing medication errors and, in 
line with the work of Jeffs and colleagues (2012), might be characterised as 
examples of planned, collective vigilance. 
(b) Storytelling  
In health care contexts, stories and storytelling can serve as substitutes for trial and 
error learning and enhance reliable performance (Weick 1987). Storytelling is a 
means by which experienced practitioners may share their experiences of errors and 
safety failure. As Weick (1987) explains:  
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A system that values stories and storytelling is potentially more reliable 
because people know more about their system, know more of the 
potential errors that might occur, and they are more confident that they 
can handle those errors that do occur because they know that other people 
have already handled similar errors (p. 113).  
Storytelling has been incorporated into foresight training programs (discussed in 
Section 5.5.1) in the form of short descriptions of actual patient safety incidents 
(Reason 2004; 2008). In the current study, nurses that were effective in managing 
gaps were not only skilful ‘story tellers’ but were adept in eliciting patient stories. 
Furthermore, storytelling was a method used by expert nurses to inform others of 
their experiences of gaps and the things that went wrong or were overlooked. For 
example, one nurse used a story of ‘gaps all over the place’ as a teaching tool to 
inform others of the risk associated with gaps.  
The ability to incorporate salient information about the patient and physiological 
data into a ‘well crafted story’ has been found to reduce the risk of communication 
failure during clinical handover (Sharit et al. 2005; Sharit, Thevenin & Barach 2008). 
In the context of nursing handover, participants in the current study revealed that a 
focussed presentation of the most relevant patient data (a well crafted story) was vital 
to preventing gaps and forestalling harm. The inclusion of pertinent information 
equipped the oncoming nurse to anticipate and respond to patient problems (e.g. 
what to do if a patient with an organ level wound and no sternum suffers a cardiac 
arrest?). 
(c) Frames and reframing 
‘Reframing’ was a strategy used by ED nurses to resolve conflict and achieve a 
change of course when they perceived that the discharge of a patient threatened the 
person’s safety. Frames are mental structures that influence how people see the 
world, the decisions they make and the way they act (Lakoff 2004). They are 
cognitive shortcuts that enable people to make sense of and organise complex 
information (Kaufman, Elliott & Shmueli 2003). Frames cannot be seen or heard but 
are part of the ‘cognitive unconscious’ that informs thinking and what people regard 
as common-sense (Lakoff 2004). An individual’s beliefs, values, experiences, 
expectations and needs determine how they frame people, events and processes and 
determine what is important (Lewicki, Barry & Saunders 2010). Lakoff (2004) writes 
that frames are known through language and that hearing a word triggers its 
associated frames in the brain. 
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Language is the means by which reframing occurs (Lakoff 2004). Participants 
indicated that while the language of the medical staff focussed on the notions of 
clinical stability, medical admission criteria and the availability of hospital beds, 
nurses used a different language to reframe the discharge as a threat to the patient’s 
safety. This was achieved by posing questions such as: ‘Is this patient going to be 
safe at home? What if this was your mother?’ Reframing changes the way people 
view a situation and what counts as common sense (Lakoff 2004). The goals of 
frame analysis and reframing processes include: 
x To clarify the perception of the issues in dispute and promote the productive 
exchange of information.  
x To sharpen the parties' understanding of their interests and how the modes of action 
they have chosen serve those interests. 
x To identify those subjects which the involved parties view differently. 
x To identify differences which cannot be bridged and seek ways to address them 
(Kaufman, Elliott & Shmueli 2003).  
5.6 The gaps identified by nurses 
The discussion of this study’s key findings will now focus on the gaps identified by 
participants. In line with the work of Cook, Render and Woods (2000), gaps were 
described as vulnerabilities, points in the patient’s journey where an opportunity had 
been created for something to go ‘wrong’ in the form of an error or adverse event. 
Participants revealed that when gaps were present, patient care was disjointed and 
lacking organisation such that the normal, expected or planned sequence of events 
was delayed, disrupted or did not occur as it should.  
One of the objectives of this study was to determine whether the gaps identified 
by participants were (i) familiar to nurses, (ii) new and unfamiliar to nurses, and (iii) 
familiar to nurses but their characteristics had changed. Nurses were familiar with 
most of the gaps identified in the current study. That is to say nurses had knowledge 
or direct experience of these gaps. Nonetheless, participants identified three new, 
unfamiliar and rare gaps of which nurses had no prior knowledge or experience. 
Attention will now turn to a discussion of these gaps.  
5.7 Gaps that were new and unfamiliar to nurses 
The only gaps that were new and unfamiliar to nurses involved technology or 
equipment, namely, a life support machine that reached the end of its battery life and 
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shut down as it was plugged into the power supply; a faulty connection between the 
oxygen hose of a ventilator and the boom of the oxygen supply; and, a life support 
machine that fell to the floor. Each of these new and unfamiliar gaps occurred in 
critical care settings, was unanticipated, and created the potential for catastrophic 
harm. In two cases, serious patient harm was forestalled, while in the third the patient 
died. The nature of these gaps supports the notion that the introduction of technology  
and other measures to improve patient safety creates the potential for new, 
unintended and unforeseen gaps and forms of failure (Jeffs et al. 2012; Nemeth et al. 
2008; Patterson et al. in press; Westbrook et al. 2013).  
5.8 Gaps that were familiar but their characteristics had changed 
The study also sought to identify gaps that were familiar to nurses but their 
characteristics had changed. Careful examination of the data failed to identify any 
gaps with these attributes. However, the study found that nurses used the same 
processes to manage gaps irrespective of their characteristics (familiar, new and 
unfamiliar).   
5.9 Gaps that were familiar to nurses 
Participants identified a number of gaps that were familiar to nurses, namely, failure 
to recognise and respond to the deteriorating patient; inattention to the ‘simple 
things’; the practice of taking ‘short cuts’; failure to communicate the information 
required to plan and deliver care safely; and lapses in critical thinking. It is to 
discussing these gaps that the remainder of this chapter will now turn. 
5.9.1 Failure to recognise and respond to a deteriorating patient 
Participants in the current study suggested that nurses were generally diligent about 
observing patients and documenting their observations. Nonetheless, they described 
numerous occasions where clinical deterioration was overlooked, not only in general 
medical and surgical wards but also in emergency and critical care settings where 
systems are usually in place to care for patients with acute and unpredictable needs 
(i.e. skilled clinicians, medical back-up, haemodynamic monitoring, and lower nurse 
to patient ratios). Failure to recognise and respond to clinical deterioration is a 
significant patient safety problem that has been the subject of intense research 
(Clarke & Aiken 2003; Needleman & Buerhaus 2007; Silber et al. 2007). Studies 
have revealed that it is a multifaceted problem, characterised by the complex 
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interplay between numerous patient and system factors (Hravnak et al. 2011; 
Mackintosh & Sandall 2008; National Patient Safety Agency 2007). The field of 
cognitive neurosciences provides useful insights into human cognition that may be 
helpful in understanding the cases identified in the current study. It is to a 
consideration of these factors, namely, inattentional blindness and confirmation bias, 
that the discussion will now turn.  
(a) Inattentional blindness  
Participants revealed that even when the documentation of patient observations was 
thorough and complete, clinical deterioration was overlooked by experienced nurses 
as well as other health care providers. A possible explanation for this is the 
phenomenon of ‘inattentional blindness’, the failure to see things that are in plain 
sight but unexpected (Chabris & Simons 2010; Mack & Rock 1998). The famous, 
‘gorilla in the midst’ 24  psychology experiment, demonstrates the limits of our 
attention and cognitive abilities (Chabris & Simons 2010). This and other studies 
confirm that human persons may fail to notice salient but unexpected events when 
their attention is focussed on a task. The phenomenon of inattentional blindness 
reveals that looking and seeing are not the same (Mack 2003). In the absence of 
attention, looking at something is no guarantee that it will be seen.  
Inattentional blindness may explain the failure of a nurse to recognise that a 
patient’s steadily decreasing blood pressure over the course of an eight hour shift was 
indicative of clinical deterioration. In focussing attention on the task (i.e. the care of 
a patient with acute and complex needs in a rapidly changing, highly unpredictable 
environment), it seems the nurse failed to ‘see’ the patient’s clinical deterioration. 
This case also highlights the challenge of maintaining a state of watchfulness while 
repeatedly performing a task (i.e. the taking and recording of patient observations) 
over long periods, as noted by Chabris and Simons (2010). Of note, this case and 
                                                 
24 The ‘gorilla’ experiment is a test for inattentional blindness. Participants watch a short video in 
which six people (three in white shirts and three in black shirts) pass basketballs to each other. 
Participants keep a silent count of the number of passes made by the people in white shirts. During the 
video a gorilla strolls into the middle of the action, faces the camera and thumps its chest, and then 
leaves, spending nine seconds on screen. As many as half of the people that watch the video and count 
the passes fail to notice the gorilla, as though it is invisible (Retrieved 13 March 2013 from, 
http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/gorilla). 
 
Chapter 5. Discussion of Findings 
177 
 
others from the current study occurred during the night shift. It is suggested that 
health care providers ‘see’ the patient with a higher level of alertness during the day 
and the greater number of ‘eyes’ (i.e. clinical and administrative staff) and the 
availability of support staff may contribute to higher levels of vigilance during day 
time periods (Hravnak et al. 2011).  
Another case from the current study also raises the possibility of inattentional 
blindness. On this occasion a health care professional failed to notice a misplaced 
endotracheal tube on a patient’s chest x-ray. In focussing attention on the patient’s 
lung function and pulmonary oedema, it would appear this person failed to ‘see’ the 
unexpected, the misplaced endotracheal tube, even though it was in plain sight. On 
this occasion, another member of the team identified that the tube was in the wrong 
position and acted to remedy the situation.  
(b) Confirmation bias 
Confirmation bias, an error of cognition, has been identified as a significant threat to 
patient safety and cause of preventable harm, especially in emergency settings where 
it creates the potential for diagnostic error (Croskerry 2003; Pines 2006). It involves 
the tendency of humans to minimise cognitive dissonance (Johnstone 2007). 
Confirmation bias occurs: 
when people selectively focus upon evidence that supports their beliefs or 
what they want, or believe to be true, while ignoring evidence that serves 
to disconfirm those ideas (Pines 2006, p. 91). 
Cases where the signs of clinical deterioration were overlooked by a series of 
nurses and doctors over a period of time were noted in the findings of this study and 
raise the possibility that they confirmed each other’s beliefs that the patient was 
stable and nothing was untoward. In a further case, an ED triage nurse created the 
potential for diagnostic error when she seemingly confirmed the belief of the 
ambulance personnel that the patient had a soft tissue injury not a broken leg. The 
patient, in pain and unable to walk, was triaged to the waiting room for several hours 
until the delay in care was identified and acted upon by another ED nurse. This nurse 
assessed the patient and recognised immediately that something was ‘wrong’.  
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5.9.2 Communication, clinical handover and teamwork 
Numerous studies in the patient safety literature have revealed that gaps in the 
interrelated processes of communication, clinical handover and teamwork are a 
significant contributor to preventable patient harm (El-Dawlatly et al. 2004; 
Greenberg et al. 2007; Lingard et al. 2004; Pronovost, Thompson, Holzmueller et al. 
2006; Riesenberg, Leitzsch & Cunningham 2010; Suresh et al. 2004; Symons et al. 
2012; Wiegmann et al. 2007; Wilson et al. 1995). Participants in the current study 
revealed that deficiencies in clinical handover and the communication of information 
created gaps and the potential for patient harm. An example of this was the 
progressive loss of information as the patient’s story was communicated between 
health care providers. Significantly, a study of clinical handover by Pothier and 
colleagues (2005) found that all information was lost after three cycles of verbal 
handover without supporting documentation or notes. This progressive loss of 
information might be characterised as ‘information funnelling’, the omission, 
oversight or failure to remember information (Anthony & Preuss 2002). Anthony and 
Preuss (2002) contend that information funnelling contributes to inadequate nursing 
surveillance because nurses are not equipped with the information required to plan 
and deliver care safely.  
 Participants in the current study also revealed that interpersonal tensions in the 
form of demeaning and humiliating behaviour contributed to gaps in patient care. 
When nurses were humiliated by a medical colleague, for example, they were 
reluctant to volunteer information that might be important to the patient’s care and a 
chain of valuable information was potentially lost. Intimidating communication is 
known to negatively influence the ability and willingness of nurses to recover errors 
(Henneman, EA et al. 2010) and question medication orders (Smetzer & Cohen 
2005). Furthermore, some of the behaviours described by participants suggest the 
presence of hierarchical structures rather than collaborative teams based on mutual 
respect and trust (Manser 2009). Lucian Leape (2009), a pioneer of the patient safety 
movement, describes the devastating impact of degrading behaviour on patient safety 
and the clinicians involved: 
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there is no room for autocratic, demeaning, humiliating behaviour to 
nurses, residents, students, anyone. It never was right, but now we know 
how devastating it can be, how it stifles creativity and saps the joy from 
everyday life, how it leads to mistakes and patient harm as nurses, 
residents, and students shy away from warning the abusive physician of 
an error in the making, avoid communication with those who put them 
down, are inhibited in their thinking about the patient’s welfare as they 
try to protect their own ego and self-image from attack (p. 396). 
5.9.3 Lack of higher order thinking 
Research indicates that nurses understand the concept of critical thinking (Borglin & 
Fagerström 2012) and have the requisite theoretical knowledge. But even so they 
have difficulty applying this requisite theoretical knowledge in clinical situations (del 
Bueno 2005; Cooper et al. 2010). Ebright (2003) contends that the application of 
higher order thinking skills to intricate aspects of patient care is constrained by the 
patterns of complexity (e.g. poorly functioning supply systems, interruptions, and 
shortcomings in communication) that nurses encounter in hospital contexts. 
Similarly, Cook and Woods (1994) note that resource limitations and pressures to 
meet production targets also influence the cognitive abilities of health care providers.  
A lack of higher order thinking by nurses contributed to gaps in care in this 
study. Many participants described a robotic approach to patient care where nurses 
were on ‘autopilot’, focussed on the physical doing without thought to what the 
patient’s needs were or the impact of their actions. They revealed that a lack of 
reflection and higher order thinking were related to knowledge and skill gaps and 
nurses feeling rushed in their daily work. In the absence of critical thinking, nursing 
practice was task oriented and lacking in expertise and reflection. Many participants 
in this study worked in rapidly changing, very acute and highly unpredictable 
environments (e.g. critical care, emergency and perioperative). The nature of these 
settings and the prospect of further sources of complexity, as described by Ebright 
(2003), may have diminished the cognitive resources of nurses and their capacity for 
higher order thinking.  
5.9.4 Cutting corners, taking short cuts 
The term to ‘cut corners’ has been defined as ‘to take the shortest or easiest way at 
the expense of high standards’ (Collins Dictionary of the English Language 2010). 
The theme of ‘cutting corners’ emerged during one of the first participant interviews 
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and, in keeping with the emergent nature of this inquiry, was explored in subsequent 
interviews. The phenomenon of short cuts was, however, not the primary focus of the 
current study, nor did the study specifically explore how nurses responded to 
shortcuts. Nonetheless, the data captured in the current study are illustrative and thus 
worthy of discussion. 
Participants in the current study suggested that taking shortcuts was a common 
practice where nurses failed to follow established protocols and processes, often to 
save time and effort. They revealed that shortcuts were taken in key areas such as 
patient assessment, essential nursing care and medication administration. Taking 
shortcuts encompassed (i) the partial or complete omission of essential patient care 
(i.e. not doing things completely or at all), (ii) delays in providing care, and (iii) the 
failure to do things correctly. The practice of cutting corners created gaps that 
contributed to preventable adverse events such as pressure ulcers and infections. 
Participants also revealed that novice nurses learnt the shortcuts of their senior 
colleagues. Furthermore, they were virtually unanimous in their view that the 
practice of taking shortcuts undermined patient safety. Nonetheless, they 
acknowledged that nurses generally did not believe they were jeopardising patient 
safety by taking shortcuts. In advancing a discussion of the phenomenon of short 
cuts, consideration will be given to the following four themes: (i) competing goals, 
trade-offs and workarounds; (ii) ‘tasks undone’, ‘missed nursing care’, ‘care left 
undone’ and ‘rationing of nursing care’; (iii) ‘at risk’ behaviour and violations; and 
(iv) the normalisation of deviance. 
(a) Competing goals, trade-offs and workarounds 
The ‘New Look’ approach to safety holds that competing goals are an inevitable 
feature of complex systems (Woods et al. 1994; Cook, Woods & Render 2000). It is 
recognised that much of the work of front line clinicians, such as nurses, involves 
making trade-offs, choosing between competing patient, organisational and personal 
goals (Ebright et al. 2006; 2003). Participants in the current study revealed that 
essential care (i.e. turning and repositioning) and the maintenance of physiological 
stability can be competing goals in critically ill patients. Nurses expressed the view 
that skin complications could be managed later, if and when, the patient survived. In 
this context, the omission of essential care might thus be characterised as a trade-off 
rather than a short cut.  
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Workarounds have been defined as behaviours that ‘circumvent or temporarily 
“fix” an evident or perceived workflow hindrance in order to meet a goal or to 
achieve it more readily’ (Debono et al. 2013). They are a means of managing 
complexity that often involve some form of deviation from established organisational 
processes and procedures. Health care professional have been described as ‘masters’ 
of workarounds (Morath & Turnball 2005, p. 52), although Debono and colleagues 
(2013) note that nursing research of this concept has been slow to evolve. While 
workarounds contribute to the smooth and efficient operation of complex systems, 
they may also undermine safety. For example, the investigation of a fatal intrathecal 
dose of the drug vincristine revealed that gaps created by workarounds were a 
contributing factor in this catastrophic outcome (see Toft 2001).  
Participants in the current study described variations in established processes for 
checking and documenting medication administration. These examples might be 
characterised as workarounds. In line with a recept conceptualisation by Debono and 
colleagues (2013), participants revealed that nurses omitted steps in the process 
because this represented the only way to ‘get things done’ and achieve the goal of 
timely medication administration. Furthermore, nurses expressed concern that getting 
behind created gaps in patient care. ‘Not getting behind’, ‘staying on time’ and 
‘immediately addressing issues’ have been identified as key attributes of vigilant 
nurses (Kooken 2008, p. 173).    
(b) ‘Tasks undone’, ‘missed nursing care’, ‘care left undone’, ‘rationing of 
nursing care’ 
Participants in the current study suggested that nurses took short cuts not in the 
highly technical and complex aspects of patient care but in patient assessment and 
the provision of essential care (i.e. mouth care, repositioning and sitting patients out 
of bed, maintaining and changing dressings). Various studies of nursing care quality 
have suggested that the omission of essential nursing care is widespread. The driver 
of this research has been the unexplained association between levels of registered 
nurse staffing and adverse patient outcomes (Aiken et al. 2002; Estabrooks et al. 
2005; Needleman et al. 2002). The omitted areas of care identified in these studies 
have been conceptualised as ‘tasks undone’ (Sochalski 2004), ‘missed nursing care’ 
(Kalisch 2006; Kalisch & Williams 2009; Kalisch, Landstrom & Williams 2009; 
Kalisch, Landstrom & Hinshaw 2009; Kalisch et al. 2011), ‘care left undone’ (Ball et 
al. 2013) and ‘rationing of nursing care’ (Schubert et al. 2008). Themes common to 
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these studies include the omission or delay of ambulation, repositioning, feedings, 
patient teaching, discharge planning, emotional support, hygiene, documentation of 
fluid intake and output. Reasons for omitted or delayed care include nursing 
workload, the availability of material resources and deficiencies in communication 
and teamwork. Of concern, the study by Schubert and colleagues (2008) revealed 
that while implicit rationing of nursing care (the failure to provide nursing care 
because of inadequate time, staffing or skill mix) was uncommon, it was a significant 
predictor of various adverse outcomes including patient satisfaction, nurse reported 
medication errors, patient falls, nosocomial infection, pressure ulcers and critical 
incidents.   
Worthy of note, is the characterisation of missed nursing care as an error of 
omission (Kalisch, Landstrom & Williams 2009), the failure to act and provide care. 
Reason’s (1990; 1995) widely accepted model of human error would appear, 
however, to refute this conceptualisation. According to Reason (1990; 1995), errors 
involve execution or performance failures (i.e. slips, lapses, trips or fumbles) where 
the plan selected for a particular goal is adequate but its execution does not proceed 
as intended, or mistakes, the selection of the incorrect plan for a particular goal. 
Commonly, errors result from a lack of information. The basis for the phenomenon 
of ‘missed nursing care’ does not consistently point to the presence of informational 
problems (inattention, inadequate knowledge or forgetting) and thus errors, as 
defined by Reason (1990; 1995). Rather, missed nursing care encompasses the 
omission of essential nursing care of which all nurses have knowledge.  
(c) ‘At risk’ behaviours or violations 
In the current study, the omission of essential care might also be considered a 
‘violation’, a deliberate deviation from safe operating practices, procedures, 
standards, or rules (Amalberti et al. 2006; Reason 1995). Reason (1995, p. 82) 
explains that violations occur in a social context and ‘are more generally associated 
with motivational problems (that is, low morale, poor supervisory example, 
perceived lack of concern, the failure to reward compliance and sanction non-
compliance)’. The example of perioperative nurses taking shortcuts to avoid public 
humiliation at the hands of their senior medical colleagues, might be considered an 
example of a ‘necessary’ or ‘situational’ violation where taking a shortcut seemed 
‘the only path available to getting the job done' (Reason 1995, p. 82).  
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The practice of nurses dabbing a tissue in the top of a bottle of Chlorhexidine 
and using it to clean a CVC whenever the opportunity presented, and, in spite of 
education on best practice might be characterised as an example of ‘reckless 
behaviour’, defined by Marx (2001, p. 5) as the ‘conscious disregard of a visible, 
significant risk’.  
(d) The normalisation of deviance 
The normalisation of deviance has been defined as an ‘incremental process’ that 
involves: 
 ‘…the gradual erosion of normal procedures that would never be 
tolerated if proposed in 1 single, abrupt leap. Instead, small incremental 
deviations are observed and tolerated. Lacking an accident, they become 
‘normalised’ (Prielipp et al. 2010, p. 284).  
In the aerospace industry, the normalisation of deviance has been a contributing 
factor in the catastrophic failure of two spacecraft (Westgard & Westgard 2009). 
Over time, flaws in the design of the spacecraft became ‘normalised’ (i.e. considered 
routine and acceptable) and were no longer considered a safety threat. Similarly, it 
has been argued that shortcuts and violations (i.e. deviations from accepted and 
standard practice) in the delivery of health care may, over time, become acceptable to 
the point that they become a ‘new standard of care’ (Amalberti et al. 2006; Banja 
2010; Jeffs et al. 2009). It is posited that poor practice in the nursing management of 
central venous catheters (see page 133 of this thesis), for example, may have become 
‘normalised’ to the point where it was considered ‘acceptable’ and ‘standard’ 
practice. Nonetheless, it might also be argued that this and other shortcuts captured in 
the current study (i.e. a case of candida sepsis from contamination of a CVC site with 
saliva, a stage three pressure area under a dressing on the back of the head) are 
examples of poor, sub-standard or incompetent nursing practice. Participants in the 
current study revealed that ‘nurses will get away with what they can’ and that 
leadership is crucial in enforcing standards of nursing care. Leape (2009) and Banja 
(2010) contend that effective leadership is vital in setting, maintaining and modelling 
safe practice; identifying and eradicating deviant practices and behaviours, even in 
the absence of apparent harm; and educating individuals about the dangerous 
consequences. 
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(e) Monitoring the gap between standard operating procedures and actual practice 
It has been argued that deviations from safe operating practices, procedures, and 
standards are a complex, multifaceted phenomena and a feature of all organisations, 
even those with excellent safety records (Amalberti et al. 2006). The smooth and 
successful functioning of complex systems is dependent upon the creativity, 
flexibility and judgement of humans in the face of production pressures, resource 
constraints, gaps, hazards and competing goals (Cook & Woods 1994; Dekker et al. 
2008; Nemeth et al. 2008; Woods & Hollnagel 2006). Nonetheless, achieving a 
balance between organisational efficiency and safety requires close examination of 
actual practice (Amalberti et al. 2006). An important feature of resilient systems is 
the attention given to continuously monitoring the gap between standard operating 
procedures and actual practice, and working to reduce this gap (Patterson et al. in 
press).  
The discussion of the phenomenon of short cuts, as described in the current 
study, has considered a number of relevant themes from the patient safety literature. 
Further research and inquiry is required to deepen understanding of this practice and 
its impact on patient safety. 
5.10 Education in patient safety and human error management 
Almost a third (N=24) of participants in the current study revealed they had not 
undertaken any formal instruction in the principles and theory of patient safety and 
human error management. Furthermore, the education and training of others were 
limited to hospital based in-services on specific patient safety issues (i.e. the 
deteriorating patient, surgical safety checklist, falls prevention) and risk management 
software programs (i.e. clinical incident management systems, RiskMan). While 
much attention in health care has been directed at systems improvement, one of the 
most important investments that can be made is in the education and training of 
people (Johnstone & Kanitsaki 2007), including nurses, who, as this study has found, 
play a key role in creating safety. 
Education in patient safety and human error management is widely recognised as 
being critical to the achievement of patient safety outcomes (Australian Council for 
Safety and Quality in Health Care 2005; Johnstone & Kanitsaki 2007; Kohn, 
Corrigan & Donaldson, M 2000; Taylor-Adams, Brodie & Vincent 2008). An 
Australian study of new graduate nurses revealed that a lack of information on the 
principles and processes of clinical risk management was an impediment to their 
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management of risk (Johnstone & Kanitsaki 2006a). Furthermore, it has been argued 
that the skills and behaviours that underpin safe clinical practice should be made 
‘explicit’ and ‘formally taught’ rather than be regarded as intuitive and derived from 
experience (Taylor-Adams, Brodie & Vincent 2008, p. 141).  
In Australia, attention has been given to the development of a National Patient 
Safety Education Framework (Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health 
Care 2005). This framework identifies the knowledge, skills, behaviours and 
attitudes central to the delivery of quality and safe care. Nonetheless, an important 
and largely unanswered question relates to how patient safety and clinical risk 
management courses can be most effectively designed and delivered for all nursing 
programs (i.e. undergraduate, post-registration, post-graduate and professional 
development). On this point, Johnstone and Kanitsaki (2007) contend that research is 
urgently needed to identify appropriate and effective models of patient safety and 
clinical risk management education.  
A key inference to be drawn from this study is that further research is needed to 
identify the range of patient safety education programmes available to registered 
nurses employed in hospital contexts throughout Australia. 
5.11 The emotionality associated with adverse events 
Participants provided first and second hand accounts of nurses’ deeply emotional 
experiences when patients were harmed by preventable adverse events. The range of 
emotions identified in these accounts included feeling ‘physically ill’, ‘bad’, 
‘horrified’, ‘scared’, ‘stressed’, ‘tense’, ‘disappointed’, ‘powerless’, ‘angry’, 
‘frustrated’, and ‘sorry’. Furthermore, participants acknowledged the ability of 
nurses to recall these events in vivid detail, in spite of the passage of time, describing 
them as tragic and memorable. 
Wu (2000) coined the phrase ‘the second victim’ to describe the emotional 
trauma experienced by health care providers when a patient is seriously harmed by 
health care. These events have been described as ‘career-altering’, with the potential 
to exact a ‘heavy personal toll’ (Scott et al. 2011, p. 323). The prevalence of second 
victims after an adverse events has been estimated at between ten and 43 percent 
(Seys et al. 2013). Furthermore, research has suggested that particular adverse events 
(i.e. those involving children, preventable harm, ‘unexpected patient demise’ and 
‘first death under their watch’) carry an increased risk of emotional distress (Scott et 
al. 2011, p. 326). The range of emotions identified in the current study and the ability 
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to recall these events in vivid detail concur with studies of the second victim 
experience (Crigger & Meek 2007; Rassin, Kanti & Silner 2005; Scott et al. 2009; 
Todesco, Rasic & Capstick 2010; White et al. 2008; Wolf et al. 2000). Participants in 
the current study described cases where the emotional impact of adverse events was 
such that nurses left the profession altogether. Others revealed having very 
unpleasant memories and feelings of sadness for some months. 
There is now widespread recognition that supporting health care providers when 
they are emotionally distressed is the ‘right’ thing to do in a moral sense and key to 
reducing risk and improving patient safety outcomes over the long term (White et al. 
2008). A study of resident doctors revealed that self perceived medical errors were 
associated with reduced quality of life, burnout and depression, which in turn 
increased the risk of future errors (West, CP et al. 2006). The availability of support 
from peers has been identified as a key factor in the success of support programs for 
distressed health care professionals (Scott et al. 2010; Van Pelt 2008). Wu (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality 2012a) argues that the health care system can ill 
afford to lose skilled clinicians, especially those who experience distress when bad 
things happen. He advocates a three pronged approach that increases awareness of 
the second victim experience, develops interventions to support distressed health care 
providers, and enhances system and individual resilience (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality 2012a).  
5.12 Near misses and emotional distress 
Nurses characterised their participation in the current study and the interview process 
as a helpful and positive experience. Of note, they revealed that the process of 
talking to a fellow nurse about instances where the management of gaps forestalled 
significant patient harm was especially cathartic and healing. Research efforts have 
tended to have as their focus the emotional experience of health care providers when 
patients are seriously harmed (Seys et al. 2013). Nonetheless, research has suggested 
that near miss events where serious harm is averted may also evoke feelings of fear 
(Engel, Rosenthal & Sutcliffe 2006). Such events have been identified as a 
significant but under-investigated source of emotional distress (Waterman et al. 
2007). An important and largely unanswered question concerns the nature of nurses’ 
emotional distress and need for support when harm is forestalled and safety is 
achieved. This is an area for further research and inquiry. 
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5.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the significance of the research findings presented in 
Chapter four of this thesis. Attention has been given to the implications of these 
findings with regard to patient safety and the role of nurses in managing gaps and 
increasing resilience. Specifically, this chapter has advanced a critical discussion of 
the skills and expertise that comprise the nursing safety net, namely, knowledge and 
experience, intuition, higher order thinking skills, nursing surveillance, 
communication and teamwork. This discussion has raised the notion that the 
management of gaps and resilience might be enhanced through efforts to promote the 
close, attentive and thorough observation and assessment of patients using a careful, 
well organised and systematic approach. Other avenues of inquiry that might be 
fruitful include the role of priming in the anticipation and management of gaps; the 
concept of ‘mental checklists’, how they are acquired and how they might be passed 
on to novice nurses; the notion of shortcuts in nursing practice; and existing models 
of nursing care delivery in Australian hospital settings and their impact on gaps and 
patient safety. In the next and final chapter of this thesis, conclusions will be drawn 
and recommendations made in regard to the ‘practical action’ needed to enhance the 
role of nurses in managing gaps and creating safety.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the final chapter of this thesis, firstly, the aims of the study are restated. Following 
this, a summary of the key findings is presented, together with a list of 
recommendations informed by these findings. Finally, a concluding statement is 
made about the role that nurses play in creating safety and how research of ‘safety 
success’ yields valuable insights into everyday nursing performance and the 
strategies nurses use to cope with complexity. 
6.2 Aims  
The purpose of this study has been to explore the relationship between patient safety 
and the management of gaps by nurses. Specifically, the study has investigated how 
nurses anticipate, identify and bridge gaps in patient care to create safety. While gaps 
are frequently cited as a contributing factor in preventable adverse events, the role 
and expertise of nurses in anticipating, detecting, and bridging gaps to prevent harm 
from reaching the patient has not been formally investigated. A key objective of this 
study was to redress this oversight.  
The main aims of this study have been to: 
x describe the patient care gaps that nurses commonly anticipate, detect and 
bridge; 
x provide a comprehensive explanation of how nurses anticipate, detect and 
bridge:  
- familiar gaps;  
- new and unfamiliar gaps; and 
- familiar gaps whose characteristics have changed. 
x describe the processes used by nurses to do so;  
x propose a practice model of gaps management by nurses; 
x posit a hypothesis of possible linkages that exist between gaps management 
and patient safety outcomes for further investigation. 
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6.3 The gaps identified by nurses 
The gaps identified in this study and found to be familiar to nurses were failure to 
recognise and respond to the deteriorating patient; inattention to the ‘simple things’; 
the practice of taking ‘short cuts’; failure to communicate the information required to 
plan and deliver care safely; and lapses in critical thinking. The study also identified 
three gaps involving technology or equipment that were new and unfamiliar to 
nurses. These gaps were unanticipated, occurred in critical care settings, and created 
the potential for catastrophic patient harm. A close examination of the data failed to 
identify any gaps that were familiar to nurses but their characteristics had changed, 
however. 
Knowledge of the gaps anticipated, detected and bridged by nurses provides a 
foundation for further inquiry and research. The phenomenon of nurses taking short 
cuts was not the primary focus of the study, nonetheless, participants indicated that it 
was widespread and a contributor to preventable adverse events. Accordingly, further 
research and inquiry is recommended to explore these ideas in greater depth by 
refining the concept of ‘short cuts’ and developing a catalogue of the short cuts taken 
by nurses. Other avenues for exploration include the rationale for nurses taking 
shortcuts and the relationship between this practice and patient safety.  
6.4 How nurses managed gaps 
The study found that the anticipation, identification and bridging (management) of 
gaps was based on nurses’ knowledge and experience of: where gaps occur; the types 
of gaps that occur; the things that happen, go wrong and are overlooked; the clinical 
environment; available equipment; and correct processes and procedures. 
Furthermore, nurses’ clinical knowledge and experience, intuition and higher order 
thinking abilities (critical thinking and clinical judgement) were key attributes that 
underpinned successful gaps management. The same processes were used by nurses 
to manage gaps, irrespective of whether the gaps were familiar or new and 
unfamiliar. Nonetheless, the anticipation, identification and bridging of gaps 
occurred in a rapid sequence such that it was not possible to assign clearly delineated 
strategies to each facet of gaps management.  
The strategies used by nurses to anticipate, identify and bridge gaps were 
surveillance, teamwork and communication. Effective nursing surveillance was 
found to be a complex process with many components: a systematic, comprehensive, 
head-to-toe and ‘hands-on’ approach to patient assessment; vigilance; observing and 
Chapter 6. Conclusion & Recommendations 
190 
 
looking; checking; and making sure. Happenstance (luck) also played a part in the 
management of gaps. Collectively, the elements of nursing expertise and strategies 
captured in this study embody what has been termed ‘the nursing safety net’, a vital 
defence against preventable adverse events in hospital settings. Through the 
anticipation, identification and bridging of gaps, the ‘nursing safety net’ enabled 
nurses to: foresee and prevent bad things from happening; prevent the evolution of 
small failures into something more serious or catastrophic; and contribute to the 
smooth and safe functioning of hospital settings (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). It is thus an 
important source of resilience in hospital contexts.  
The study has demonstrated that the investigation of how nurses anticipate, 
identify and bridge gaps generates valuable insights into successful everyday nursing 
performance and the strategies used by nurses to cope with complexity. In spite of 
the wide availability of technology in modern health care, the human person was 
invaluable in navigating and managing the gaps spawned by the complex and 
undefined nature of patient care. Specifically, the study found that safety is created 
through fundamental assessment skills, whereby nurses use their hands, eyes and ears. 
It is concluded that vigilant observation and assessment of patients using a ‘hands 
on’, head-to-toe and systematic approach protects patients from the harmful 
consequences of gaps in health care. Nonetheless, such an approach tends to be 
undervalued, poorly implemented and a method for which many nurses may be 
inadequately prepared in Australian hospital contexts. Further research and inquiry is 
recommended to explore this issue. Additional avenues of inquiry include the 
perceptions and understandings of nurses about the role and importance of patient 
assessment and observation, and identification of the system factors that augment 
and subvert vigilant patient assessment and observation. 
6.4.1 The ‘nursing safety net’ 
The important role of the ‘nursing safety net’ in creating safety and increasing 
system resilience suggest that the organisation and delivery of nursing services (i.e. 
model of care) are important considerations. Participants in this study suggested that 
existing models of nursing care delivery in Australian hospital settings contribute to 
discontinuity and fragmentation in patient care. Accordingly, it is recommended that 
further research is undertaken to examine the relationship between models of nursing 
care delivery, gaps and patient safety.  
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6.4.2 ‘Mental checklists’ 
The nursing management of gaps was found to be enhanced through the use of 
‘mental checklists’; the phenomenon of priming; mindfulness; and assertive 
communication. Individual, internal, ‘mental checklists’ informed nurses of gaps in 
their clinical environment and supported swift decision making and action in 
undefined clinical situations. Areas for further exploration include the concept of 
‘mental checklists’, how nurses devise these checklists, and how they might be 
transferred to novice nurses. The priming effect was not directly observed or 
researched thus it is only possible to describe its role in the management of gaps and 
patient safety, even so, it is worthy of further consideration. Nurses in the study 
displayed some of the key attributes of mindful practice, namely, attentive 
observation and critical curiosity. Further research and inquiry is recommended to 
explore these attributes in greater depth as well as the usefulness of mindfulness in 
coping with complexity. 
6.5 Education in patient safety and clinical risk management 
The study found that almost a third (N=24) of participants had not undertaken any 
formal instruction in the principles and theory of patient safety and clinical risk  
management while the education and training of others were limited to hospital 
based in-services on specific patient safety issues and software programs. Further 
research is recommended to identify the formal learning opportunities in patient 
safety available to Australian nurses. 
6.6 Nurses’ emotional response when harm is averted 
Nurses’ emotional response when harm is averted was not the primary focus of this 
study. However participants revealed that the process of talking to a fellow nurse 
about instances where the management of gaps forestalled significant patient harm 
was especially cathartic and healing. The nature of nurses’ emotional response and 
need for emotional support when harm is forestalled is an area for further 
consideration.   
6.7 Key recommendations 
On the basis of the findings of this study, it is recommended that further research and 
scholarly inquiry is conducted to investigate: 
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x the skills of nurses in systematic, head-to-toe and ‘hands on’ assessment; 
x the perceptions and understandings of nurses about the role and importance of 
patient assessment and observation;  
x the system factors that augment and subvert patient observation and 
assessment; 
x the relationship between existing models of nursing care delivery in 
Australian hospital settings, gaps and patient safety; 
x the concept of ‘mental checklists’ and how nurses devise these checklists;  
x how these checklists might be transferred to novice and inexperienced nurses; 
x the phenomenon of priming in the nursing management of gaps and the 
relationship between priming and patient safety; 
x the attributes of attentive observation and critical curiosity in nurses and the 
relationship between these attributes, the management of gaps and patient 
safety; 
x how assertive communication might be promoted in younger and less 
experienced nurses; 
x the concept of ‘short cuts’, the ‘short cuts’ taken by nurses and the rationale 
for nurses taking ‘short cuts’; 
x the relationship between ‘short cuts’ and patient safety; 
x the formal learning opportunities available to Australian nurses in clinical 
risk management and patient safety; and 
x the nature of nurses’ emotional response and their need for support when 
harm is forestalled and patient safety is maintained.  
6.8 Conclusion 
In this, the final chapter of this thesis, conclusions have been drawn and 
recommendations made on the basis of the findings of this study and the discussion 
advanced in Chapter five. These recommendations have encompassed the research 
and inquiry needed to enhance the role of nurses in the management of gaps and 
creation of safety in hospital contexts.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PATIENT SAFETY AND GAPS MANAGEMENT BY REGISTERED 
NURSES 
BROAD INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Tell me a little bit about your nursing career and your current work environment 
and role. 
2. Have you had an opportunity to attend any education sessions around patient 
safety and clinical risk management? 
3. Describe for me what you understand by the terms adverse event and harm. 
4. Have you been involved in a situation where a patient has suffered an adverse 
event?  
- Can you describe it for me? 
- Can you think of where things went wrong? 
- What do you think happened? 
- What alerted you to the event? 
- How did you respond? 
- How did you feel at the time?  
5. Describe for me what you understand by the terms ‘discontinuities’ or ‘gaps’. 
6. Can you describe for me some of the ‘discontinuities’ or ‘gaps’ that you 
commonly encounter in your current work environment and role? 
- What, if anything, particularly stands out about these ‘discontinuities’ or 
‘gaps’? 
- What alerts you to the presence of these gaps? 
- How do you respond to these gaps? 
- How do you feel? 
- Why do you feel that way? 
- What makes you feel that way 
- Do you go to your practice anticipating/expecting that gap, or is it a case of 
it happening and you responding? 
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9. Tell me about your best experience of responding to a gap. 
- What alerted you to the presence of this gap? 
- How did you respond to the situation? 
- How did you feel at the time? 
- What, if anything, particularly stood out about this ‘discontinuity’ or ‘gap’? 
10. Tell me about your worst experience of responding to a gap. 
- What alerted you to the presence of this gap? 
- How did you respond to the situation? 
- How did you feel at the time? 
- What, if anything, particularly stood out about this ‘discontinuity’ or ‘gap’? 
- With the wisdom of hindsight would you have dealt with this differently? 
11. What do you understand by the term ‘cutting corners’? 
- Do you think that staff cut corners? 
- What corners do they cut? 
- How do they decide which corners to cut? 
- What are the implications? 
12. How do you think nurses can best help themselves in managing gaps in clinical 
practice? 
13. Describe the kind of relationships you have developed with co-workers in 
managing gaps.  
14. What processes do you believe are best suited to promoting safety and quality in 
nursing and health care settings? 
15. Is there anything in your own background or life experience that you think has 
influenced your capacity to manage gaps? 
16. Any other comments. Can I return to you at a later date if I have any further 
queries?
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APPENDIX 2 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
PROJECT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
Project Title: 
Patient safety and gaps (discontinuities of care) management by registered nurses 
 
Investigators: 
Ms Angela Jones (PhD student, School of Nursing, Deakin University, amj@deakin.edu.au) 
Professor Megan-Jane Johnstone (Principal Supervisor, Professor of Nursing, School of 
Nursing, Deakin University, megan.johnstone@deakin.edu.au, 92446159) 
Professor Maxine Duke, (Associate Supervisor, Head, School of Nursing, Deakin University, 
maxine.duke@deakin.edu.au) 
 
 
Dear 
 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Deakin University. 
This information sheet describes the project in straightforward language, or ‘plain English’. 
Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before 
deciding whether to participate.  If you have any questions about the project, please ask one 
of the investigators.   
 
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted? 
 
The researcher in this project is Angela Jones. This project is being conducted as part of a 
PhD degree and will be supervised by Professor Megan-Jane Johnstone and Professor 
Maxine Duke of Deakin University. The project has been approved by the Deakin University 
Human Research Ethics Committee. This project is being conducted to understand how 
nurses positively influence patient safety outcomes by bridging gaps in patient care. Little is 
known about how nurses anticipate, detect and then bridge gaps in clinical practice so as to 
prevent adverse events and harm to patients. An important aim of this study is to redress this 
oversight.  
 
Why have you been approached? 
 
You have been approached with this invitation because you are working as a nurse in a 
clinical setting relevant to the study and have indicated that you are interested in 
participating.  
 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed? 
 
Research studies conducted since the early 1990s in the USA, the United Kingdom, Canada 
and Australia have found that a significant number of  hospital patients suffer some kind of 
harm during their admission due to human error and/or an adverse event. In approximately 
50 percent of cases these harms could have been prevented and were therefore 
‘preventable adverse events’. There is a need to find out what went ‘wrong’ by looking at the 
‘root causes’ of preventable adverse events. However, it is also true that many more people 
have not been injured in health care, and that this too is worthy of investigation. In short, we 
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need to focus on safety successes and find out what went ‘right’. This study aims to generate 
knowledge about the creative ways in which nurses manage gaps in clinical practice and 
avert harm to patients.  
 
Gaps, or discontinuities in patient care, may appear as losses of information, momentum or 
interruptions in the delivery of care. In health care, the complex combination of processes, 
technologies and human interaction produces many gaps between providers, stages and 
processes. However, little is known about how nurses anticipate, detect and bridge gaps in 
clinical practice so as to prevent adverse events and the harm that may occur as a 
consequence.  
 
The questions being addressed are: 
 
What are the gaps that are commonly anticipated, detected and bridged by nurses? 
How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge gaps that are familiar to them? 
How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge new and unfamiliar gaps? 
How do nurses anticipate, detect and bridge familiar gaps whose characteristics have 
changed? 
How do nurses bridge gaps once detected? 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do? 
 
If you agree to participate in this project you will be required to complete a consent form and 
demographic questionnaire and return it to me in an addressed, stamped envelope or by e-
mail. You will also be required to participate in a semi-structured interview where you will be 
asked to talk about your clinical experiences of rescuing patients from harm or an adverse 
event.  
 
You will be able to choose between face to face and e-mail interviewing. The face to face 
interviews will involve 1-2 interviews of approximately 1-1.5 hours each.  These interviews 
will be audio taped and conducted in a location and at a time that is convenient to you. The 
e-mail interviews will consist of regular exchanges between you and the researcher over a 
period of weeks to months. You will need regular access to the internet and your own email 
address to participate in this type of interview. The researcher will provide clear instructions 
about how to complete the interview and you will be encouraged to write in a conversational 
style. You can participate at a time that is convenient to you. There are no incorrect answers 
and you will be encouraged to include as much detail as possible in your responses. 
Symbols can be used to communicate emotions and there is no need to correct spelling and 
grammatical errors.  
 
What are the risks or disadvantages associated with participation? 
 
There are no risks outside normal day-to-day activities associated with participation in this 
study. If you are unduly concerned about your responses to any of the questionnaire items or 
if you find participation in the project distressing, you should contact Professor Megan-Jane 
Johnstone as soon as convenient. Professor Johnstone will discuss your concerns with you 
confidentially and suggest appropriate follow-up, if necessary. 
 
What are the benefits associated with participation? 
 
It is acknowledged that there may be no immediate benefits to you; nevertheless your input 
would make a valuable contribution to the area of patient safety and discipline of nursing.  
 
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
 
Your responses will be kept strictly confidential and your anonymity assured by the following 
processes: demographic questionnaires and envelopes will not have any personally 
identifying codes or markings on them; any identifying information contained in data will be 
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seen only by the researcher before it is removed; the information collected will be presented 
in such a manner that it is not possible to identify participants or their workplaces. Any 
information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others from 
harm, (2) a court order is produced, or (3) you provide the researchers with written 
permission. The face to face interviews will be audio taped and erased once they have been 
transcribed. The findings of this study will be published in professional nursing journals and 
conference papers but will contain no personally identifying information. The research data 
will be kept securely at Deakin University for a period of 5 years before being destroyed.   
 
What are my rights as a participant? 
 
You are under no obligation to participate in this study. Your decision to participate is entirely 
voluntary.  Should you decide to take part and then change your mind, at any stage of the 
study, even after the information has been collected, you are still free to do so without giving 
a reason and without prejudice. You are entitled to have any unprocessed data withdrawn 
and destroyed, provided it can be reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not 
increase the risk for the participant. Any questions that you may have will be answered at 
any time. 
 
Whom should I contact if I have any questions? 
 
In the first instance please contact me if you have any general questions or concerns. I can 
be reached via e-mail at amj@deakin.edu.au or by telephone during work hours on 0450 781 
606. My principal supervisor is Professor Megan-Jane Johnstone, School of Nursing, Deakin 
University and she can be contacted by e-mail at megan.johnstone@deakin.edu.au or by 
telephoning 03 92446159. 
 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or 
any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact:   
 
The Executive Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Deakin University, 221 Burwood 
Highway, Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7123, Facsimile: 9244 6581; research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au. 
 
Please quote project number EC 153 -2008. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Angela Jones 
RN, BEd, Grad. Dip. Neurosciences, MNg 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Prescribed Consent Form For Persons Participating In Research 
Projects Involving Interviews, Questionnaires or Disclosure of 
Personal Information 
 
 
Faculty Health, Medicine, Nursing & Behavioural Sciences 
School of Nursing 
Name of participant:  
Project Title: Patient safety and gaps (discontinuities of care) management by 
registered nurses 
  
Name(s) of investigators:     (1) Angela Jones Phone: 0450 781606 
 (2)Prof. Megan-Jane Johnstone Phone: 9244 6120 
 (3) Professor Maxine Duke Phone:   
 
1. I have received a statement explaining the interview/questionnaire involved in this project. 
 
2. I consent to participate in the above project, the particulars of which - including details of the 
interviews or questionnaires - have been explained to me. 
 
3. I authorise the investigator or his or her assistant to interview me or administer a 
questionnaire. 
 
4. I acknowledge that: 
 
(a) Having read Plain Language Statement, I agree to the general purpose, methods and 
demands of the study. 
(b) I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time and to 
withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied. 
(c) The project is for the purpose of research and/or teaching. It may not be of direct 
benefit to me. 
(d) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and only 
disclosed where I have consented to the disclosure or as required by law.   
(e) The security of the research data is assured during and after completion of the study.  
The data collected during the study may be published, and a report of the project 
outcomes will be provided to_____________ (researcher to specify).   Any information 
which will identify me will not be used. 
 
 
 
Participant’s Consent 
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Participant:  Date:  
(Signature) 
 
Witness:  Date:  
(Signature) 
 
 
Participants should be given a photocopy of this consent form after it has been signed. 
 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or any 
questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact:   
 
The Executive Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, 
Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7123, Facsimile: 9244 6581; research-ethics@deakin.edu.au. 
 
Please quote project number EC 153 -2008. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Participant Identification Code (PIC) _______________  
 
Please tick the appropriate box. 
 
1. Age   
  
20 – 25     46 – 50  
  
26 – 30     51 – 55  
  
31 – 35     56 – 60  
  
36 – 40     61 – 65  
  
41 – 45     65 – 70   
 
   
2. Gender   
 
Male      Female   
 
 
3. In which State/Territory are you currently working? 
 
WA      NT      QLD      NSW     
 
ACT      VIC      TAS    SA   
 
 
 
4. Which clinical area are you currently working in? 
 
Emergency Department   Operating Room   
  
Intensive Care/Critical Care   Rehabilitation    
  
Neurosurgery    Transitional care   
 
Neurology    
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Paediatrics     Adults     
 
   
 
5. What type of organisation do you work in? 
  
Public hospital    Private hospital   
 
Community/primary health care  Other: ________________  
 
 
6. What is your current role? 
 
Ward nurse    Associate nursing unit manager  
 
Nursing unit manager  Nurse educator    
 
Clinical nurse specialist  Clinical nurse consultant   
 
Other: ________________  
 
 
 
7.  Please provide details of your qualifications: 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________
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